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A. My understanding was that the department head
would review and approve all expenditures and then the
city administrator -- well, not all. There was -- and I
don't remember the dollar amount. Yeah, the department
head would approve all expenditures, but they had
discretion, up to some dollar amount. I don't remember
exactly what it was.
And then there was a secondary approval, which
was the city administrator. And for expenditures -- and
this was part of the policy over -- I don't remember the
dollar amount, $1000 or something, it required a city
council member's approval.
And we were assigned and rotated through which
city council members actually approved those
expenditures. We reviewed the invoices for those
amounts.
Actually, we reviewed all the invoices. They
didn't all require our initials, but they were all part
of a packet that was provided once a month for rotating
city council members to review.
Q. In addition to the rotating city council member
who would review all of the invoices for city
expenditures, was the city council also presented with a
packet of expenditures at city council meetings?
A. No, not that I recall.
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Q. The review of the statements, that took place
outside of the meeting?
A. Yes.
Q. But the approval of the payment took place in the
meeting?
A. I believe it did, because that was a regulatory
requirement.
Q. While you were sitting as a city council member,
do you recall whether there was ever any policy about
the non-disclosure of executive session ongoing?
A. Yes, there was.
Q. Do you recall what that policy was? And not word
for word, just generally speaking.
A. I believe it was just a policy about not
revealing what was discussed in executive session.
Q. Was there ever a period of time that you can
recall where your fellow city council members were up
for review for disclosing information that was disclosed
in an executive session?
A. Yes, I believe there was.
Q. Was the policy implemented before or after that
event?
A. After.
Q. And was the policy put in place because of that
event?
Page 13
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Q. Do you recall who would prepare the packets of
expenditures for the city council member's review?
A. The city treasurer.
Q. Was there a period of time that you recall, while
sitting as a city council member, where approval was
given for a payment of credit card bills in advance?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
I can just object for the record. If you
if you need him to clarify the question, you can ask him
to clarify the question.
A. Just repeat the question, again, please.
Q. Do you recall at any time, while you were sitting
as the city council member, a period of time when the
city council was asked to approve the city credit card
bills in advance, so that the bills could be paid in a
timely manner?
A. Oh, yes. Because we actually had -- the council
had to act on the actual payment, yes, yes.
Well, I can't say -- I think possibly, I can't
remember exactly. Possibly.
That was sort of a -- it was one of the
administrative functions that we did. At council
meetings we weren't reviewing them, so it was just a
sort of a perfunctory vote that it happened. The review
took place outside of the council meeting.
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A. I wouldn't be able to answer that. I don't know.
Q. Was it -- do you recall whether the policy was
3 put in place because the city council wanted to make
4 absolutely clear that everybody on the council
5 understood that what took place in executive session was
6 not to be disclosed at the session?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
7
A. Yes, I believe that that's the case.
8
Q. Do you recall learning of allegations of misuse
9
10 of public funds by Ms. Hammer?
A. Would you repeat the question, please?
11
Q. Sure. Do you recall, while you were sitting as a
12
13 city council member, any allegations being brought to
14 light about Ms. Hammer's alleged misuse of public funds?
15
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall when you first learned that?
16
A. I believe it was over the weekend of November
17
18 11th, 12th.
Q. Of201I?
19
A. Yes.
20
Q. Do you recall how it is that you came to learn of
21
22 those allegations?
A. I don't recall who I learned about them from
23
24 first. I think it was from Adam King, but then also
25 from Mayor Willich.
1
2
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Q. Do you recall, did they phone you, did they email
you?
A. I got telephone calls, telephone calls. I may
have gotten an email to call, but through telephone
calls.
Q. Were you out of town when you received the call?
A. I was back in town. I was in town.
Q. Did you ever get a voicemail from Nils Ribi about
a special executive session that was being called on
November 11, 2011?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
A. I believe I did get a call, a message. It may
have been -- yes, l believe I did get a message.
Q. Do you recall what Mr. Ribi stated on the
message?
A. All I recall is that it was about an executive
session and I provided my availability.
Q. You returned his phone call?
A. Either that or I emailed. I don't recall which.
Q. Did they wait for you to return back to town
before holding their executive session?
A. No.
Q. Do you know why?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever ask why they did not want -- why
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A. Well, I believe he explained that she had
listened, Miss Hammer had listened to the police officer
relaying -- listened by phone to the police officer
relaying that there was an executive session, discussing
Ms. Hammer's termination.
Q. Did Mr. King -- did he ask that Miss Hammer put
the police officer up to listening into the session?
A. No.
Q. Did Mr. King elaborate upon how the immediate
dismissal was going to -- Miss Hammer's employment was
proposed to take place?
A. Yes.
Q. What did he share with you?
A. That Mr. Willich -- Mayor Willich was instructed
to provide a severance pay offer to her and request her
resignation.
Q. Who instructed Mayor Willich to deliver the
severance and demand for resignation?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. To the
extent you're asking -- and foundation -- if you're
asking her for an incident that did not happen where she
was present, if you're asking if she was told and by
whom, then lay that foundation.
Q. Miss Lamb, I'm just asking for your understanding
of -- do you recall -- do you have an understanding of
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they did not wait for you to return?
A. I believe I may have asked Mayor Willich.
Q. Did you get an explanation?
A. Yes.
Q. What was the explanation?
A. That Nils had information that he wanted the
council to be aware of and did not want to wait.
Q. When you did return to town and you had a phone
call with Adam King, what did Mr. King share with you?
A. Mr. King stated that the acts that Ms. Hammer
committed were so egregious that it called for her
immediate dismissal.
Q. Did you ask what the acts or the alleged acts
were?
A. Yes.
Q. What was that? What was his explanation?
A. What was I told?
Q. Yes.
A. About expense account irregularities and also
about the overhearing of the executive session by one of
the police officers that was relayed then to Miss Hammer
by telephone.
Q. Did Mr. King suggest to you that Ms. Hammer had
any involvement in the police officer overhearing the
executive session?
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who instructed Mayor Willich to deliver the demand for
resignation and the offer of severance?
MR. NAYLOR: Same objection.
A. I was told by Mayor Willich that Nils Ribi, with
the support of Wayne Briscoe and Bob Youngman told Mayor
Willich that he had to confront Ms. Hammer and ask for
her resignation and that Adam King supported that.
Q. What else did Mayor Willich share with you during
your phone call upon return back to the valley?
A. That's a pretty open ended question. Well, can
you be more specific?
Q. Sure. Adam King shared with you that Miss Hammer
engaged in egregious acts and the acts required her
immediate dismissal.
Did Wayne Willich share with you -- Mayor Willich
share with you a similar opinion?
A. He shared with me that he did not share that
opinion, but had no choice because he was outvoted.
Q. Did he share with you that he did not believe
that Miss Hammer had done anything wrong?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
A. I'm trying to recall exactly how he phrased -- I
believe he said that there were some expense accounts
discrepancies that needed to be investigated that he -that there was concern about the use of city vehicles
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and he was adamant that that had been approved by him,
1
and he had also communicated that to the city council
2
3 members on many occasions.
3
4
And with respect to the overhearing of the
4
s executive session, he stated that it was virtually
5
6
impossible not to overhear an executive session,
6
7
especially if you were up in the officers' quarters,
7
8
because you could just hear everything that went on in
8
9
the council chambers without trying.
9
10
Q. Did either Mayor Willich or Adam King share with 10
11 you anything about discussions regarding the amount of 11
12 severance offered to Miss Hammer?
12
13
A. I believe Mayor Willich did, but I don't remember
13
14 the amount.
14
1s
Q. Did he share with you who was -- who came up with 15
16 the amount?
16
17
A. I believe he said the three council members did.
17
18 And actually, I believe it was -- I believe it was
18
19 something like three months severance.
19
20
Q. Did he indicate whether he had any involvement in
20
21 coming up with the severance amount in connection with 21
22 Mr. Ribi, Briscoe and Youngman?
22
23
A. My recollection is he did not agree with the
23
24 amount.
24
25
Q. Adam King did not agree with?
25
1

2
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A. Yes.
MR. SWARTZ: Mary, if you could provide Ms.
Lamb the notebook. And Ms. Lamb, I'll have you tum to
Tab No. 3.
MR. NAYLOR: 3?
MR. SWARTZ: Correct.
A. Okay.
Q. Let's see, under Tab 3, a letter dated November
12, 2011. Please first just confirm that you got that
letter.
A. SH-TIMELINE and then it's got five O's and an 8?
Q. Correct. And you see at the bottom of that Page
12, there's a cc, which includes J. Lamb.
A. Yes.
Q. Take just a moment to review that letter and let
me know when you're done, okay?
My question will be just generally whether you
recognize it.
MR. NAYLOR: Eric, you're either stepping
away from your phone or not talking directly into it
anymore and you're really hard to hear.
A. Okay. I've read it. And yes, I am familiar with
it.
Q. Did you read a copy of that letter upon your
return to Sun Valley?
Page 21
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1
A. Oh, no, that Mr. Willich didn't. Why don't you
2
rephrase that question.
Q. Sure. Did you come to know whether Adam King had 3
4
an opinion on the amount?
5
A. No.
6
Q. Did Mayor Willich or Adam King relay to you that
1
there were discussions about -- discussions of Miss
8
Hammer's conduct being criminal in nature?
9
A. Yes.
10
Q. Did either Mayor Willich or -- well, let me ask
this first. Who shared that with you? Mayor Willich or 11
12
Adam King?
13
A. Adam King.
Q. Did Mr. King share with you whether Mr. Ribi, Mr. 14
Youngman or Mr. Briscoe was in line with the belief that 15
16
her conduct was criminal in nature?
11
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
10
A. I don't recall.
Q. Upon your return to Sun Valley, were you provided 19
with any materials in advance of the November 14, 2011 20
21
city council meeting and executive session, do you
22
recall?
23
A. I don't recall any.
24
Q. Do you recall seeing any letters from Mr. Donoval
25
on behalfofMs. Hammer?

'.\-!in-l-Sctipt".lt

A. Yes.
Q. Did you read it at that time?
A. Yes.
Q. There is a second letter behind that one that
you've reviewed, dated November 12, 2011. And it's
addressed to Mayor Willich.
And again, my question would be whether you
recognize it. And if you don't mind taking a brief look
at that as well.
A. Okay.
Okay. I've read it and I don't recall seeing
this letter.
Q. Okay. Let's go back to -- actually, you did
attend a November 2011 city council meeting; is that
correct?
MR. NAYLOR: November what?
MR. SWARTZ: November 14,201 l.
A. Yes.
Q. That was your first meeting upon your return to
Sun Valley?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall what took place there?
MR. NAYLOR: Well, answer his question. I
just pointed her to the minutes, but -A. That's November 11th.
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MR. NAYLOR: Do you recall? Just tell him
1 that Ms. Hammer felt like Miss (sic) Ribi's conduct
what you recall.
2 toward her was inappropriate?
A. Of November 14th?
3
A. Yes.
Q. Correct.
4
Q. That she believed his conduct was in violation of
A. You know, I have to read the agenda or have
5 the city's harassment laws?
specific questions asked to be able to tell you what I
6
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
recall.
7
A. Yes.
Q. I asked specifically about the executive session,
8
Q. Have you ever witnessed Mr. Ribi engage in
not the public portion of the meeting, okay? So we have
9 conduct toward Ms. Hammer that you felt was
the same understanding?
10 inappropriate?
A. Yes.
11
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
Q. Was there any discussion of what transpired,
12 Foundation.
following the November 11th executive session in the
A. Yes.
13
instruction to Mayor Willich to demand the resignation
14
Q. Can you recall what it -- the type of behavior
and the offer of severance?
15 that you observed was?
A. What I remember mostly was just a discussion
16
A. It was a raised voice to the extent you could
17 call it yelling, reprimand about either opinion or
about how to move forward in terms of determining
whether the allegations were correct or not.
18 actions that she had taken. I can remember some of that
Q. Was there, if you can recall, did anyone voice a
19 in council meetings and then some in the hallway, out in
dissent to wanting to investigate and wanting to -- take
20 the hallway during council meetings, where he disagreed
action on the information that was being presented.
21 with an opinion she'd expressed.
A. Would you repeat that? You just you cut out just
22
Q. Did you did you believe that his conduct toward
23 her violated the city's harassment policy?
a little bit.
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
Q. Yeah. You said that there was discussions about
24
wanting to look into whether the allegations were true.
25 Foundation.
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And my question to you is, did anyone voice an
objection to wanting to investigate any of the
allegations, but instead just rely upon the information
that had been presented?
A. I don't recall that.
Q. Do you recall anybody being opposed to
investigating the allegations?
A. No. There may have been, but I don't recall any.
Q. Do you recall any discussions about Miss Hammer's
conduct being criminal in nature during the November
14th executive session?
A. I don't recall it in that session. I recall the
discussion, I believe, with Adam King and also
separately with Wayne Willich, but I don't believe those
discussions were in this meeting.
Q. Do you recall any discussions during the November
14th executive session about Ms. Hammer's allegations
against Nils Ribi and his conduct toward her?
A. I don't recall those. It's hard for me to say
whether I recall a discussion, whether they were in that
session or an independent phone call with Wayne, with
Mayor Willich. I'm not sure. I think they were in the
independent phone call. I remember a -- definitely
remember a discussion about it.
Q. A discussion regarding her allegation? Was it

\!in-!.. -Script'.\r
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A. I believed that it was inappropriate for anyone,
either a public official, employee. It was
inappropriate behavior.
Q. Did you observe that Mr. Ribi's conduct toward
Ms. Hammer was different than his conduct toward city
council members?
A. No. I'd have to say no, he showed that behavior
numerous times with the mayor.
Q. Was his conduct toward women different than it
was toward men, as far as you could observe?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
A. I can't say that it was, but it's different when
you're an employee than when you're an equal.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. Well, if someone is exerting -- using their -- if
they're in a position of potential power relative to
your employment, if they're being abusive verbally, it
takes a different -- carries a different weight than if
it's someone who is of equal stature position or above.
Q. Did you feel like Mr. Ribi's conduct toward you
was the same as conduct toward the male city council
members?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
A. He was much more deferential to the other male
council members, to the male council members, yes.

M & M Court Reporting Sen-ice, Inc.
(208)345-9611(pb) (800)234-9611 (208)-345-SSOO(fax)

(6) Pages 22 - 25
1362

Joan Lamb
June 10, 2014

Hammerv.
City of Sun Valley
Page26

1
2
3
4

s
6

7

a
9

10
11
12

13
14

1s
16
17
18
19
2o
21

22
23
24

25

Q. Do you recall whether Mr. Donoval's letter that
was received to all the city council members and two
incoming city council members was discussed during the
2014 executive session?
A. I'm sorry. Would you say that again? Repeat the
question.
Q. Yeah. The letters from Mr. Donoval, dated
November 12, 201 l, under Tab 3 that you testified you
received a copy of before the November 14, 2011 meeting,
was that letter discussed in the executive session at
the November 14, 2011 meeting?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall the discussion surrounding the
second topic in that letter which is on SH-TIMELINE 9,
retribution for Ms. Hammer's reporting of his own
abusive behavior and harassment?
A. What was question about that?
Q. Do you recall what the discussion was regarding
that topic?
MR. NAYLOR: I'm going to object to the
extent it calls for legal advice, attorney-client
privilege, work-product related.
And let me just put you on mute for just a
second and find out if there he is any substance to
that.

Page28
1

2
3
4
5

6
7
8

9

10

11
12

13
14
15
16
11
18
19
20
21

22
23

24
25

affiliated with Holly Troxell, and they had previously
been the city attorney for the city, we went to them for
an employment labor relation specialist to advise us.
And we -- excuse me. We agreed to look for someone to
handle the expense account allegations.
And I contacted my contacts at Perkins Coie. We
got one of their specialists in this area to contact
Mayor Willich.
Q. Was there a particular reason why you were
suggesting Perkins Coie?
A. I had done a lot of work in a prior career with
them and I thought it would be advisable to have someone
with -- certainly not located in the Wood River Valley,
totally independent, third-party take a look at the
allegations.
And it turned out that they actually had someone
in their Boise office who had experience in this area.
Q. In your experience with Perkins Coie, did you
understand that it was a law firm?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you seeking their investigative work in the
expense allegation specifically for legal purposes or
was it just a fact finding investigation?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
A. State the question again, please.

Page27

(Discussion off the record.)
MR. NAYLOR: Okay. Maybe Mary can just read
3
the pending question.
4
(Record read.)
5
A. What I recall is that we spent time needing to
6
hire a professional who could advise us on sexual
7
harassment and employee relations, because none ofus
8
had the expertise to deal with that.
9
Q. Was there any discussion about hiring a
10 professional regarding the allegations against Miss
11 Hammer?
12
MR. NAYLOR: Objection. A professional
13 what?
14
MR. SWARTZ: Just using Miss Lamb's phrase.
15
A. Well, there was a discussion about hiring
16 professionals who investigate the vacation and expense
1 7 account misuse allegations, so there was two.
18
There was a professional to help us investigate
19 the allegations related to expenses and then also to
20 handle the sexual harassment allegations.
21
Q. Now, ultimately were there two professionals that
22 the city council decided hire?
23
A. Yes.
24
Q. And who were those professionals?
2s
A. We-- since Adam King was affiliated and had been
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Q. Were you using Perkins -- were you suggesting the
use of Perkins Coie because you - you were seeking them
to provide legal services or were you seeking a
professional to do a fact finding investigation?
A. Seeking professionals to do what I believe was
called a forensic audit, the fact finding mission of
wrongdoing.
Q. By Ms. Hammer?
A. Yes.
Q. Was there any discussion about needing a
professional to do that fact finding mission because of
litigation or the threat oflitigation?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
A. Yes, I believe there was because of the -Q. Do you recall who discussed that?
A. No, I don't.
Q. Was there a discussion about the -- during -again, during this November 14, 2011 executive session,
were there discussions about the city being concerned
about being sued by Ms. Hammer?
A. I don't recall when exactly those discussions
happened. But I know that certainly -- and I believe
others from the very beginning were concerned about
handling this properly to protect the city from
litigation.
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Q. Do you recall what you believed Ms. Hammer might
sue the city for?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. You're
just asking for her own thoughts, not what attorneys
told her?
MR. SWARTZ: That's what I'm asking.
A. Well, I think, as I recall, the two issues that
seemed to be a concern were wrongful termination in some
fashion and sexual harassment allegations that had been
made. Not sexual harassment. excuse me,just
harassment.
Q. Do you recall any discussion during the November
14, 2011 executive session about Nils Ribi abstaining
from any discussions regarding the allegation against
Ms. Hammer in light of Ms. Hammer's allegations against
Mr. Ribi?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Turning back to Mr. Donoval's November 12th
letter, the first topic was entitled, Ms. Hammer was
granted flexible personal time, was authorized to use a
City of Sun Valley vehicle. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. It was there any dispute during the November 14,
2011 executive session regarding the statement that Ms.
Hammer was granted flexible personal time and was
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Q. Nonetheless, he was the proponent?
A. Yes.
Q. Any other proponents?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Please turn the page to SH-TIMELINE IO and you'll
see a subject line: Sun Valley City Attorney Adam King
should be barred from further participation?
A. And can I just comment on that. I can't actually
recall if I heard that in the meeting or I heard that
afterwards from Mayor Willich.
But I do recall being told that. I do recall Mr.
Ribi being the one who wanted the investigation.
Q. Into Miss Hammer's flex time and use of the
vehicle?
A. Yes. I'm sorry. You want me to go to Page IO?
MR. NAYLOR: Next page.
A. Okay.
Q. And specifically, the section on stating that
Adam King should be barred from further participation.
Did you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Was there any discussion that you can recall
about that in the November 14, 2011 executive session?
A. Not that I can say happened, that I heard in that
meeting, no.
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authorized to use the City of Sun Valley vehicle?
MR. NAYLOR: Did you say whether there was
3 any discussion or whether there was any dispute?
MR. SWARTZ: Dispute.
4
s Q. Did anyone disagree with what Mr. Donoval was
6 stating in that first topic?
7
A. I don't believe so, because we had all been
8 informed in the city council meetings about this.
Q. In light of the lack of dispute on that topic,
9
10 why was there a need to investigate Ms. Hammer's use of
11 personal flexible time and the use of the City of Sun
12 Valley vehicle?
A. At that time, I didn't know of any reason.
13
Q. Do you recall who on the city council found that
14
15 there was a reason to investigate these matters despite
16 the fact that there was no disagreement over her ability
17 to use flex time and the vehicle?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
18
19
A. Mr. Ribi.
Q. When you identify Mr. Ribi as being a proponent
20
21 of investigating these matters, despite the fact that
22 they were not being disputed, was it that he was vocal
23 about needing to investigate them or vocal about wanting
24 to investigate them; do you recall?
A. No.
25
1
2
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Q. How about any discussion at all?
A. I wasn't able to hear everything that happened in
that meeting.
Q. You were not?
A. Yeah. I -- my recollections relate to the
discussions about needing to hire the professionals.
Those, I quite clearly remember. The rest of it, I'm
not I'm as clear about.
I had a -- there was a conversation with Mayor
Willich I had about Adam King and his -- the
appropriateness of whether he participate further or
not. and I do remember that.
Q. And do you recall what the outcome of your
discussion with Mayor Willich about that topic was?
A. Mayor Willich had told me that there had been
ongoing problems between Ms. Hammer and Mr. King because

she was taking on more and more of his work and he
wasn't happy with that because she was -- she is also an
attorney.
Q. Did you or Mr. Willich, to your knowledge, go on
and discuss that with any of the city council members or
Mr. King?
A. I think Mr. Willich brought that up in front of
the entire council, but I'm not certain about that or
when it happened.

M & M Court Reporting Service, Inc.
(208)345-9611 (ph) (800)234-9611 (208)-345-SSOO(fax)

(8) Pages 30 - 33
1364

Joan Lamb
June 10, 2014

Hammerv.

City of Sun Valley

Page36

Page 34

1
2

3
4

s
6
7

s
9

10
11
12
13
14

1.s
16

17

1.s
19
2o

21
22

23

24
2s

1
subjects to your fellow city council members?
Q. Do you recall how the discussion transpired?
2
A. I can't be certain about that, whether I did that
A. I recall us having this discussion in Mr.
3
in
that meeting or if it was just in the conversation
Willich's office.
4
with
Mayor Willich.
Q. And then later with the entire city council?
5
Q. Did you find it important to keep the
A. I couldn't say if later or before. I'm foggier
6
investigation into the allegation against Ms. Hammer
on that. It seemed to me that actually may have
7 confidential?
happened quite a bit earlier in just sort of general
conversation with the council about how Miss Hammer -- s A. Yes. State the question again. Did I find it
that it was a good thing that Miss Hammer was taking on 9 important to keep it confidential?
more of the regular contract business and so forth, so
10
Q. Yes.
11
A. Yes.
that there was less expense to the city.
And I believe that happened in a much earlier
12
Q. Was there any discussion about the importance in
city council meeting.
13
keeping confidential the investigation into the
14 allegations against Miss Hammer with the city council
Q. As far as you can recall, some of the city
council members found this to be a bad thing?
15 members in the November 14,201 I executive session?
A. Right, because it was presented as a good thing
16
A. I don't recall.
in terms of saving the city and tax payers money.
17
Q. Do you recall any discussion with city council
Q. Moving on down to the next section identified in
1s members at any time regarding Ms. Hammer's reputation
Mr. Donoval's letter. And specifically, his request
19 and what the allegations being made against her would do
that Miss Hammer be presented with the entirety of the
20 to her reputation?
allegations being made against her and having the
21
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
opportunity to the express those, do you recall whether
22
A. I don't recall that from the city council
that was discussed during the November 14th 2011
23
meeting.
executive session?
24
Q. And not just the November 14, 2011 meeting. I'm
A. I'm sorry where exactly are you?
25 just asking about any time.
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Q. In the city of Sun Valley has a well established
1
A. I don't recall other conversations with other
policy on employee discipline section on Page 10.
2 city council members. I believe that Mayor Willich and
A. Mm-hmm.
3
I discussed that.
Q. And it goes over to Page 11.
4
Q. You've alluded to, several times, that you're
A. I remember a discussion with Adam King about
s having discussions with Mayor Willich that were separate
this, but I don't believe it was in that executive
6
from the city council. And I'm just sensing kind of a
session.
7
divide between you and Mayor Willich being in one camp
And not about the policies in place and all of
s and Mr. Ribi, Briscoe and Youngman being in another
that, not about that, but about the misconduct.
9
camp.
Q. Do you recall any discussion, then, about whether
10
Was there something along those lines going on
or not to allow Ms. Hammer to respond to the allegations 11 regarding the allegations being made against Miss
being made against her?
12 Hammer?
A. I remember a discussion -- again, whether it
13
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
happened in that meeting or not, I couldn't say for
14
A. I think one could make that conclusion.
sure. But a discussion about how it was necessary to do 1s Q. Is that a feeling that you had?
the investigation and then allow Ms. Hammer a chance to 16 A. Mayor Willich and I were -- had both lost our
respond. That may have been a discussion I had
17
reelections, so there seemed to be a momentum by those
separately with the mayor.
18
who were still in office and had one reelection to move
Q. Did you feel like it was important for Ms. Hammer
19 forward, according to their agenda.
to be aware of allegations being made against her?
20
Q. Did you think the agenda included terminating
A. Absolutely.
21 Miss Hammer's employment as you understood it?
Q. Did you feel like it was important for Ms. Hammer
22
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
to have an opportunity to respond to those allegations?
23
Foundation.
24
A. It appeared that way since they took allegations,
A. Yes.
25 and as I was told, instructed Mr. Willich to take
Q. Did you convey your feelings on both of those
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immediate action to terminate Miss Hammer by having her
resign.
Q. Was there any discussions that you were part of
where terminating Ms. Hammer's employment by firing her
was discussed?
A. I recall the city attorney stating something to
7
that effect to me.
8
Q. That immediate action should be taken just to
9 terminate her employment, don't offer resignation, don't
10 go through an investigation, just terminate the
11 employment?
12
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form to the
13 extent it calls for legal advice and privileged. Let's
14 go ahead and take a-- go off the record for a minute.
15
(Discussion off the record.)
16
MR. NAYLOR: Okay, Eric, the question as
17 framed called for legal advice and I'll instruct Ms.
18 Lamb not to answer.
19
Q. Ms. Lamb, the statement that you previously
20 attributed to Mr. King, was that being made just to you
21 or to the city council at large?
22
A. We better repeat all of that, what the statement
23 was. Can we have that...
24
Q. Yes, yes. Mr. King discussed terminating, not
25 asking for resignation, but terminating Ms. Hammer's
1
2
3
4
5
6
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A. The mayor had requested that we go through him
with respect to questions that we had of the city
attorney years prior at the beginning of his term. He
sort of set that up as his preferred way of operating.
But my understanding had been that we as council
members could individually seek counsel from the city's
attorney. And I had on several occasions called with
questions.
And this case, Mr. King was just bringing me up
to date on things that I had missed in the executive
sessions.
Q. From the November 11,201 l executive session?
A. Well, and -- and it may have been information
that came out subsequent to that as well. I don't
actually recall when, during that week, we had this
conversation.
Q. Turning back to the November 14, 2011 meeting
date.
If you'll look under Tab 4 of your binder, and
the third page, specifically, that I'll have you take a
look at. The that page number on that one is 2070.
A. Okay.
Q. lfl understand the meeting minutes correctly,
you all came out of the executive session and amended
the agenda and hiring an independent investigation. ls
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employment?
MR NAYLOR: That's the question that was
posed as far as what the legal advice was. Why don't
you just restate.
MR. SWARTZ: We can back up on the record,
if you wish, but stated in response to the generalized
question whether anyone discussed terminating Ms.
Hammer's employment, she identified Mr. King as
discussing that.
My question to her now is whether that
discussion was with her individually or the city council
at large.
A. With me individually.
Q. Based on your experience as a city council
member, could a city council member act on their own or
is an act of a city council required to be done by
resolution and vote?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
Foundation.
A. Act on their own in what regard?
Q. Well, with the exception ofreviewing -- being
designated to review expenses on that monthly basis,
could a city council member, for example, go to -unless otherwise directed by the council, go to Adam
King and ask for legal advice?

\rt in-l-Script1!:
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that on the agenda? Sorry on the meeting minutes?
A. Yes.
Q. The independent investigation that was -- that
was to be conducted, was that into the allegations
against Miss Hammer or into the allegations against Mr.
Ribi by Ms. Hammer or both, if you recall?
A. I recall it to be the allegations against Ms.
Hammer.
Q. Do you recall what the plan of action was with
regard to the allegations by Ms. Hammer against Mr. Ribi
at the November 14, 2011 meeting?
A. No. I recall discussing hiring an employment
specialist, but I don't recall at what meeting that was.
Q. You stated earlier that in light of the fact that
there was no disagreement about Ms. Hammer's flex time
and use of the vehicle, that you didn't believe that
there was need for an investigation.
Do you recall that need for an investigation? Do
you recall that?
A. Yes, I recall that we were -- we council members
were aware that she had the use of the vehicle and flex
time. That was presented to us when she was initially
hired.
Q. Was there something else that you believed was
going to be investigated as part of this new agenda item
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at the November 14, 2011 meeting or were the allegations
regarding flex time and the vehicle, were those the
items that were going to be investigated?
A. Well, I recall being told that the city
treasurer, Michelle Frostensen, had said that there had
been discrepancies in terms of how expenses -- I guess,
it was mostly vacation time -- was handled.
So, so were these allegations being made that
needed to be resolved one way or the other to ascertain
whether they were appropriate or not appropriate.
Q. And that's what you understood the
investigation -- that's why you believe the
investigation was proceeding?
A. Yes, to take the allegations that the city
treasurer had made and determine whether there were,
indeed, infringements or if it was in the guidelines
that Mayor Willich had set out.
MR. SWARTZ: We've have been going for about
an hour and a half. Would now be an okay time to take a
break get up and stretch our legs?
(Discussion off the record.)
(Break taken.)
BY MR. SWARTZ:
Q. Ms. Lamb, I previously was asking about whether
there was any discussion regarding whether Mr. Ribi
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Miss Hammer's behalf while you were sitting as a city
council member?
MR. NAYLOR: That's a yes or no question.
A. No, pretty sure not. No. I think I remember
Mr. -- never mind.
Q. So your answer is no?
A. No.
Q. Your answer is no, correct?
A. Yes, my answer is a no.
Q. Your answer is no?
A. Yes, it is no.
Q. I'm with ya Let me have you turn back to the
binder and specifically, Tab 5, there's a November 15,
2011 letter SH-TIMELINE 000016 through 17, a letter by
Mr. Donoval, cc'ing all city council members as well as
incoming city council members.
Take a moment to review that. Let me know when
you're done. And again, my question will just be
whether you recognize it.
A. I can't say that I really recall this letter, but
that doesn't mean I didn't see it.
Q. Sure.
A. Yeah.
Q. Turn one more page, and it's an email from Mr.
Donoval to you and to Mayor Briscoe delivering what
Page45
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should abstain from discussions about Ms. Hammer in
light of the allegations that she was making against
him.
Along the same line to that question, I'll ask
whether there was any discussions about Mr. Ribi perhaps
needing to abstain from those discussions in light of
him being sued by Ms. Hammer. Do you recall anything
like that?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall any discussions about Mr. Ribi and
Mr. Donoval having made allegations about Mr. Ribi's
mental health?
A. Well, what was in that letter provided by the
letter sent by Mr. Donoval.
Q. Was that discussed at the November 14, 2011
meeting?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Were there any allegations of or any discussions
about Mr. Youngman not engaging in discussions about Ms.
Hammer because he was sued by Ms. Hammer?
MR. NAYLOR: At what time?
MR. SWARTZ: Ever.
A. I don't recall.
Q. Do you recall ever being presented with any
offers of settlement by Ms. Hammer or by Mr. Donoval on
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appears to be that letter.
I'm just going to ask you whether the email helps
refresh your recollection.
A. I don't think I got this email, because I wasn't
getting emails at that email address.
That was the City of Sun Valley email address and
I had a hard time accessing those emails. I never
checked that email. I don't think I saw this.
Q. What about-- go ahead and turn the page to a
letter November 16, 2011, HAMMEROOOI35 through 138, take
a moment to review that let me know when you're done.
And again, I'll ask whether you recognize it.
A. I can't say that I've seen this letter either.
(Pause.)
A. Hello?
Q. Yes.
A. Yeah, I said, I can't say that I've seen this
letter, either.
Q. The next city meeting was on November 17, 20 l l.
And I understand this was after the decision to conduct
an investigation into the allegations against Miss
Hammer had been decided.
My question for you is whether you recall what
took place at the November 17, 2011 executive session.
And if will refresh your recollection, the meeting
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minutes are under Tab 6 in the binder.
1
A. I believe he thought it was inappropriate until
A. And what's the question you're asking me?
2 the allegations were investigated and substantiated or
Q. Whether you recall what was discussed in
not.
3
executive session on November 17, 2011.
4
Q. We previously spoke about two camps forming after
A. No. No, you'd have to ask me specific questions.
5 the election. You and Mayor Willich in one camp and Mr.
Q. Do you have any recollection of anything that was
6 Briscoe, Ribi, Youngman in the other camp.
discussed in the November 17, 2011 executive session?
7
Which camp would you say Adam King was affiliated
A. Well, I don't remember which meeting we discussed
8 with?
the hiring of our two outside advisors, if you will, the
9
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
employment lawyer from Holly Troxell. I know we had a 10 A. Well, as the city attorney, he wanted to continue
conversation with him on the phone. It might have been 11 to be city attorney, so his opinions mirrored those of
in that executive session. I don't recall if that was
12 the other three that your -- or his statements were
the one.
13 consistent with the other three that you'd mentioned.
And I think, again, at some point Mr. Willich
14
Q. And were those statements generally about Ms.
reported to us about him having hired Patty Ball. I
15 Hammer having engaged in conduct that they believed to
don't know if it was -- I don't recall if it was at that
16 be criminal in nature?
meeting or not.
17
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
Q. And if it helps trigger your recollection, this
18 Foundation.
meeting was held at the Sage Room at the Sun Valley
A. I remember the word criminal being used. I'm
19
Lodge.
20 not -- I don't remember who used it.
And according to the meeting minutes when you all 21 Q. Was it that this other camp generally believed
came out, you amended the agenda to add the appointment 22 that Ms. Hammer had engaged in the conduct that she was
23 alleged to have engaged in?
of an assistant city clerk?
24
A. Yeah. There were a lot of personnel issues at
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
that time reported to us about who was refusing to come 25 Foundation. Calls for speculation.
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to work because of various allegations. Again, I don't
remember the timeline exactly. There was a lot of
turmoil at that point in time.
Q. Did you understand what was causing the turmoil?
A. My understanding was that there was a lot of
whistleblowing going on because people were concerned
about their jobs.
Q. Do you recall Ms. Hammer having been identified
as a whistleblower as a result of her allegations of
inappropriate conduct by Mr. Ribi?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
A. No.
Q. Do you recall any discussions about whether to
place Ms. Hammer on administrative leave?
A. Yes, I remember a heated discussion about that, I
can't say at what meeting it was, with Mayor Willich
saying he wasn't going to do it and Mr. Ribi pressuring
him to do it.
Q. Did you have an understanding of why Mr. Ribi was
pressuring Mr. Willich to put Ms. Hammer on leave?
A. I believe he wanted her on leave so that she
wouldn't have any access to the books and records in the
city.
Q. Do you recall why Mayor Willich was opposed to
placing Miss Hammer on leave?
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A. State the question again or do you want to
restate it another way or...
Q. The sentiment that Mr. King, Mr. Briscoe, Mr.
Ribi, Mr. Youngman was displaying to you and that you
were observing, was that sentiment that Miss Hammer had,
in fact, engaged in the inappropriate conduct or was it
just more along the lines ofwe have to investigate
this?
In other words, had they made up their minds
about the conduct, as far as you could tell?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. Calls for
speculation, foundation.
A. Well, certainly Mr. Ribi seemed quite clear about
the allegations being more than just allegations,
something that required action.
Mr. King seemed to be most -- the conversation
with me, seemed to be most concerned with, even if the
allegations weren't true, the fact that she eavesdropped
on the executive session, which was -- I don't believe
he used the word criminal activity, but grounds for
dismissal.
Q. And what about Mr. Briscoe?
A. He generally followed Mr. Ribi. I don't recall
exactly what he may have stated.
Q. What about Mr. Youngman?
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A. Sarne. He was generally supportive of Mr. Ribi's
position.
Q. At some point before your term as a city council
member ended, do you recall a meeting where you were
presented with preliminary findings by Patty Ball?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. Use of
preliminary findings.
A. I was made aware of her report being available
for city council members to review in Mr. King's office
a_nd I went and reviewed the report.
Q. Do you recall when that was?
A. No. It was prior -- it was while I was still a
member of the council. I believe it must have been in
December. I don't recall when the report was published.
Q. Do you recall any discussions about whether to
make the report public?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall any discussions about any
inaccuracies in the report?
A. I believe Mayor Willich and I had a conversation
about his concerns about that.
Q. Concerned about inaccuracies contained in the
report?
A. Inaccuracies and questions that he had.
Q. Did you discuss those inaccuracies and questions
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behavior?
A. November 18th?
Q. Correct.
A. There was nothing that -- there was nothing
definitive. So I guess the answer would be perhaps, but
we had no information supporting that at that time.
Q. Have you ever -- whether this was while you were
sitting as a city council member or afterward, had you
ever come to know of any conduct that Miss Hammer
engaged in that you believe was improper?
A. Could you repeat the question, please?
Q. Have you ever come to know of any conduct that
Ms. Hammer engaged in that you believed to be improper?
A. The only possible conduct related to statements
that were made in the Patty Ball report that -- many of
which needed further investigation, in my opinion, what
I saw was more lapse of judgment.
But the report, in my opinion, wasn't the final
document. And I believe she even stated that in her
report, that there were items that needed to be
clarified.
Q. So would you agree with me, then, that you never
have become aware that Miss Hammer engaged in what you
believed to be inappropriate?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.

Page 51
1

2
3

4
5
6
7
8
9

10
ll.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
2l.
22
23
24
25

that Mayor Willich had with your fellow city council
members?
A. No.
Q. Was there any discussion about any need to
correct the Patty Ball report that you reviewed in Adam
King's office?
A. Not that I was part of.
Q. Do you recall what the plan was for proceeding
after you reviewed the report in Adam King's office with
regard to the allegations against Ms. Hammer?
A. No.
Q. Did you have an understanding of whether the
investigation into the allegations against Miss Hammer
were finalized at the time that you had reviewed the
Patty Ball report in Adam King's office?
A. Given the timing of the report and the Christmas
holidays and the swearing in of the new elected
officials, I believe it all was being deferred until
they took office.
Q. So as you understood it, everything was just kind
of placed on hold until Mayor Briscoe took office and
the new city council person took office?
A. Yes.
Q. As ofNovember 18th, 2011, did you have reason to
believe that Ms. Hammer may have engaged in criminal
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A. Nothing that was totally substantiated and
proven, no.
Q. Let me have you tum to Tab 7, about halfway
through that section. You'll see an affidavit of Nils
Ribi and the page numbers are HAMMER000813817.
MR. NAYLOR: She's there.
A. Am I supposed to read this?
Q. Well, we're going to go through just a couple of
portions.
Down on the second page, Paragraph No. 8, Mr.
Ribi states, "During the course of the executive
session, matters were presented to the council that
caused all members serious concerns about possible
misuse of public funds and equipment by the Plaintiff."
Do you see that there?
A. Mm-hmm.
Q. Is that a yes?
A. Yes, yes. Sorry.
Q. Sharon Hammer is the Plaintiff, you'll see on the
first page, the caption of this affidavit -A. Yes.
Q. -- that Mr. Ribi is referring to.
My question to you is whether you recall the city
council authorizing Mr. Ribi to reveal what transpired
in the executive session?
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didn't believe she could do her job properly and -yeah, so I remember discussions about that.
Q. Do you recall why the city clerk didn't feel as
3
though
she could perform her job?
4
A.
She
believed that Miss Hammer was going to be
5
vindictive
towards her in some fashion.
6
Q.
Do
you
know whether Miss Hammer was on
7
administrative leave at the time that the city clerk was
8
concerned that Ms. Hammer might be vindictive toward
9

l

MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.

l

2

A. No.
Q. Do you recall Mr. Ribi asking for authorization
by the council to reveal what transpired in the
executive session?
A. No.
Q. Based upon your understanding of the policy
against revealing what transpired in the executive
session, do you believe that Mr. Ribi's statement in
Paragraph 8 about what transpired in executive session
violates that confidentiality policy?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
Foundation.
A. Yes.
Q. I'll have you tum to the next page, Paragraph
10. Mr. Ribi states in the second sentence there, "That
the mayor and the council had reason to believe that the
Plaintiff may have committed serious misconduct,
including possible criminal violations." Do you see
that section?
A. Mm-hmm.
Q. Did you believe that as a council member, that
she may have committed serious misconduct, including
criminal violations, as of November 18, 2011?
A. I didn't know. I didn't have any infonnation one
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her?
A. I don't recall. I recall that there was an issue
between which one of those was on administrative leave
at what time. And that because Ms. X's cell phone had
been the one that recorded the conversation with the
police officer, she was concerned about being in the
same office that Miss Hammer was in.
But I don't remember the dates, because they were
put on administrative leave, brought back, put on again.
And I don't remember who was there when.
Q. Okay. Do you recall an offer of settlement made
by Ms. Hammer that included calling for Mr. Ribi's
resignation?
A. Well, I just saw that in the documents here. And
what tab was that one under?
Q. Well, I think that there is one reference to it
Page 57
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way or the other.
Q. Let me have you turn to Tab 8. This should be
the December 2nd, 2011 meeting and executive session.
Let me know when you're there.
A. Yes.
Q. My question to is whether you remember what was
discussed in executive session at that December 2nd
2011 meeting?
'
A. I would need to have specific questions to jog my
memory.
Q. Do you recall whether allegations about Miss
Hammer were discussed in th: December 2nd, 2011 meeting?
MR. NAYLOR: ObJect for the form
Foundation.
·
A. Oh, I'm sure they were.
MR. NAYLOR: Do you recall?
A. Yes. That was the purpose of the meeting.
Q. Was the purpose of the meeting to discuss any
other allegations against any other employees or if you
recall whether it was just focused on Miss Hammer?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the fonn.
Foundation.
A. Again, I don't recall if it was at this meeting
or another._ But there was a discussion about the city
clerk wanting to be on administrative leave because she
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on under Tab 9 SH-TIMELINE335.
A. There was the December 6th one. Let's see.
We've already passed one.
Q. Okay. Then try Tab 7, right after the Ribi
affidavit.
A. It's under Tab 5. Let's see. It's the November
16th letter.
Q. Okay. That's HAMMERI35 through 138?
A. Yes.
Q._ D~ you recall any discussion about Mr. Ribi
resigning as part of an offer being made by Miss Hammer?
A. No.
Q. Tab No. 10, please. Actually, No. 11. It should
be a December 2011 meeting, an executive session.
A. Okay.
Q. Do you have any recollection of what was
discussed in executive session on December 20, 2011 -oh, I'm sorry, December 15th, 2011?
_A. Not_without specific questions. I mean, I know
it_ was still about the issues with Miss Hammer and other
city ~mployees, but beyond that, I don't recall
specifics without specific questions.
Q. Fair enough. It's been a while ago.
When you would attend executive session, would
you generally take notes?
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A. Not generally, no.

Q. Do you have any recollection of any time Mayor
Willich having decided that Miss Hammer had done nothing
wrong, that he was ending the investigation and that he
was bringing her back to work?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
A. I remember that he was saying that he was
bringing her back to work, because she was still on the
city payroll and needed to be back to work and there was
work to be done. That's what I remember.
Q. Do you remember anyone voicing an opposition to
Mayor Willich bringing Miss Hammer back on?
A. I believe that Mr. Ribi and perhaps some of the
other council members were in opposition and that Mr.
Willich said that it was within his purview to do and he
was doing it.
Q. Do you recall any discussions at any time about
whether to disclose Patty Ball's report to the Blaine
County prosecutor?
A. I remember that there was discussions about that
and about whether it was -- I think it was a discussion
about whether it was required that we do so or not.
Q. Do you recall ultimately what was decided
regarding whether you were required to turn it over to
the Blaine County prosecutor?
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And I believe Mr. Ribi was very opposed to that.
And I also remember that it was clear to
everybody that the important decisions were all going to
be made by the new council and the mayor. Or not
important, but the decisions regarding resolution of the
issue were going to be made by them.
Q. And not by Mayor Willich?
A. Well, not by, yes, not by the existing Mayor
Willich or the lame duck council at that point. Because
there were -- thP.re w.::t<. rli<.agrP.PmPnt >1nrl th .. -- ,md as
you pointed out. there was a minority point of view, and
a majority point of view.
And the minority point of view was in favor of
continuing to -- continuing to review the allegations
and the majority opinion was in favor of termination of
Ms. Lamb.
Q. Unless you have something to add to your
testimony or anything that you need to correct, I think
I'm done. Mr. Naylor may have some follow-up.
MR. NAYLOR: Let's take a break. I just
need to review my notes and I'll see.
MR. SWARTZ: Okay. Back with you all in
about five minutes.
(Break taken.)
EXAMINATION

Page59

MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
A. No.
Q. Do you recall any discussion about whether Miss
Hammer should be interviewed by Patty Ball a second time
to address your-- to address questions that had come up
during Patty Ball's investigation?
A. I don't remember that specifically. I remember
the mayor having questions about many of her findings.
9
Q. After the Patty Ball report came out and before
10 you left office, do you recall any discussions during
11 that timeframe about terminating Miss Hammer's
12 employment?
13
A. I don't recall any specific discussions, no.
14
Q. Were there discussions, in general, from the time
15 that you returned to the valley on November 12th that
16 said, through the end of your term, regarding the
17 termination of Miss Hammer's employment?
18
A. It's hard for me to remember. There were -- I
19 remember Nils being adamant about her being terminated.
20 I don't remember exactly what period of time that was.
21 I mostly remember by the time we had the report, that
22 this was -- the mayor refused to -- wanted her back to
23 work, thought that she should be there, based on the
24 information that had been provided and further
25 evaluation of it.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
_8
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BY MR. NAYLOR:

2
3
4
5

Q. Ms. Lamb, you testified that Wayne Willich had
talked to you about some issues or something to with the
Ball report. Do you remember when you had that
conversation with Wayne Willich? And maybe it might
help, was it before or after you reviewed it in Adam
King's office?
A. I can't remember if it was -- well, I would have
to say after, because I can remember saying that I felt
there was -- there were clearly lapses of judgment, but
I believed Ms. Hammer needed a chance to respond to the
various instances that were outlined in there. And we
both agreed on that fact.
Q. Do you recall what Mayor Willich said were the
issues that he had with the Ball report in that
conversation?
A. No. I can remember him talking about use of the
credit card and just in kind of a general -- no, I don't
remember any specifics. I think it was more that there
were a lot of -- there was a lot of detail there and
that Miss Hammer needed a chance to look it over and
respond.
And in his opinion, he thought there would be
explanations for some of it, much of it, something in
that range.
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Q. You used the term "inaccuracies" in reference to
Mayor Willich talking about the Ball report. And what
did you mean by that?
A. I just remember him saying something along those
lines. And I don't know what he meant, if he just meant
that he thought that there would be clarification of
some of the points raised. So there was nothing
specific that I recall.
Q. After you reviewed the Ball report, did you have
an opinion nn whether ynu considered it to be a fair,
reasonable, accurate, thorough report?
A. It seemed.
MR. SWARTZ: Objection. Compound.
A. It seemed to be very thorough to me. But it also
raised questions in my mind, as I read it. as to what
the other side of -- what's the other side of the story.
And fair and accurate, I mean, it's hard to say
fair and accurate without, again, the person who is
accused of these things having a chance to rebut it, so
to speak.
Q. Now, you recall in that Ball report that she had
already interviewed Sharon Hammer?
MR. SWARTZ: Objection. Foundation.
A. Yeah. I recall that there was an interview of
Sharon, yes. Yeah.
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within the confines that Mayor Willich had authorized
her?
3
A. It seemed as though the city treasurer had some
4 questions about that. So -- that she had raised them.
5 But again, this is -- I wasn't at that meeting. And so
6 I think the major thing that I recall was more about -7
at that time, was more about the vacation time. That
8 that was the bigger issue, bigger dollar amount, that
9 she had been paid for vacation time or somehow had
10 hadn't appropriately recorded the vacation time, so it
11 had been overpaid, something related to that, but that
12 was the major issue.
13
Q. So what was the reason for -- well, even though
14 you didn't apparently vote on the motion to retain an
15 attorney to do an independent investigation at the
16 November 14th or November 17th meeting because your
17 phone cut out, were you supportive of the mayor hiring
18 an investigator?
A. Yes.
19
20
Q. And what was your reasoning for hiring an
21 investigator at that time?
22
A. Well, that the city's treasurer had come forth
23 with allegations that she thought were substantive and
24 that it was possible for us to ascertain what the -- for
25 us, the city council to ascertain, what was factual and
1
2
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Q. Okay. And some of the conclusions that Ms. Ball
raised were that there needed to be further additional
follow-up on some issues?
A. That's what I remember. That, yes, that some
items raised questions that she thought needed
follow-up.
Q. Now, at the time that the -- well, I believe you
testified that the city council knew that Sharon Hammer
was using the city vehicle and driving it around?
A. And for personal use as well as city use, yes.
Q. And so then, what was the need to -- for Patty
Ball to follow-up and investigate with regard to that
issue?
A. Well, again, I wasn't at that executive session
meeting. But my understanding was that there was
allegations that some of the -- let's see. That perhaps
in some of the personal use -- well, again, you know, it
was about the gas credit cards. And I don't remember
when the gas credit cards came out.
But I thought that was part of the treasurer's
initial allegations, some charges on the gas credit card
for personal use weren't appropriate. There was
particularly a trip to Boise.
Q. And was there any issue at that time that needed
to be investigated about whether her use of the car was
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what wasn't without an independent third-party doing
such an audit, looking at the issues that had been
raised.
Q. Did Mayor Willich object to the recommendation to
have the independent investigator?
A. I don't recall. I don't recall any objections.
I mean, sometimes he would -- I mean, he would say
himself, sometimes he would have a reaction to something
and then he'd settle back down and then move back
forward with whatever the plan was, so I don't recall.
Q. Do you know why Mayor Willich hired Patty Ball
over somebody that you recommended at Stoel Rives or
Perkins Coie?
A. Perkins Coie. I thought that was at your
recommendation, but I'm not sure. I don't know.
Somebody had recommended-- I think one of the attorneys
somewhere along the line, maybe it was at Holly Troxell,
I don't recall, that recommended hiring Patty because
she was local and had just done something similar and
would cost less.
One-man shop. She would cost less than a large
law firm.
Q. Did Mayor Willich ever tell you why he chose
Patty Ball?
A. Just, I think he told me those reasons, that she
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was recommended to him and she was going to cost less.
Q. And she had done something similar?
3
A. She had experience in this area, which Perkins
4
Coie, the attorney there did too.
5
But Mr. Willich, his predilection was more to
6
using the independent practitioners because he was
7
always trying to keep cost down.
8
Q. Was it your understanding that Patty Ball was
9
tasked with investigating the allegations about
l.O harassment by Mr. Ribi that Sharon Hammer had made?
l.l.
A. No. I believe -- I thought she was tasked with
l.2
doing what we called a forensic audit, is what I recall.
13
It's possible once we got Holly Troxell's employment
l.4
lawyer involved, there were other conversations between
l.5
him and Mayor Willich. And I don't know. I don't
16 recall -- no, I recall hers as being forensic audit.
17
Q. And when you read the Patty Ball report, you
l.8 recall it discussed the financial matters, but also
l.9
discussed the allegations dealing with Nils Ribi?
20
A. I don't remember the Nils Ribi one so much. I
2l. remember the financial matters mostly.
22
Q. Do you recall anything about the fire department
in the Patty Ball report?
23
24
A. l remember there being some questions raised
25 there. I don't remember how thorough it was. I can't
l.

2

Page68

Q. Did you ever have a conversation and sought
information from Nils Ribi regarding Michelle
3 Frostensen's allegations?
A. I don't remember that. It's possible we could
4
5 have had some exchange on that, but I don't recall that
6 conversation.
7
Q. And I'm asking about other than at a city council
8 meeting.
A. I don't believe so.
9
10
Q. Did Mayor Willich suggest that some of the
11 allegations raised by Michelle Frostensen, if true,
12 could implicate criminal misconduct?
13
A. No.
Q. You didn't talk about any kind of criminal,
14
15 potential criminal issues with Mayor Willich?
16
A. I don't remember. I remember it being more in
17 the context of, you know, the disciplinary action. I
18 don't remember -- I don't remember criminal activity
19 being discussed, no.
Q. Okay. I don't have anymore questions. Eric may
20
21 still have some.
MR. SWARTZ: No. Thank you, Miss Lamb.
22
MR. NAYLOR: You have the opportunity to
23
24 read and sign your deposition, which means you could
25 review the transcript to ensure that accuracy of the
1
2
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remember about the fire department. I think most of it
happened later, but I think she sort of unearthed the
tip of the iceberg there, where there were some, yeah,
some real questions about how the procedures that were
being followed through.
Q. So you don't recall Patty Ball's investigation or
conclusions relating to Nils Ribi?
A. Not the harassment. I remember reading something
that seemed to sort of absolve him from any wrongdoing.
And I guess that must have been in her report, because I
can't think of another report or document that I would
have seen.
Q. Did you ever observe Nils Ribi's conduct that
you've described that was concerning ever related to
anything other than work conduct, failure to do
something or the way he wanted it or related to work at
the City of Sun Valley?
A. No. It primarily related to decisions, work
product, points of view, yeah.
Q. And then you testified that most of your
information came the Michelle Frostensen's allegations,
because you weren't at the November 11th meeting, most
of the information came from Wayne Willich and Adam
King, correct?
A. Yes,yes.
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court reporter. If you make any changes, obviously, and
testify differently at a later time, that can be
commented on.
But you can also waive that right and just
leave it the way it's been recorded by the court
reporter. It's your choice.
THE WITNESS: So it's about whether she got
it accurate or not?
MR. NAYLOR: Yes. I mean, some witnesses
say, I'm done. The court reporter is fine. Or'some
want to read their transcript to make sure that there
wasn't anything misspoken and you have that right.
THE WITNESS: I suppose I should read it.
(Whereupon, the deposition concluded at
12:10 p.m.)
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C E R T I F I C A T E
I, JOAN LAMB, do hereby certify
that I have read the foregoing transcript of my

4

testimony, and further certify that i t is a true and

5

accurate record of my testimony (with the exception of

6

the corrections listed below):
Page
Line
Correction

7

8

9

10

--------------- - - - -

11
12

13
14
15
16
17
18

19

20
21

JOAN LAMB
Sworn and subscribed to before me this
day of
, 2014.
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Notary Public
My Commission expires:
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CERTIFICATE
State of Oregon
County of Multnomah

5

I, Mary c. Soldati, Registered Professional Reporter

6

and Notary Public in and for the State of Oregon, do

7

hereby certify that JOAN LAMB, was satisfactorily
by me, and that such

8

identified and was duly sworn

9

deposition is a true record of the testimony given by

10

the witness.

11

I further certify that I a:m neither related to

12

nor employed by any of the parties in or council to this

13

action, nor am I financially interested in the outcome

14
15
16

of this action.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand

this 25th day of June, 2014.
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19

Mary

c.

Soldati, RPR

20
21
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My commission expires:
October 28, 2014
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2012-479
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; and
DeWayne BRISCOE,

-

CORRECTED MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF SUN VALLEY'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

C!)

a:

0

CJ

Defendants.

Defendant, the City of Sun Valley, by and through its counsel, Naylor & Hales, P.C., hereby
submits this Memorandum in Support of Sun Valley's Motion for Summary Judgment. As shown
below, summary judgment is appropriate in this case and Plaintiffs complaint should therefore be
dismissed, with final judgment entered in favor of Sun Valley, Nils Ribi and De Wayne Briscoe.

SUN VALLEY'S CORRECTED MSJ MEMORANDUM - 1.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer sued Sun Valley under the Idaho Public Employee Protection
Act, Idaho Code§ 6-2101 et seq (the "Whistleblower Act") on June 29, 2012. (See Complaint for
Damages and Demand for Jury Trial). She claims that she was twice placed on paid administrative
leave pending an investigation in December 2011 and January 2012, then terminated on January 19,
2012, in retaliation for having allegedly reported that then-Councilman Nils Ribi 1 harassed her.
Hammer, however, waived this claim when she executed her City Administrator Employment
Agreement ("Employment Agreement") on June 1, 2008. She then later released this claim at the
time she was terminated in January 2012 when she executed a "Supplemental Release Pursuant to
City Administrator Employment Agreement" (the "Release") in exchange for a six-month severance
payment. Indeed, the Honorable Edward J. Lodge, United States District Court for the District of
Idaho, has already ruled that Hammer's waiver and release was valid and binding with respect to
similar state and federal claims based on retaliatory discharge.
Additionally, Hammer's Whistleblower Act claim is meritless. First, a portion of it is time
barred because she did not timely file suit within 180 days after the alleged violation. More so, with
respect to the non-time barred portions, summary judgment is appropriate because, in short, there
is insufficient evidence upon which Hammer can make out a prima facie case of retaliation in
violation of the statute. And even if she could, Sun Valley had a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason to discharge her and she cannot show that such reason was a pretext. Trial is therefore
unwarranted here.

1

Nils Ribi served two, four-year terms as a Sun Valley Councilman, ending in January

2014.
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Last, Hammer's claims for damages exceed the scope of allowable damages under the
Whistleblower Act. In the unlikely event that any portion of Hammer's claim makes it past summary
judgment, and in the even more unlikely event she prevails at trial, Hammer cannot as a matter of
law obtain the full relief she seeks. The Court should therefore grant partial summary judgment with

.

resoect to damal!es.
..,

II.
BACKGROUND

A.

Hammer's Employment A~reement and Release

Hammer was hired as the City Administrator for Sun Valley on June 1, 2008, under the terms
of a written Employment Agreement. (Complaint,

11

1, 16.) Section 3 of the Employment

Agreement contains two termination provisions such that Hammer's employment could be
terminated by Sun Valley either with or without cause. Specifically, Section 3.A (the "without cause"
provision) provides in plain and unambiguous language:
Employer, acting through the Mayor, may terminate Employee's employment,
without cause, for any reason or no reason. Any such decision to terminate shall
occur only after the Mayor consults with each member of the City Council. Upon
such termination, Employer shall pay Employee, as severance pay, a lump sum cash
payment equal to six (6) months, base salary described in Section 5, Subsection A.
The severance payment herein is intended to be Employee's sole exclusive remedy
for any and all claims for damages of any kind arising from a termination without
cause and such severance payment is hereby agreed to be reasonable, fair and
equitable by both parties to this Agreement. Consequently, receipt of the severance
payment is subject to execution of a release of all claims against the City of Sun
Valley. A termination without cause shall not entitle Employee to an informal
review under any section of the City of Sun Valley Personnel manual ("Personnel
Manual").

SUN VALLEY'S CORRECTED MSJ MEMORANDUM - 3.
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(Declaration of Susan Robertson, Ex. A (Employment Agreement, § 3.A)) (emphasis original).
Section 3 .B provides that in the event of a termination "with cause" Hammer would not be entitled
to any severance payment. (Id.,§ 3.B.)
The next year Hammer executed an Employment Agreement Extension that provided for
automatic, annual one-vear extensions of the Emolovment A2:reement. (Id.. Ex. B rEmnlovment
•

..

....

...

'-'
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~

'

..I.

.,,

Agreement Extension, § 2.)) It is thus undisputed that the Employment Agreement was in full force
and effect at the time of Hammer's termination.
On January 19, 2012, Hammer was terminated from her position at Sun Valley under the
"without cause" provision ofher Employment Agreement. In compliance with Section 3 .A, Hammer
drafted, through her attorney/husband James R. Donoval, and executed the Release stating in full:
Upon payment ofthe severance payment required pursuant to Section 3 .A. of the City
Administrator Employment Agreement dated June 1, 2008, I release the City of Sun
Valley for any claims defined in Section 3 .A. of the City Administrator Employment
Agreement as were intended when the City Administrator Employment Agreement
was entered into on June 1, 2008.
(Id., Ex. C) Hammer received her six-month severance payment as stated therein and she and Sun
Valley parted ways.
A mere six months after accepting that money and agreeing not to sue Sun Valley, however,
Hammer turned around and sued Sun Valley and two officials2 for alleged violations of the
Whistleblower Act. 3 Hammer alleges that during the time of her employment at Sun Valley from

2

The Court dismissed defendants Mayor DeWayne Briscoe and Councilman Nils Ribi on
November 26, 2013, because there is no individual liability under the Whistle blower Act.
3

Hammer had previously sued and then voluntarily dismissed Sun Valley and various
officials based upon similar allegations, in Blaine County Case No. CV-2011-928 (J. Elgee). She
had also filed a claim against Sun Valley, Ribi and Briscoe with the Idaho Human Rights
Commission, also based on similar allegations. It is undisputed that Hammer knew of the
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June 1, 2008, until her discharge on January 19, 2012, she was harassed by Councilman Nils Ribi,
which she asserts she reported to various Sun Valley officials and in retaliation she was placed on
administrative leave, investigated, then terminated. (Complaint, ,i,i 31-3 8.) Her Complaint
conveniently ignores the waiver language in her Employment Agreement and the fact that she
received a six-month severance in exchange for releasing this very claim

B.

Hammer's Termination

Mayor Briscoe was sworn into office as the new Sun Valley mayor on January 3, 2012.
(Complaint at 29, ,i 143.) As is common with new administrations, he made the determination that
he could not work with the prior mayor's chosen city administrator. Instead, as was his prerogative
as mayor, Mayor Briscoe decided he would rather vet and hire his own person for that important
position, with whom he would necessarily have a close working relationship. 4 (Declaration ofKirtlan
G. Naylor, Ex. A (Briscoe Depo Tr. at 129:4- 130:8); Ex. B (Griffith Depo Tr. at 13:14-24, 15:2123, 17:1-5, 29:13-21, 33:16-24); Ex. C (Youngman Depo Tr. at 27:24- 29:6, 82:11 - 83:1); Ex. D
(SuhadolnikDepo Tr. at 14:16-24); Ex. E (Ribi Depo Tr. at 171:20-172:15)). Thus, on January 19,
Hammer's position with Sun Valley was terminated under the "without cause" provision of her
Employment Agreement, under which she executed a Release of all claims against Sun Valley and
received a six month severance payment, as set forth above.

allegations that form the basis of the present lawsuit at the time she was terminated and signed
the Release.
4

Under Idaho Code§ 50-206, appointed officers (such as Hammer) may be removed by
the mayor for any reason "deemed sufficient" with the affirmative vote of half the full city
council plus one. Alternatively, a city council may upon its own initiative remove an appointed
official by unanimous vote.

SUN VALLEY'S CORRECTED MSJ MEMORANDUM - 5.
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Related Federal Case

Hammer also brought a related federal action against Sun Valley, Briscoe and Ribi, wherein
she alleged fourteen claims for gender discrimination and harassment, retaliation, due process
violations (both procedural and liberty interest), conspiracy, assault, wrongful termination, breach
of contract and negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Hammer v. Sun Valley, Case No. I: l 3cv-21-EJL. That case is still pending, but substantially overlaps with the present Whistleblower case,
especially with respect to the Employment Agreement and Release. The Honorable Edward J. Lodge,
United States District Judge, significantly narrowed the federal case by dismissing all but two claims
based on the plain and unambiguous language of the very same Employment Agreement and Release
at issue here. (Naylor Deel. Ex. I ("Lodge Decision"))
In Judge Lodge's words: "the lanmaae of the contract could not be clearer. The

waiver/release was to 'any and all claims' without any limitations." (Lodge Decision at 17)
( emphasis added). Thus, Judge Lodge dismissed nearly all of Hammer's claims existing against Sun
Valley at the time of her termination. Notably, Judge Lodge's dismissal included claims for
retaliation closely mirroring Hammer's Whistleblower claim here. Only Hammer's claims for assault
(which does not involve Sun Valley) and liberty interest violation (which accrued after the release)
remain in the federal lawsuit. 5

D.

Other On~oina Sun Valley Matters

While Hammer's termination was because Mayor Briscoe determined he could not work with
her and would rather vet and hire his own City Administrator, there were other ongoing Sun Valley
5

Hammer moved for reconsideration but no decision has been entered yet on that motion.
Additionally, defendants moved for summary judgement on the remaining two claims, which is
aiso pending.
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matters under investigation, which did in part relate to her being placed on paid administrative leave.
These matters were not, however, the cause of Hammer's termination.
To put these events in context, the starting point is the fall of 2011. On October 5, 2011, thenSun Valley Treasurer Michelle Frostenson met with then-Mayor Wayne Willich and expressed
concerns she had about oossible Citv mismanag:ement. (Navlor Deel.. Ex. F (Frostenson Deoo Tr.
.&.

.,;

_.

'

.,J

.,

'
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at 15:22 - 16:14, 25:11 - 37:19); Ex. B. (Willich Depo Tr. at 11: 14 - 14:3)) Frostenson again raised
the same issues to Councilman Ribi on or about November 10 because she did not believe Mayor
Willi ch had adequately addressed her concerns. (Frostenson Depo Tr. at 15 :22 - 16:6; 53: 14-22; Ex.
C (Ribi Depo Tr. at 26:14 - 32:9)) Ribi contacted Councilman Bob Youngman and
Councilman/Mayor-Elect DeWayne Briscoe6 regarding these same matters and a City Council
special executive session was called for November 11, 2011. (Complaint at 26, ,r 129.)
During the November 11 executive session, Frostenson presented her allegations to the
Mayor and City Council. (Complaint at 26, ,r 130; Briscoe Deel., Ex. A. 7) Afterwards, Mayor Willich
and Adam King, the City Attorney, met with Hammer, presented the allegations that had been made
against her and proposed that she resign in exchange for a severance payment. (Complaint at 26, ,r
131.) Hammer turned down the offer. (Complaint at 27, ,r 133.)
On November 13, Hammer's husband/attorney, James R. Donoval, delivered to the Sun
Valley City Council and Mayor Willi ch a letter, dated November 12, threatening litigation regarding

6

Briscoe defeated Willich in the Mayoral race on November 8, 2011. Additionally, Franz
Suhadolnik and Michelle Griffith were elected as new City Council members, replacing Mayor
Briscoe (due to his vacancy) and Joan Lamb.
7

Mayor Briscoe's declaration is attached as Exhibit J to the declaration ofKirtlan Naylor.
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Ribi's alleged harassment, and in the event of any disciplinary action against Hammer. (Complaint
at 27, 1136; Briscoe Deel., Ex. B.)
On November 14, the City Council conducted a follow-up executive session. (Complaint at
27, 1 137.) The City Council voted to engage an attorney to conduct an independent investigation
into the allegations being made. (Briscoe DecL, Ex. A at SV 2070.)
Donoval sent Sun Valley a second letter, dated November 15, again threatening a lawsuit in
connection with Hammer's allegations of harassment by Ribi and the City's intent to conduct an
investigation. (Briscoe Deel., Ex. C.) Donoval followed up with a third letter, dated November 16,
which actually applauded the decision to conduct an internal investigation, yet still threatened a
lawsuit unless Sun Valley agreed to Hammer's absurd settlement terms, which included Ribi's
resignation, a six-figure payment to Hammer, and a promise that Ribi would never contact Hammer
again, otherwise he would be subjected to a hundred thousand dollar punitive damage assessment.
(Briscoe Deel., Ex. D.)
On November 18, Mayor Willich placed Hammer on non-disciplinary paid administrative
leave, pending the outcome of the investigation. (Briscoe Deel., Ex. E.) Hammer responded by filing
a Whistleblower Claim ( the first Whistleblower action) in Blaine County Case No. CV-2011-928,
which was later voluntarily dismissed. She also filed a complaint with the Idaho Human Rights
Commission. (Complaint at 28, 1139.)
Sun Valley hired Patricia Ball 8 on or about November 21 to conduct the investigation. The
"Ball Investigation" occurred over the next several weeks and, with authorization from Mayor

8

While Ms. Ball is an attorney, her investigation was not done in the capacity of a legal
representative.
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Willich, expanded into a broader inquiry of Sun Valley financial issues, Fire Department issues, and
Hammer's allegations of harassment by Ribi. (Briscoe Deel., Ex. F.) (Filed Under Seal)
On December 16, Mayor Willich provided authorization for the Blaine County Prosecuting
Attorney to be notified about "information and facts discovered in an employment investigation that
may be the subject of criminal conduct." (Briscoe Deel. Ex. I.) He also issued to Hammer a
"NOTICE OF CONTINUED PAID ADMINISTRATIVE LEAVE PENDING INVESTIGATION",
along with a Garrity Notice. (Briscoe Deel., Ex. G and H) (emphasis original).

j
•

I

The Ball Investigation then culminated in a December 20, 2011 report known as the "Ball
Report" 9 (id.). With respect to Hammer, the Ball Report concluded that"[ s ]ufficient evidence exists
to support multiple violations of City policy by Hammer[]" and that "[t]hese matters should be
immediately referred to an outside agency for further audit and investigation of possible civil and/or
criminal violations." (Id. at BALL 3.) After receiving the Ball Report, but before Ball actually
presented it to the Mayor and City Council, Mayor Willi ch decided that he disagreed with the report
and recommendations Ball made and therefore unilaterally brought Hammer back from paid
administrative leave on December 27. (Complaint at 28, ,1141-142.)
Briscoe took office as Sun Valley's new Mayor on January 3, 2012. (Complaint at 29,, 143.)
The next day he provided authorization for the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney to be notified
about "information and facts discovered in an employment investigation that may be the subject of
criminal misconduct." (Briscoe Deel., Ex. J.) He also issued Hammer a "NOTICE OF PAID
ADMINISTRATIVE LEAVE PENDING INVESTIGATION", essentially tracking the language of

9

The Ball Report actually consists of three separate reports covering allegations involving
the Fire Department, Ribi and Hammer. (Briscoe Deel.,, 8.) For purposes here, the Ball Report
will refer only to the report covering the investigation into Hammer.
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former-Mayor Willich's notice. (Briscoe Deel., Ex. K.) Mayor Briscoe also issued Hammer a Garrity
Notice. (Briscoe Deel., Exl. L.) Similar notices were issued to other Sun Valley employees in
connection with the Ball Investigation findings about the Fire Department. (Briscoe Deel., ,r 14.)
As noted above, Hammer was terminated on January 19, 2012, because Mayor Briscoe
determined he could not work with her and would rather vet and hire his own city administrator.
Afterwards, Sun Valley issued a press release in the Idaho Mountain Express informing the public
that Hammer had been terminated as the City Administrator. (Briscoe Deel., Ex. 0.)
In February 2012, shortly after Hammer was terminated, Sun Valley hired the law firm of
Moffatt Thomas Barrett Rock & Fields, Chtd., who engaged an independent accounting firm, Hagen,
Streiff, Newton & Oshiro, P.C., to conduct a thorough audit of Sun Valley's financial matters from
2009 through 2011. (Briscoe Deel., ,r 18.) The resulting Forensic Audit was completed in August
2012. The audit found significant problems, including: (a) non-compliance with control and approval
of expenditure processes; (b) lack of control over work schedules by salaried exempt employees; (c)
exempt employees being paid twice for work performed during normal working hours; (d) exempt
employees being paid salaries inconsistent with the personnel manual; (e) problems with the
compensation of hourly on-call firefighters; (f) non-compliance with the accrued vacation hour
policies; (g) improper use of city property; (h) improper use of city credit cards; (i) inappropriate use
of a fuel card; and G) problems with travel expenses reimbursement. (Briscoe Deel., Ex. P.)
Similarly, on November 21, 2012, the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney issued a letter to
Sun Valley about the criminal investigation initiated months before, which had been performed by
Scott Birch, the Attorney General Office's Criminal Investigative Unit Chief. Based upon the
criminal investigation, which included a review of Sun Valley documents as well as the Ball Report

i
!
i
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and the Forensic Audit, the PA found misconduct by Hammer, but he chose not to pursue criminal
charges in light of the heightened burden of proof of "beyond a reasonable doubt." Notably, the PA
concluded:
Although no criminal charges will be forthcoming, the investigations revealed serious
failures at multiple levels of management and supervision within the City of Sun
Vallev. includin!! (1) a failure to document: (2) a failure to follow stated nolicies and
procedures; (3) lax management and oversight; (4) poor time accounting; (5)
apparent conflicts of interest; and (6) a lack of checks and balances throught the
claims process.
.,.
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(Briscoe Deel., Ex. Q.)
Meanwhile, in June 2012 while both the Forensic Audit and criminal investigations were
underway, two tort claim notices against Sun Valley and various Sun Valley officials, including
Hammer, were settled. These claims were brought by Frostenson and Kelly Ek, a former Sun Valley
Clerk. Both claimed that Sun Valley officials, including Hammer, retaliated against them after
making allegations of misconduct and financial problems. (Briscoe Deel., , 20.) Sun Valley
published press releases about the fact of the settlements in June 2012, which included brief
synopses of the allegations. (Briscoe Deel., Exs. Rand S.) Both matters were later resolved.
Hammer then filed the present suit on June 29, 2012, and has attempted to confuse these
events and conflate them in such a way as to show that Ribi somehow orchestrated a scheme to have
her fired in retaliation for reporting his alleged harassment. As shown below, however, Hammer
cannot proceed to trial because she waived and then released this claim and, in any event, there is
insufficient evidence to support her claim.
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III.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c); Shapleyv. Centurion Life
Ins. Co., 154 Idaho 875 (2013). A defending party may move for summary judgment as to all or any
part of the claims against it. I.R.C.P. 56(b).
The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests with
the moving party. Harris v. State, 147 Idaho 401, 404-405 (2009). In determining whether this
burden has been met, "a court will consider only that material contained in affidavits or depositions
which is based upon personal knowledge and which would be admissible at trial. 11 Petricevich v.
Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 869 ( 1982). Any disputed material facts is liberally construed
in favor of the non-moving party, and the court makes all reasonable inferences in favor of the party
resisting the motion. McCoy v. Lyons,. 120 Idaho 765, 769 (1991).
Upon this initial showing, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party and in order to
defeat summary judgment must submit "evidence ... which contradicts the evidence submitted by
the moving party, and which establishes the existence of a material issue of disputed fact. 11 State
Dept. ofAgric. v. Curry Bean Co., 139 Idaho 789, 792 (2004). Even disputed facts will not defeat
summary judgment when the non-moving party fails to establish the existence of an essential
element of the case, Radell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101,102 (1988), or when a plaintiff fails to establish
a prima facie case on which he or she bears the burden of proof. State v. Shama Res. Ltd P's hip, 127
Idaho 267, 270 (1955). Further, the non-moving party "must not rest on mere speculation because
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a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact." Harris v. State Dept.
of Health and Welfare, 123 Idaho 295,298 (1992).

IV.
ARGUMENT
A.

Hammer Plainly and Unambieuously Waived and Later Released Her
Whistleblower Claim Ai!ainst Sun Vallev

Hammer's Employment Agreement is a plain and unambiguous complete recital of the terms
and conditions of her employment with Sun Valley. It specifically states that "[t]he text herein shall
constitute the entire agreement between the parties." (Employment Agreement§ 12.) Relevant here,
the Employment Agreement provides that Hammer could be terminated, "without cause, for any
reason or no reason." (Id., § 3.) (emphasis added) It further provides that, at the time Hammer
executed the agreement, she waived all claims of any kind arising from a termination without cause.
(Id.) In a separate clause Hammer also agreed that upon receipt of the agreed upon severance
payment she would release all claims against Sun Valley. (Id.)
Thus, Hammer's present Whistle blower Claim fails for two distinct reasons: first, she waived
any claim arising from a termination without cause when she entered into her Employment
Agreement with Sun Valley; second, she later released all claims against Sun Valley when she
received her six-month severance payment. Summary judgment is therefore appropriate, consistent
with the Lodge Decision on the same issues.
1.

Hammer's Waiver and Release are Enforceable

It is well settled that "[f]reedom of contract is a fundamental concept underlying the law of
contracts." Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496, 499 (1970). It is, therefore, "a
general rule of this state and the majority of American jurisdictions that a party may contract to
SUN VALLEY'S CORRECTED MSJ MEMORANDUM - 13.
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absolve [herself] from certain duties and liabilities under a contract subject to certain limitations."

Anderson & Naftiger v. G. T. Newcomb, Inc., l 00 Idaho 175, 178 (1979).
A legally enforceable contract must manifest mutual assent of the parties to its terms, which
must be stated plainly and explicitly, and there must be consideration. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413,
415 (2009) (citing 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 19 (2d ed. 2009)). When the terms of a contract are
clear and unambiguous their interpretation and legal effect are questions oflaw. Opportunity, LLC.

v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602,605 (2002) (citing Idaho v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883,886 (2000)). "The
meaning of an unambiguous contract must be determined from the plain meaning of the words. 11 Id.
The intent of the parties is thus ascertained from the contract language. Id. at 607.
Thus, " [w]here preliminary negotiations are consummated by written agreement, the writing
supercedes all previous understandings and the intent of the parties must be ascertained from the
writing." Valley Bank v. Christensen, 119 Idaho 496,498 (1991) (emphasis added). "If the written
agreement is complete upon its face and unambiguous, no fraud or mistake being alleged, extrinsic
evidence of prior or contemporaneous negotiations or conversations is not admissible to contradict,
vary, alter, add to or detract from the terms of the written contract." Id.
All contracts must also be supported by valid consideration. Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners

Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519, 526 (2012). Consideration exists where there is something given in
exchange for a promise. While consideration is invalid if it is something to which the other party
already has an absolute right, "forbearance to prosecute a disputed claim is good consideration."

Salmeron v. US., 724 F.2d 1357, 1363 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing 1 Corbin on Contracts§ 140 at 595
(1963)). Further, where a contract is in writing the presumption is that it is supported by valid
consideration. Weisel, 152 Idaho at 526.
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2.

Hammer Waived Any Claim Arising from a Termination
Without Cause Under the Plain and Unambiguous Terms of the
Employment Agreement

When Hammer was hired by Sun Valley in June 2008 she executed the Employment
Agreement in which she contractually waived any claim that could arise from a future termination
without cause. (Employment Agreement§ 3.A.) Specifically, the clear and unambiguous language
of her Employment Agreement states:
The severance payment herein is intended to be Employee's sole exclusive remedy
for any and all claims for damages of any kind arising from a termination without
cause and such severance payment is hereby agreed to be reasonable, fair and
equitable by both parties to this Agreement. Accordingly, Employee waives her right
to bring a claim of any kind for damages against Employer arising from a termination
without cause. Consequently, receipt of the severance payment is subject to
execution of a release against the City of Sun Valley.

(Id.) (bold in original, underline added) Accordingly, Hammer cannot maintain her present
Whistleblower Action against Sun Valley because she indisputably waived this claim when she
executed the Employment Agreement.

3.

Hammer Later Released Sun Valley of All Existing Claims Under
the Plain and Unambiguous Terms of the Release

The "without cause" provision in Section 3.A of Hammer's Employment Agreement also
includes a requirement stating that "receipt of the severance payment is subject to execution of a
release of all claims against the City of Sun Valley." (Employment Agreement,§ 3.A.) This release
clause is separated from the previously discussed waiver provision, as it allowed Hammer the choice
(upon a termination "without cause") to: (1) accept the contractually provided severance payment
and consequently release all claims against Sun Valley, regardless of whether they arose from a
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termination without cause; or (2) to reject the severance payment and retain the right to pursue all
non-waived claims against Defendant City of Sun Valley. (Id.)
The plain language ofPlaintiffHammer' s Employment Agreement clearly states that receipt
of the severance payment is subject to a release of all claims against Defendant. (Id.) This release
is a conditional term and was onlv
reauirerl
if Pl::iintiff H::immer vnhmt::irilv
took receint
of the
.,
""J.
.;
r

severance payment. This is a clear and distinct event from the initial waiver for all claims arising
from a termination "without cause". In other words, when Hammer made her choice to accept the
severance payment and executed the Release, she released all claims against Sun Valley.
If Hammer wanted to sue Sun Valley, her option at that time was to forego the severance
payment and pursue any non-waived legal action she believed she might have. This was a basic
risk/reward analysis. In signing the Release and accepting the severance payment, Hammer was
guaranteed her six-month severance payment. In exchange for that certainty, she agreed to release
any claim for damages available at that time. Alternatively, she could have rejected the severance
payment and taken the risk of pursuing a lawsuit against Sun Valley for any un-waived claims.
It is undisputed that on January 23, 2013, Hammer chose the first option and accepted the
severance payment in exchange for a release of "all claims against the City of Sun Valley." She is
now attempting to seek double-recovery as she has retained her six-month severance payment and
also seeks money damages under the Whistleblower Act (as well as her federal court claims). This
is contrary to the plain and unambiguous language of her Employment Agreement and Release.
Because Hammer has released all claims against Sun Valley- as Judge Lodge has already foundHammer cannot maintain the present action. Summary judgment is therefore appropriate. The
analysis and decision by Judge Lodge is correct, persuasive and can be relied upon by this Court.
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B.

Hammer's Whistleblower Claim Is Meritless
1.

Idaho's Whistleblower Act

For the sake of argument, even if the Court were to analyze Hammer's claim on its merits,
it cannot survive summary judgment. The Whistleblower Act is designed to benefit the citizens and
protect the integrity of government "by providing a legal cause of action for public employees who
experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and violations of law,
rule or regulation." I.C. § 6-2101. Specifically, the Whistleblower Act prohibits the governmental
employer from taking:
... adverse action against an employee because the employee ... communicates in
good faith 10 the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a
violation or suspected violation of law, rule or regulation adopted under the law of
this state, a political subdivision of this state or the United States. Such
communication shall be made at a time and in a manner which gives the employer
reasonable opportunity to correct the waste or violation.
LC.§ 6-2104(1)(a).
The Whistleblower Act contains an implicit, common-sense requirement that the employer
engage in some sort of "predicate act" that triggers the application of the statute in the first place.

Black v. Idaho State Police, 155 Idaho 570,574 (2013). Thus, the statute cannot be used as a tool
to resolve or take action as a result of political, internal, or organizational issues. It only protects
activities directed at reporting or "blowing the whistle" on the predicate act of wrongdoing related
to waste or the violation of a law, rule or regulation. See id.; LC.§ 6-2101.

10

"For purposes of subsection l(a) of this section, an employee communicates in good
faith if there is a reasonable basis in fact for the communication. Good faith is lacking where the
employee knew or reasonably ought to have known that the report is malicious, false or
frivolous." LC.§ 6-2104(l)(b).
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If a plaintiff can establish the existence of a predicate act triggering the application of the
Whistleblower Act, the issue becomes whether the plaintiff can set forth sufficient facts to
demonstrate a prima facie case for retaliatory discharge. This requires an adequate showing that: (1)
the plaintiff was an employee that engaged in or intended to engage in a protected activity; (2) the
defendant is an employer that took adverse action a!!ainst the emolovee: and
-

..

-

.a.

.,

.,

(3)
... .,

there is a causal

connection between the protected activity and the employer's adverse action. Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty
Fire & Rescue, 138 Idaho 391, 464 (2008).

Under McDonnell Douglas, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts
to the defendant to show that its adverse employment action was for a legitimate, non-retaliatory
reason. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-804 (1973). If the employer meets
this burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason the employer proffered is a pretext. Id; see Hathewayv. Bd ofRegents ofUniv. ofIdaho, 155
Idaho 255, 263-264 (2013) andFrogleyv. Meridian Jt. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 155 Idaho 558,564 (2013)
(both implicitly overruling Curlee's summary judgment framework and applying McDonnell
Douglas burden shifting framework to employment retaliation claims). "A plaintiff may establish

pretext either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence." Frogley, 155 Idaho at 564.

2.

A Portion of Hammer's Claim is Time-Barred

All actions under the Whistleblower Act must be brought "within one hundred eighty (180)
days after the occurrence of the alleged violation .... " I.C. 6-2105(2). Hammer's Complaint was
filed June 29, 2012. She therefore cannot proceed on any alleged violation that occurred prior to
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January 1, 2012, which is 180 days before the date of her Complaint. See id. This necessarily
excludes her theories that she was retaliated against by being placed on paid leave and investigated
in November and December 2011.

3.

Sun Valley Did Not Engage in a Predicate Act Merely Because an
Elected Official Allegedly Violated City Policy

Hammer alleges that Councilman Ribi harassed her in violation of Sun Valley's Personnel
Policies & Procedures Manual. (Complaint,

1 18, Ex.

1 ("Employee Manual")) The Employee

Manual includes a "Standard of Conduct" section that, among other things, prohibits work place
harassment "in any form, including verbal, physical and visual harassment." (Id., § 27; Employee
Manual, § 7.5.) The Complaint rambles on at some length about the alleged violations of the
Employee Manual Ribi supposedly engaged in, but they essentially boil down to mere allegations
that Hammer and Ribi had several disagreements about a number of work-related issues and at times
Ribi would become angry, bang his fists on a table and "verbally chastise her for not doing exactly
what he wanted her to do." (See id., 11 43-126.)
Hammer's deposition testimony echoes the same type of alleged misconduct:
Q. And what was the nature of the harassment?
A. Those allegations are in the complaint.

Q. What was the nature of the harassment that you claim Nils Ribi did?

A. The bigger incidents are in the complaint. The nature of his harassment was to try
to intimidate me into doing what he wanted me to do. He had a pattern of coming by
City Hall during the lunch hour when he knew that the mayor and most of the other
City employees were not in City Hall. He would stand in my doorway and try to
intimidate me into doing things that he - I had not been directed to do by the mayor.
When I would suggest that he talk to the mayor, because it was very - made clear to
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me that my direction came from the mayor, he got very agitated. He would raise his
hands and lean through the doorway and shake his hands and say, "No. No. You don't
understand." He yelled at me that the mayor did not know what his job was.
(Naylor Deel., Ex. H, Hammer Depo Tr. at 187:7 - 188:6.)
In other words, Hammer's allegations comes down to her belief that Ribi would at times
become angry over work-related disoutes. Even assumirn:1: this conduct violated the Emolovee
-

•

....

._,

.l

ol

Manual, it certainly does not trigger application of the Whistleblower Act. Indeed, the Idaho
Supreme Court has rejected taking an expansive view of what constitutes a violation of a law, rule
or statute necessary to implicate the Whistleblower Act. Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615, 620
(2004). Under the plain language of the statute, the Mallonee court ruled that there must be a
violation oflaws, rules or regulations that had been properly promulgated by an administrative body
giving them the force and effect oflaw. Id. Where no such promulgation has occurred, a violation
of a city policy simply does not amount to a predicate act. Id. at 620-621. Thus, merely violating an
internal city policy does not trigger application of the Whistle blower Act. See id.
Consequently, while reporting an alleged assault or status-based harassment may be a
predicate act for purposes of the Whistleblower Act, Hammer cannot proceed to trial under any
theory that Ribi merely violated the Employee Manual.

4.

Hammer Cannot Demonstrate a Prima Facie Case

Even to the extent Hammer could show a Sun Valley official engaged in a sufficient predicate
act to implicate the Whistleblower Act, she still cannot adequately demonstrate a prima facie case
to warrant trial.
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a.

Placing an Employee on Paid Administrative Leave
Pending an Investigation Is Not Adverse Action

The Whistleblower Act plainly states what constitutes an adverse action: "to discharge,
threaten or otherwise discriminate against an employee in any manner that affects the employee's
employment, including compensation, terms, conditions, location, rights, immunities, promotions
or privileges." LC.§ 2103(1).
Sun Valley does not dispute that termination is an adverse action. However, placing an
employee on paid administrative leave pending an investigation is not. As the Rhode Island Supreme
Court very recently explained in finding that similar action as here did not violate that state's nearly
identical whistleblower statute, 11

" [ t]he

use of paid administrative leave provides a reasonable means

of immediately neutralizing a potentially contentious situation while minimally affecting the
[employee]." Russo v. State, Dept. of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals, 87 A.3d 399,407
(R.I. 2014) (internal quotations omitted).
The Russo court further discussed how its decision was bolstered by the fact that under
federal case law, to be actionable, an adverse employment action must be "materially adverse in
order to 'prevent lawsuits based upon trivial workplace dissatisfactions' or 'bruised 'ego[s]."' Id
(quoting White v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., 364 F.3d 789, 795, 797 (6th Cir.
2004) (en bane) affd by Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)
(requiring that an adverse employment action must be material). Thus, consistent with the wording
of the Idaho Whistleblower Act, actionable adverse actions include (other than the obvious
11

Rhode Island's Whistleblower Act states "[a]n employer shall not discharge, threaten, or
otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms,
conditions, location, or privileges of employment ... [because the employee engaged in
protected activity.]" R.I. Gen Laws § 28-50-3.
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discharge) such things as change in salary, benefits, responsibilities, refusals to hire or promote,
reprimands, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities and otherwise inflicting direct
economic harm. Id. Indeed, "several federal appellate courts have specifically held that
administrative leave with pay is not an adverse employment action." Id. (citing Singletary v.

Missouri Dept. of Corr., 423 F.3d 886; 891-892 (8th Cir. 2005); Kenney v. Merit Syst. Protection
Bd., 356 Fed. Appx. 394, 396 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 2006);
Peltier v. United States, 388 F.3d 984, 988 (6th Cir. 2004); Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858,
869 (4th Cir. 2001); Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 F.3d 150 (5th Cir. 2000)).
Idaho's case law is consistent with the these other jurisdictions. In fact, the Idaho Supreme
Court in Hatheway, mandated that to be actionable an adverse employment action must include
significant changes in employment. Hatheway, 155 Idaho at 265 (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v.

Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998); Kcosis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 887 (6th Cir.
1996). Being placed on paid administrative leave pending an investigation does not constitute an
adverse action, as in such instances there is no material or significant changes to the "compensation,
terms, conditions, location, rights, immunities, promotions or privileges" of one's employment. See
LC. § 6-2103(1).

In this case, Hammer was placed on paid administrative leave twice pending the Ball
Investigation into the allegations that had been made against her during the November 11, 2011
executive session, as well as a possible criminal investigation pursuant to the authority given by
former-Mayor Willich on December 16 and reiterated by Mayor Briscoe on January 3, 2012. As
numerous jurisdictions have made clear, such paid administrative ]eave does not constitute an
adverse action. Rather, it was Sun Valleys' means to neutralize contentious situation with minimal
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effect on Hammer's employment. As such, while Sun Valley does not dispute that termination is an
adverse act, Hammer cannot base her Whistleblower Act claim on merely being investigated while
on paid leave.

b.

Not All of Hammer's Reporting Qualifies as a Protected
Activity

As discussed above, merely violating a city policy does not constitute a predicate act and thus
does not trigger appJication of the Whistle blower Act. See Section 3 .b, supra. It follows that
reporting conduct that does not constitute a predicate act is likewise insufficient to create liability.

See LC.§ 6-2104(1)(a) (requiring reporting in good faith the existence of waste, or violation or
suspected violation oflaw, rule or regulation). Hammer therefore cannot support this element of her
cause of action merely by showing that she reported Ribi's conduct that was allegedly in violation
of the Personnel Manual.

c.

Hammer Cannot Demonstrate That Her Termination Was
Causally Connected to Complaining About Ribi's
Conduct

Hammer claims that she was terminated because from 2008 through 2011 she reported
harassment by Ribi to Mayor Willich, Adam King and Cam Daggett. Even viewing the evidence in
a light most favorable to Hammer, however, her contentions are belied by the actual evidence in the
record. To reiterate, Mayor Briscoe was sworn into office as the new Sun Valley mayor on January
3, 2012. As is common with new administrations, he made the determination that he could not work
with the prior mayor's chosen city administrator. Instead, as was his prerogative as mayor, he decided
he would rather vet and hire his own person for that important position, with whom he would
necessarily have a close working relationship. Thus, on January 19, Hammer's position with Sun

SUN VALLEY'S CORRECTED MSJ MEMORANDUM - 23.

1397

Valley was terminated under the "without cause" provision of her Employment Agreement, for
which she executed a Release of all claims against Sun Valley and received a six month severance
payment.
Hammer cannot create a triable question of fact as to causation simply by claiming that
beginning over three years prior to her termination she complained about alleged harassment by Ribi.
In fact, no Council Member testified that such was a reason for her termination. Rather, her
termination was related to the change in administration and Mayor Briscoe's determination to hire
his own City Administrator. Hammer's mere speculation that she was discharged in retaliation for
complaining about Ribi is insufficient to show a prima facie case for retaliatory discharge.

5.

Sun Valley Had a Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason to
Discharge Hammer

As detailed above, Mayor Briscoe decided that he wanted to hire his own city administrator
because he could not work with Hammer. She was therefore terminated under the without cause
provision of her Employment Agreement and received her six-month severance payment.

6.

Hammer Cannot Show that Sun Valley's Reason for Her Discharge Was
a Pretext

Because Sun Valley had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to discharge Hammer, the
burden shifts to her to adequately show that Sun Valley's reason was a pretext. "A plaintiff may
establish pretext 'either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence." Frogley, 155 Idaho at 564 (quoting Texas Dept. ofComty. Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248,256 (1981)).
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a.

There is Insufficient Direct Evidence of Pretext

Direct evidence may exist in retaliatory discharge cases where the "evidence, if believed,
proves the fact without inference or presumption." Id at 565 (internal quotations omitted). In other
words, the evidence must require the conclusion that the defendant unlawfully retaliated against the
plaintiff Id This typically requires some overt statement. See id. For example, in one age
discrimination suit an employer issued a memorandum to management saying to "Fire Early - he is
too old." Id (discussing Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 1997). This direct
statement thus requires no inferences as it directly showed that the employer's proffered reason for
firing that employee was a pretext. This type of evidence is rare in retaliatory discharge cases. Id.
at 567.
There is simply no similar direct evidence in this case that would show Sun Valley's reason
for discharging Hammer was a pretext. Absent such evidence, Hammer cannot create a triable issue
rebutting Sun Valley's proffered reason for her discharge.

b.

There is Insufficient Indirect Evidence of Pretext

Where there is no direct evidence of pretext, a plaintiff "may come forward with
circumstantial evidence that tends to show that the employer's proffered motives were not their actual
motives because they are inconsistent or otherwise not believable." Frogley, 155 Idaho at 567
(internal quotations omitted). However, "such evidence must be substantial and specific." Id.
(emphasis added). "[I]ndirect evidence is not substantial and specific where no evidence beyond
what is produced to satisfy the plaintiffs prima facie case is produced. Id. And" [c ]ourts only require
an employer [to] honestly believed its reason for its actions, even if its reason is foolish or trivial or
even baseless." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Summary judgment is therefore appropriate where
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the plaintiff fails to show that the defendant did not honestly believe its proffered reasons for its
actions. Id.
There is simply no such evidence in this case. Rather, the evidence merely shows that the
only thing that happened at all related to Hammer reporting alleged harassmentt by Ribi is that Sun
Valley broadened the Ball Investigation to include looking into those allegations, Hammer's theory
that Ribi had some grand plan to get her fired, for which he recruited various other city officials and
employees to execute, is pure speculation. Hammer cannot meet her burden to show pretext by
relying on her baseless accusations.

c.

Hammer's Remedies are Limited By the Wbistleblower Act

If the Court allows Hammer to proceed to trial on any portion of her Whistleblower claim,
it should nevertheless grant partial summary judgment to Sun Valley with respect to the scope of
Hammer's potential recoverable damages. Specifically, Hammer claims that she has suffered "severe
economic damages" and is entitled to her "loss of past and future wages, retirement benefits, medical
benefits, other fringe benefits, and other losses to be proven at trial[,]" and also seeks recovery for
her "emotional damages, including but not limited to public ridicule, contempt, and hatred;
embarrassment, emotional pain and suffering; and loss of enjoyment of life." (Complaint at 32, ,r
169 .) Thus, Hammer indicates that she is entitled to recovery any type and category of damages she
can prove as a result of her termination if a jury finds her termination was in violation of the
Whistleblower Act. Such broad recovery, however, is not authorized under the statute.
Instead, the Whistle blower Act explicitly limits the scope of recoverable damages to a finite
enumerated list of special damages, and does not allow for general damages at all. Initially, the
statute defines "damages" to include "injury or loss caused by each violation of this chapter, and
SUN VALLEY'S CORRECTED MSJ MEMORANDUM - 26.
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includes court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees." LC. § 6-2105(1). It then states that "[a]n
employee who alleges a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive
relief or actual damages, or both .... " I.C. § 6-2105(2). The statute goes on to list the specific
remedies that are available, stating:
A court, in rendering a judgment brought under this chapter, may order anv or all of
the following:
(1) An injunction to restrain continued violation of the provisions of this act;

(2) The reinstatement of the employee to the same position held before the
adverse action, or to an equivalent position;
(3) The reinstatement of full fringe benefits and seniority rights;
(4) The compensation for lost wages, benefits and other remuneration;
(5) The payment by the employer of reasonable costs and attorneys' fees;
(6) An assessment of a civil fine of not more than five hundred dollars
($500), which shall be submitted to the state treasurer for deposit in the
general fund.
I.C. § 6-2106 (emphasis added).
Thus, the statute only allows the court to order "any or all" of these express and specific
remedies; it does not provide for any other type of relief. Although the initial providing for damages
or equitable relief seems general, see I.C. § 6-2105, it must be read in conjunction with the more
specific provisions of I. C. § 6-2106, which plainly and explicitly sets forth the remedies that a court
may order for an employee. See Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. ofHealth and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 263264 (2009) (stating that the court "must construe a statute as a whole, and consider all sections of
applicable statutes together to determine the intent of the legislature."). Reading the provisions
together, Section 2105 authorizes damages and/or specific relief, and Section 2106 lists the types
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relief the court may order. To read the Whistleblower Act so broadly as to provide the broad and
unenumerated relief sought by Hammer would require the Court to effectively nullify Section 2106.
In this case, Hammer does not seek the equitable relief authorized under subsections (1)
through (3) (nor would it be appropriate here) and therefore in the unlikely event Hammer were to
prevail she would only be allowed to recover her reasonable costs and attorney fees and
"compensation for lost wages, benefits and other remuneration." LC.§ 6-2106(4), (5).
At least one Idaho district court has found that the Whistleblower Act limits the scope of
recoverable damages such that damages do not include pain and suffering or front pay. See Van v.
PortneufMed Ctr., Inc., 156 Idaho 696, 1065 (2014) (Van II). That issue was appealed but the Idaho
Supreme Court declined to consider it because the court found no liability. Id Nevertheless, the
district court's decision in Van II was correct. Nothing in Section 2106 can be read as a "makewhole" remedy. It contains no reference to pain and suffering or any other general damages Hammer
believes she is entitled to. It also does not refer to front pay extending to Hammer's retirement as her
claims suggests. Instead, it contains a list of six enumerated remedies, to the exclusion of all others.
Thus, Hammer is not entitled to the broad relief she seeks. Consequently, in the event any portion
of her Whistleblower Act claim proceeds, the Court should take this opportunity to grant partial
summary judgment in favor of Sun Valley with respect to Hammer's damages.

v.
CONCLUSION
As shown above and in the accompanying materials, summary judgment is appropriate in
this case.
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DATED this 2.1!_ day ofNovember, 2014.
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.

Ian G. Naylor, Of the Firm
omeys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the .tttaay of November, 2014, I caused to be
served, by the method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
Eric B. Swartz
JoyM. Vega
Jones & Swartz, PLLC
PO Box 7808
Boise, ID 83707-7808
Attorneys for Plaintiff

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
_ J:ax Transmission: 489-8988
- ~ - E11mail:
F
eric@jonesandswartzlaw.com
joy@jonesandswartzlaw.com
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Kirtlan G. Naylor
[fSB No. 3569]
DEC O2 2014
Jacob H. Naylor
[ISB No. 8474]
Jol..ynn_ Drags, Clerlc D/strlct
Tyler D. Williams
[ISB No. 8512]
Coult Blaine Coun Idaho
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; jake@naylorhales.com: tdw@navlorhales.com
Attorneys for Defendants City of Sun Valley,
Ribi, and Briscoe.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2012-479
Plaintiff,
vs.

CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; and
DeWayne BRJSCOE,

SUN VALLEY'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

Defendant, the City of Sun Valley ("Sun Valley"), by and through its counsel, Naylor &
Hales, P.C., hereby submits this Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment. As shown below, Plaintiffs motion must be denied.

I. INTRODUCTION
On November 18, 2014, Sun Valley moved for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff
Sharon R. Hammer ("Hammer") waived and laterreleased her present Whistleblower claim pursuant
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to the plain and unambiguous terms of her 2008 Employment Agreement and 2012 Release. 1 In a
related federal case, Judge Lodge has already analyzed those documents at length and ruled that they
clearly foreclosed Hammer from bringing similar federal retaliation claims under the United States
Constitution and the Idaho Human Rights Act.
Nevertheless, Hammer has now moved for summary judgment on two of Sun Valley's
defenses, contending primarily that the same dispositive waiver and release in the related federal case
are illegal because they purportedly violate public policy. In the alternative, Hammer argues that she
did not knowingly and voluntarily agree to a waiver or release of her Whistleblower claim, but rather
only contracted away a claim arising from a dispute over the severance payment she received in
exchange for her release.
Hammer's arguments are meritless. As discussed in more detail below, she cites to no
controlling authority whatsoever for the proposition that one cannot waive or release a claim under
the Whistleblower Act. Instead, she relies on unrelated case law involving pre-injury waiver of
personal injury claims, and which expressly limits its holding to such settings. Additionally,
Hammer's Employment Agreement and Release are fully integrated, plain and unambiguous written
contracts (the later of which her attorney drafted) and she cannot rely upon extrinsic evidence to
alter, change or modify the easily understandable language therein. Even so, it is apparent she
voluntarily waived and later released this claim. Simply put, Hammer's arguments fail and her
motion must be denied.

Sun Valley hereby incorporates by reference its own summary judgment briefing and
related materials.
1
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II. ARGUMENT
A.

The Waiver and Subsequent Release Did Not Violate Public Policy

It is well-settled that "[f]reedom of contract is a fundamental concept underlying the law of
contracts." Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496, 499 (1970). It is, therefore, "a
general rule of this state and the majority of American jurisdictions that a party may contract to
absolve himself from certain duties and liabilities under a contract subject to certain limitations."

Anderson & Nafziger v_ G. T Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 178 ( 1978). In other words, the general
rule is that exculpatory clauses are valid, but there are exceptions, one of which is where the
exculpatory clause violates public policy. See, e.g., Lee v. Sun Valley Co_, 107 Idaho 976, 978-979
(1984). Whether a contract violates public policy is a question oflaw. Hyta v. Finley, 13 7 Idaho 755,
757 (2002).
Hammer relies on Lee, supra, to support her argument that her waiver and release contravene
public policy. That case, however, does not support Hammer's argument. There, the plaintiff
participated in a horseback ride put on by a licensed outfitter and guide. Id. at 977. Prior to riding,
the plaintiff signed an agreement stating that the would hold the outfitter hannless from all claims
arising from any injuries that might occur from use of the horse and equipment. The outfitter
readjusted the horse saddle and, during the ride, the horse reared and plaintiff fell off, sustaining
injuries. Id. The plaintiff sued the outfitter for damages and the district court granted summary
judgment for the outfitter based on the pre-injury hold harmless agreement. Id. at 977-978.
The Idaho Supreme Court found that the waiver did not exempt the outfitter from liability
based on its holding that:
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We do not attempt to articulate a general rule applicable to all statutes. However, we
do hold that where the legislature has addressed the rights and duties pertaining to
personal injuries arising out of the relationship between two groups, i.e.,
employers/employees, outfitters and guides/participants, and has granted limited
liability to one group in exchange for adherence to specific duties, then such duties
become a "public duty" within the exception to the general rule validating
exculpatory contracts.
Lee, 107 Idaho at 979 ( emphasis added).

Lee plainly does not control here. The Idaho Whistleblower statute simply does not address
the rights and duties pertaining to personal injuries and it does not grant limited liability to one group
in exchange for adherence to specific duties. Instead, it provides a private cause of action for
retaliatory adverse employment action, similar to the Ida110 Human Rights Act, Title VII, or
Constitutional retaliation claims, all of which can be waived or released. (See Judge Lodge's
Decision at 9-18.)
Hammer also ignores the fact that, even if - for the sake of argument only - a prospective
waiver of a Whistleblower claim was in violation of public policy, she also later signed a release,
which plainly and unambiguously relinquished all claims she had at the time of her termination.
Hammer has shown nothing to indicate how such a release would violate public policy and, indeed,
she could not as it makes no sense to forbid the resolution of existing claims.
Overall, Hammer attempts to create an incredibly broad and legally unsupported exception
to the general rule that exculpatory clauses are legal and enforceable. And she does so by relying on
inapposite case law dealing exclusively v.rith personal injuries and statutory-based limited liability
provisions. This "one-size-fits-all" approach is unavailing. Because the general rule allows
exculpatory clauses and there is no contrary authority in Idaho for the proposition that an employee
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cannot waive or release a Whistleblower claim, Hammer's motion for summary judgment must be
denied.
B.

Hammer Cannot Rely On Extrinsic Evidence to Alter the Plain Meanine
of Her Emplovment Agreement and Release

Hammer contends that even if she could release a Whistleblower claim, she did not have
"voluntary intent" to do so here. (Plfs Memo at 12, 15-17.) She also contends that the waiver and
release are invalid because they do not specifically state Hammer was relinquishing a Whistleblower
claim. Instead, despite the plain and unambiguous language in the Employment Agreement and
Release, Hammer argues their scope "extended only to claims arising out of a dispute related to the
severance package." (Plfs Memo at 15.) She has provided the Court with her O\:vn declaration, with
several exhibits, her husband/attorney James R. Donoval's declaration, and the declaration of fonner
mayor Wayne Willich, all of which she contends shows what she believes is the true meaning of the
Employment Agreement waiver and the Release.
These materials, however, are inadmissible. Exculpatory clauses are subject to the normal
rules of contract interpretation. Relevant here is the parol evidence rule, which provides that
"[w]here preliminary negotiations are consummated by vvritten agreement, the writing supercedes
all previous understandings and the intent of the parties must be ascertained from the writing." Valley
Bank v. Christensen, 119 Idaho 496, 498 ( 1991) (emphasis added). Further:

If the written agreement is complete upon its face and unambiguous, no fraud or
mistake being alleged, extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous negotiations
or conversations is not admissible to contradict, vary, alter, add to or detract from the
tenns of the written contract. It is well established in Idaho that [o]ral stipulations,
agreements, and negotiations preliminary to a written contract are presumed merged
therein and will not be admitted to contradict the plain terms of the contract.

Id. (internal quotations omitted).
SUN VALLEY'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MSJ - 5.
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As detailed in Sun Valley's moving papers, there is no dispute here that the Employment
Agreement and Release are complete upon their face and that there is no fraud or mistake being
alleged. The Employment Agreement waiver plainly and unambiguously states that Hammer waived
her right to bring a "claim of any kind against [Sun Valley] arising from a termination without
cause." (Robertson Deel., Ex. A at SV 62.) And Hammer plainly and unambiguously released Sun
Valley from "any claims" defined in the Employment Agreement ''as were intended when the City
Administrator Employment Agreement was entered into on June 1, 2008. (Robertson Deel., Ex. C.)
Such intent can only be found through the fully integrated Employment Agreement and Release.
Nevertheless, Hammer attempts to get around this straightforward rule by arguing that the
waiver and release are vague or ambiguous because they do not specifically state that Hammer was
relinquishing a claim under the Whistleblower Act. (Plfs Memo at 16.) She has consequently
submitted extrinsic evidence purporting to show what she (as well as Donoval and Willich)
subjectively understood her Employment Agreement and Release to mean. It is difficult to
understand why Hammer fails to grasp the plain and unambiguous language of her waiver and
release. As Judge Lodge stated: "the language ofthe contract could not be clearer. The waiver/release
was to 'any and all claims' without any limitations." (Lodge Decision at 17) (emphasis added).
Further, there is no requirement in that an exculpatory clause of this kind must specifically
identify the claim being released. Indeed, the language quoted by Hammer in support of this
proposition merely states that exculpatory clauses "must speak clearly and directly to the particular
conduct of the defendant which caused the harm at issue." Jesse v. Lindsley, 149 ldaho 70, 75 (2008).
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This standard is plainly satisfied by the language of the Employment Agreement and Release, as
quoted above, and Hammer's argument to the contrary is simply meritless.

c.

The Waiver and Release Were Made Knowingly and Voluntarilv

When significant federal constitutional or civil rights are waived or released, it must be done
knowingly and voluntarily. E.g., Salmeron v. United States, 724 F.2d 1357, l 361 (9th Cir. 1989).
In those cases courts will look to the totality of the circumstances to ensure proper waiver. Sun
Valley is not aware of any similar requirement in Idaho related to the waiver or release of a state
Whistleblower claim. As noted above, under basic contract principles, the intent of the parties is
ascertained in a complete, plain and unambiguous written contract from within its four corners.
Extlinsic evidence cannot be used to "contradict, vary, alter, add to or detract from the terms of the
written contract." Valley Bank. 119 Idaho at 498.
There is no reason here to vary from Idaho's well-settled contract law. Even were the Court
to look outside of the Employment Agreement and Release it is clear that Hammer knowingly and
voluntarily waived and later released her Whistleblower claim. In Judge Lodge's apt words:
... The Court finds the totality of the circumstances evidences that Ms. Hammer
made a voluntary, deliberate and informed waiver of any and all of her claims when
she accepted the agreed to severance payment. Ms. Hammer signed the release after
being advised by her legal counsel and husband on the matter. The plain and
unambiguous terms make abundantly clear that the acceptance of the severance
payment waives and/or releases any and all claims Ms. Hammer may have had for
damages arising from her termination. Althol!gh Plaintiffs (Donoval and Hammer]
now argue they did not know or intend to give up their non-contract tort and
constitutional claims, the fact remains that the plain and express terms of the
documents they signed clearly state otherwise. Ms. Hammer is a knowledgeable
person who worked in a professional capacity for the City for several years and was
advised by her legal counsel and husband before signing the release. Had the
Plaintiffs believed and/or intended something other than what was plainly and
explicitly stated in the written documents they could have and should have included
language to that effect in the documents themselves.
SUN VALLEY'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MSJ - 7.
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(Lodge Decision at 15-16) (brackets added) This reasoning is just as sound when applied to
Hammer's present Whistleblower claim as it is when applied to her other claims in federal court.

III. CONCLUSION
As shovm above, and in Sun Valley's own summary judgment materials, Hanuner's motion
for summary judgment must be denied.
DATED this 2"d day of December, 2014.

NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of December, 2014, I caused to be served,
by the method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
Eric B. Swartz
Joy M. Vega
Jones & Swartz, PLLC
PO Box 7808
Boise, ID 83707-7808

/u.s.Mail
_ ~and Delivered
k'.:Aax Transmission: 489-8988
Email: eric@ionesandswartzlaw.com
joy<@jonesandswartzlaw.com

J2'

Attorneys for Plaint~ff
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Joy M. Vega, ISB #7887
JONES & SWARTZ PLLC
1673 W. Shoreline Drive, Suite 200 [83702]
P.O. Box 7808
Boise, ID 83 707-7808
Telephone: (208) 489-8989
Facsimile: (208) 489-8988
Email: eric@jonesandswartzlaw.com
joy@jonesandswartziaw.com
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Attorneys for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2012-479
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI;
and DeWA YNE BRISCOE,

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
SUN VALLEY'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer has sufficiently pied and herein submits evidence of a prima

facie case of retaliation against her by Defendant City of Sun Valley ("Sun Valley," "City" or
"Defendant") in violation of the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act, Idaho Code §§ 62101, et seq. ("IPPEA").

Ms. Hammer also submits argument and evidence refuting

Sun Valley's claim that she has previously waived or released the rights and privileges afforded
by Idaho's legislature pursuant to the IPPEA. The evidence of record does not support any
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aspect of Sun Valley's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons below, that Motion
should be denied.
II. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS WHICH ARE IN DISPUTE

Ms. Hammer submits this section, Statement of Material Facts Which Are in Dispute, in
response to Sun Valley's Section II, Background. (Def's. Corrected MSJ Mem., § II, pp. 3-11.)
Ms. Hammer also incorporates her Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, and all citations in
support thereof, as set forth in Section II of the MEMORANDUM

IN

SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ("Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts"), filed on November 18, 2014, as
if set forth in full herein.
Ms. Hammer raises disputed issues of material fact, as follows:
1.

Plaintiff disputes certain alleged facts contained at Def s. Corrected MSJ Mem.,

pp. 3-4. Plaintiff disputes that the Employment Agreement, as presented by Defendant, is a true
and correct copy of that document because it is missing the last page. 1
2.
p. 4.

Plaintiff disputes certain alleged facts contained at Def s. Corrected MSJ Mem.,

Plaintiff disputes that she was terminated from her position at Sun Valley under the

"without cause" provision of her Employment Agreement, as claimed by Defendant. 2 Sun
Valley and various officials and representatives had been named by Ms. Hammer as defendants
in lawsuits, notices of tort claims, and charges of discrimination to the Idaho Human Rights
Commission. 3 Mayor Briscoe submitted sworn testimony in the 2011 IP PEA Case enumerating

1

AFFIDAVIT OF SHARON R. HAMMER IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ("Pltfs MSJ Aff. of Hammer"), filed on November 18, 2014, Ex. 1.
2
Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r,r 4, 6-10, 12-17, 21-29.
3
Pltf's MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r,r 12, 16, 17, 20.
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purported reasons why he placed Ms. Hammer back on leave. 4 And, Mayor Briscoe later
testified that a majority of those reasons could be cause for terminating Ms. Hammer. 5 On
January 25, 2012, the Idaho Mountain Express reported:

"When asked whether Hammer's

termination was with or without cause, Naylor said, 'There was no stated cause."'6 Even Mr.
Naylor's quote that, "[t]here was no stated cause," implies that some cause did exist, but Sun
Valley would not, or could not, be publically forthright about that cause. 7 Further, Defendant's
actions and the publicity it generated regarding Ms. Hammer's personnel matters, the
investigations into the allegations lodged against her, and the bias existing within Sun Valley
toward her all evidence that Sun Valley only purportedly terminated her without cause. 8
3.

Plaintiff disputes certain alleged facts contained at Def' s. Corrected MSJ Mem.,

p. 4. Plaintiff disputes that after she received the severance payment from Sun Valley they
"parted ways," as claimed by Defendant. 9

Following her termination from Sun Valley,

Defendant has engaged in a campaign to ruin Ms. Hammer's personal and professional
reputations. 10 Before and after Ms. Hammer's termination, Mr. Ribi maintained a website and a
blog, both of which recounted and discussed allegations of misconduct, criminal conduct, and
alleged harassment of other Sun Valley employees by Ms. Hammer. 11 As a result of the large
amount of publicity that Defendant generated leading up to and following Ms. Hammer's
Pltf's MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r 23.
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT {"Pltf's
MSJ Aff. of Counsel"), filed on November 18, 2014, Ex. 25, Briscoe Dep. 88:20-108:14.
6
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO SUN VALLEY'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ("Pltf's Resp. Af£ of Counsel"), filed contemporaneously herewith, Ex. 2;
Pltf's MSJ Aff. of Counsel, Ex. 25, Briscoe Dep. 152:20-158:14, 166:9-19, 168:3-169:1.
7
See Pltf's MSJ Stmt of Facts, 114, 6-10, 12-17, 21-29.
8
Def's Corrected MSJ Mem. § II; Pltf's Stmt of Disputed Facts.
9
Pltf's Resp. Aff. of Counsel, Ex. 1, ,r,r 12-17; Pltf's MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r, 13-14, 21-23, 27-29.
10
Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,i,r 13-14, 21-23, 27-29; Pitf's Resp. Aff. of Counsel, Ex. 1, ilil 12-17.
11
Pltf's MSJ Aff. of Counsel, Ex. 26, Ribi Dep. 159:23-161:4; 173:4--175:9.
4

5
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termination, she has been unable to obtain employment in her chosen career field of local
management administration. 12
4.

Plaintiff disputes certain alleged facts contained at Def's. Corrected MSJ Mem.,

p. 4. Plaintiff disputes that she "agree[d] not to sue Sun Valley," as claimed by Defendant.13 In
June 2008, when the Employment Agreement was entered into by Ms. Hammer and Sun Valley,
there was no intent by either party that Ms. Hammer was waiving or would waive any
constitutional or statutory rights, or claims of discrimination, harassment, retaliation, or tort.

14

In

January 2012, when Ms. Hammer signed the Supplemental Release, she had no intent to
relinquish any constitutional or statutory rights or waive any of the claims alleged in the present
IPPEA case. 15
5.

Plaintiff disputes certain alleged facts contained at Def's. Corrected MSJ Mem.,

p. 5. Plaintiff disputes that "she received a six-month severance in exchange for releasing [her
claims under the IPPEA]," as stated by Defendant. 16

Plaintiff incorporates by reference

paragraph 4, above, herein.
6.
p. 5.

Plaintiff disputes certain alleged facts contained at Def's. Corrected MSJ Mem.,

Plaintiff disputes that she was terminated from her position at Sun Valley under the

12

Pltf's Resp. Aff. of Counsel, Ex. 1, 1112-17.
Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts, 11 30-37; Pltf's MSJ Aff. of Hammer, 11 3-4, 7-11, 15-22;
AFFIDAVIT OF WAYNE WILLICH IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
{"Pltfs MSJ Aff. of Willich"), filed on November 18, 2014, fl 2-3, 5-10; AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES
R. DONOVAL IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ("Pltf's MSJ Aff. of
Donoval"), filed on November 18, 2014, fl 4-9 and Exs. 1-3.
14
Pltf's MSJ Stmt of Facts, 1,r 35-36.
15
Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts, fl 31-33, 37.
16
Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r,r 30-37; Pltf's MSJ Aff. of Hammer, 11 3-4, 7-11, 15-22; Pltfs
MSJ Aff. ofWillich, ,r,r 2-3, 5-10; Pltf's MSJ Aff. ofDonoval, 114-9 and Exs. 1-3.
13
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"without cause" provision of her Employment Agreement, as claimed by Defendant. 17 Plaintiff
incorporates by reference paragraph 2, above, herein.
7.

Plaintiff disputes certain alleged facts contained at Def s. Corrected MSJ Mem.,

p. 5. Plaintiff disputes that "she executed a Release of all claims against Sun Valley," as claimed
by Defendant.
8.

18

Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraph 4, above, herein.

Plaintiff disputes certain alleged facts contained at Defs. Corrected MSJ Mem.,

p. 6. Plaintiff disputes that the lawsuit filed with the United States District Court for the District
of Idaho, Case No. 1: 13-cv-211-EJL, "substantially overlaps with the present Whistleblower
case," as claimed by Defendant. The federal case alleges causes of action arising from the
federal defendants' violations of Ms. Hammer and her husband, James R. Donoval's, civil
rights. 19 The federal case also alleges causes of action based in Idaho common law.20 This case
is based on the statutory rights and protection enacted by Idaho's legislature as the Idaho
Protection of Public Employees Act, Idaho Code, §§ 6-2101, et seq. The federal court has never
had before it a claim of waiver of rights under the IPPEA. 21 Thus, while both cases arise from
the same set of facts, they are different in scope and governing precedent.
9.

Plaintiff disputes certain alleged facts contained at Def s. Corrected MSJ Mem.,

p. 6. Plaintiff disputes that Judge Lodge ''significantly narrowed the federal case by dismissing
all but two claims," as stated by Defendant. The federal decision cited by Defendant has no

Pltfs MSJ Stint of Facts, ,r14, 6-10, 12-17, 21-29.
Pltfs MSJ Stint of Facts, ,r,r 30-37; Pltfs MSJ Aff. of Hammer, 11 3-4, 7-11, 15-22; Pltfs
MSJ Aff. ofWillich, 1,r 2-3, 5-10; Pltfs MSJ Aff. ofDonoval, ,r,r 4-9 and Exs. 1-3.
19
Sharon R. Hammer and James R. Donoval v. City of Sun Valley, Nils Ribi, and De Wayne
Briscoe, Case No. 1:13-cv-211-EJL, In the United States District Court for the District of Idaho
("Hammer, et al. v. Sun Valley, et al."), ON 1, Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial.
20
Hammer, et al. v. Sun Valley, et al., DN 1, Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial.
21
Hammer, et al. v. Sun Valley, et al., DN 1, Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial.
17
18
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bearing on this case. In response to the federal court's issuance of the referenced decision,
Ms. Hammer timely filed PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT'S
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS that is still
pending.

22

Ms. Hammer also filed PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED MOTION TO AMEND THE SCHEDULING

ORDER AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT, which is still pending in the federal
court.

23

And, Ms. Hammer filed PLAINTIFF SHARON HAMMER'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT regarding certain federal causes of action and state common law claims that the
federal court erroneously dismissed and/or that are expected to be revived when the federal court
grants the pending Motion for Reconsideration. 24 Judge Lodge's decision is not final.
10.

Plaintiff disputes certain alleged facts contained at Defs. Corrected MSJ Mem.,

pp. 6-7. Plaintiff disputes that her "termination was because Mayor Briscoe determined he could
not work with her and would rather vet and hire his own City Administrator," as claimed by
Defendant. 25 Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraph 2, above, herein.
11.

Plaintiff disputes certain alleged facts contained at Def s. Corrected MSJ Mem.,

p. 7. Plaintiff disputes that ongoing Sun Valley matters under investigation "were not ... the
cause of Hammer's termination," as claimed by Defendant. 26 Plaintiff incorporates by reference
paragraph 2, above, herein.
12.

Plaintiff disputes certain alleged facts contained at Def's. Corrected MSJ Mem.,

p. 7. Plaintiff disputes that after the November 11, 2011 executive session that Mayor Willich or
Adam King "presented the allegations that had been made against her," as claimed by
22

Hammer, et al. v. Sun Valley, et al., DNs 44, 44-1, 51, 57.
Hammer, et al. v. Sun Valley, et al., DNs 45, 45-1 - 45-4, 52, 58.
24
Hammer, et al. v. Sun Valley, et al., DNs 48-48-44, 50, 53.
25
Pltf's MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,14, 6-10, 12-17, 21-29.
26
Pltf's MSJ Stmt of Facts,,, 4, 6-10, 12-17, 21-29.

23
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Defendant.

27

At the time her resignation was demanded, Ms. Hammer was told only that

undefined allegations of misconduct had been lodged against her. 28
13.

Plaintiff disputes certain alleged facts contained at Defs. Corrected MSJ Mem.,

p. 8. Plaintiff disputes that the November 18, 2011 involuntary leave was "non-disciplinary," as
claimed by Defendant.

29

Shortly after forcing Ms. Hammer to go on leave, Sun Valley allowed

the Idaho Mountain Express newspaper to report that:

"An internal investigation of Sun

Valley City Administrator Sharon Hammer's 'possible misuse of public funds and
equipment' was the cause of her being placed on administrative leave two weeks ago."30
Nils Ribi, as a Sun Valley City Councilman submitted sworn testimony that: "[T)he Mayor and

Council had reason to believe that the [Ms. Hammer) may have committed serious
misconduct, including possible criminal violations of statutes dealing with the misuse of
public funds and falsification of public records."31 These, and other, public statements by Sun
Valley show that Ms. Hammer's involuntary leave was not non-disciplinary.
14.

Plaintiff disputes certain alleged facts contained at Def s. Corrected MSJ Mem.,

p. 10. Plaintiff disputes that she was tenninated ''because Mayor Briscoe detennined he could
not work with her and would rather vet and hire his own city administrator," as claimed by
Defendant. 32 Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraph 2, above, herein.
15.

Plaintiff disputes certain alleged facts contained at Defs. Corrected MSJ Mem.,

p. 11. Plaintiff disputes that in the present suit she "has attempted to confuse these events and

Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts,~ 8-9, 25; Pltfs MSJ Aff. of Hammer, ,r 14.
Pltfs MSJ Aff. of Hammer, ,r 14.
29
Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r,r 11, 13-14.
30
Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r 13 (emphasis added).
31
Pltfs MSJ Strnt of Facts, ,r 13 (emphasis added).
32
Pltf s MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r,r 4, 6-10, 12-17, 21-29.

27
28
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conflate them in such a way as to show that Ribi somehow orchestrated a scheme to have her
fired in retaliation for reporting his alleged harassment," as argued by Defendant. 33
unsupported argument does not assert or prove any issue of material fact.

This

Regardless,

Ms. Hammer disputes the argument, as presented herein and in her Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, filed November 18, 2014.
16.

Plaintiff disputes certain alleged facts contained at Defs. Corrected MSJ Mem.,

p. 11. Plaintiff disputes that "she waived and then released this claim and, in any event, there is
insufficient evidence to support her claim," as argued by Defendant. 34 Plaintiff incorporates by
reference paragraph 4, above, herein.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). In making
the determination, disputed facts within the record are to be construed in the light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.

Castorena v. General Elec., 149 Idaho 609, 613, 238 P.3d 209, 213 (2010) (citation omitted).
"The fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment does not change the
applicable standard of review, and [the] Court must evaluate each party's motion on its own
merits." Ciszek v. Kootenai County Bd. of Comm'rs, 151 Idaho 123, 128, 254 P.3d 24, 28-29
(2011) (quoting Barley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 176, 233 P.3d 102, 107 (2010)). "When both
parties file simultaneous cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court still bears the
33

Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts.
Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts, 11 30-37; Pltf's MSJ Aff. of Hammer, 'i['i[ 3-4, 7-11, 15-22; Pltfs
MSJ Aff. of Willich, 'i['i[ 2-3, 5-10; Pltfs MSJ Aff. ofDonoval, 'i['i[ 4-9 and Exs. 1-3.

34
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responsibility for determining whether disputed issues of material fact are present, and must
evaluate all of the evidence submitted." Al-Kidd v. Gonzales, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106989 at
** 22-23, 2008 WL 553777 at *7 (D. Idaho Feb. 13, 2008) (citing Fair Hous. Council of

Riverside County, Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001).

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Ms. Hammer Did Not Waive or Release Any Rights or Remedies Arising from
Sun Valley's Violations of the IPPEA
1.

The public policy underlying the IPPEA prohibits the waiver and release claimed
by Sun Valley.

The public policy of the IPPEA is an express exclusion to the general contract analysis
relied upon by Sun Valley to excuse itself of liability arising from its violations of the IPPEA.
(Defs. Corrected MSJ Mem., § IV.A.) The State of Idaho has seen fit to protect government
employees and define the legality of a government employer's response when informed of
allegations of misconduct by one employee against another. The statute's declared intent is that:
The legislature hereby finds, determines and declares that
government constitutes a large proportion of the Idaho work force
and that it is beneficial to the citizens of this state to protect the
integrity of government by providing a legal cause of action for
public employees who experience adverse action from their
employer as a result of reporting waste and violations of a law, rule
or regulation.
LC.§ 6-2101. This statement of intent is Idaho's declaration of public policy with respect to the
protection of "whistleblower" employees. "Public policy may be found and set forth in the
statutes,judicial decisions or the constitution." Jesse v. Lindsley, 146 Idaho 70, 75,233 P.3d 1, 6
(2008) (quotation omitted). Sun Valley cannot relieve itself of liability arising from its, or its
employee's, violations of the IPPEA by conditioning payment of Ms. Hammer's severance
payment on her assent to a contractual exculpatory clause. Any such alleged waiver or release

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO SUN VALLEY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 9
1420

would be void as against the public policy of this State. "Whether a contract violates public
policy is a question of law for the court to determine from all the facts and circumstances of each
case." Jesse, 146 Idaho at 75,233 P.3d at 6 (citation omitted).
Sun Valley is prohibited from contracting its way out of liability arising from violations
of the IPPEA because such liability has been prescribed to it by Idaho's legislature. "[W]e do
hold that where the legislature has addressed the rights and duties pertaining to personal
injuries arising out of the relationship between two groups, i.e., employers/employees ... ,
and has granted limited liability to one group in exchange for adherence to specific duties,
then such duties become a 'public duty' within the exception to the general rule validating
exculpatory contracts." Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976, 979, 695 P.2d 361, 364 (1984)

(emphasis added).

Under the IPPEA, government employers are subject to liability for

enumerated relief when the jury finds that the employer took an adverse action against the
employee because the employee engaged in protected activity. I.C. §§ 6-2104, 6-2106.
Prior to Lee, "the general rule ... that 'express agreements exempting one of the parties
[from liability] are to be sustained' is subject to exceptions where: '(1) one party is at an obvious
disadvantage in bargaining power; (2) a public duty is involved (public utility companies,
common carriers)."' 107 Idaho at 978, 695 P.2d at 363 (quoting Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler
Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496, 499-500, 465 P.2d 107, 110-11 (1970)).

"However, it [was]

nevertheless well established that courts look with disfavor on such attempts to avoid liability
and construe such provisions strictly against the person relying on them, especially when that
person is the preparer of the document." Anderson & Nafziger v. G. T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho
175, 178, 595 P.2d 709, 712 (1979) (citations omitted).
The Court in Lee clarified the public duty exemption and affirmed that, in Idaho,
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"[certain] statutory rights and duties may not be waived or exempted by contract." 107 Idaho at
979, 695 P.2d at 364 (citations omitted).

And, "[e]ven though no express provisions be

contained in the ... statute, it would seem that any attempt to nullify or limit the operation of law
must be held to be invalid as being against public policy."

Id. (quoting 81 Am.Jur.2d

Workmen's Comp.§ 51, p. 741 (1976)). The IPPEA falls within the class of statutory rights and
duties that cannot be waived or released by contract because it pertains to injuries arising out of
the relationship between government employers and their employees - a pairing specifically
identified in Lee's holding. Id.
Beginning in October 2009, Ms. Hammer made numerous complaints to Mayor Willich
and City Attorney King regarding Councilman Ribi's acts of harassment, hostility and
misconduct against her. 35 Mr. Ribi's harassing conduct violated Section 7.5 of the City of
Sun Valley Personnel Policies & Procedures Manual. 36 The Policies & Procedures Manual

had been repeatedly adopted by resolutions of the Mayor and City Council, causing it to be
a "permanent record" of the City of Sun Valley.37 LC. § 50-907(1); see also LC. § 50-902
(establishing process for passage of resolutions).

Ms. Hammer's acts of reporting Mr. Ribi's

violative conduct, and her subsequent, related IHRC and court filings were all protected
activities under the IPPEA.38 LC. § 6-2104. Prior to her termination, Sun Valley made public
statements about Ms. Hammer being placed on administrative leave, and that she was being
investigated for criminal misconduct.

39

On January 19, 2012, Mayor Briscoe, with the majority vote of the Sun Valley City
35

Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,i 4.
Pltfs MSJ Aff. of Counsel, Ex. 3, § 7.5.
37
Pltfs MSJ Aff. of Counsel, Ex. 3, cover page.
38
Pltfs MSJ Strnt of Facts, 114, 12, 15-17, 20.
39
Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,i113-14, 21-29.
36
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Council, terminated Ms. Hammer from her position as City Administrator.

purportedly terminated Ms. Ham.mer "without cause."

41

40

Sun Valley

Pursuant to Section 3 of her

Employment Agreement, termination without cause required the City to make a severance
payment to Ms. Ham.mer, under the following terms:

SECTION 3. TERMINATION AND SEVERANCE PAY
A. Employer, acting through the Mayor, may terminate
Employee's employment, without cause, for any reason or no
reason. Any such decision to terminate shall occur only after the
Mayor consults with each member of the City Council. Upon such
termination, Employer shall pay Employee, as severance pay, a
lump sum cash payment equal to six (6) months, base salary
described in Section 5, Subsection A.
The severance payment herein is intended to be
Employee's sole exclusive remedy for any and all claims for
damages of any kind arising from a termination without cause and
such severance payment is hereby agreed to be reasonable, fair and
equitable by both parties to this Agreement.
Accordingly,
Employee waives her right to bring a claim of any kind for
damages against Employer arising from a termination without
cause. Consequently, receipt of the severance payment is subject
to execution of a release of all claims against the City of Sun
Valley. A termination without cause shall not entitle Employee to
an informal review under any section of the City of Sun Valley
Personnel manual ("Personnel Manual"). 42
The Employment Agreement did not describe or specify what the anticipated release should say
or the causes of action the release was anticipated to cover. 43
Following a series of conversations between Mr. Donoval, as Ms. Hammer's attorney,
and Sun Valley's attorney, Mr. Naylor, Ms. Hammer provided Sun Valley with the Supplemental
Release on January 23, 2012. 44 At no time did Mr. Naylor or Sun Valley ever demand language

Pltf s MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r 28.
Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r,r 28-30.
42
Pltfs MSJ Aff. of Hammer, Ex. 1, § 3.A (emphasis original).
43
Pltfs MSJ Aff. of Hammer, Ex. 1, § 3.A.
44
Pltf s MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r,r 31-32.
40

41
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releasing Ms. Hammer's claims under the IPPEA. Leading up to the Supplemental Release, Mr.
Donoval repeatedly advised Sun Valley that Ms. Hammer would not waive or release any claim
other than those arising from the severance package (i.e., she would only waive contract and
wage claims). 45 The intent of Ms. Hammer's release extended only to claims arising out of a
dispute related to the severance package.46 In line with Ms. Hammer's position regarding the
scope of Section 3.A. of the Employment Agreement, the Supplemental Release succinctly
stated:
Upon payment of the severance payment required pursuant to
Section 3.A. of the City Administrator Employment Agreement
dated June 1, 2008, I release the City of Sun Valley for any claims
defined in Section 3.A. of the City Administrator Employment
Agreement as were intended when the City Administrator
Employment Agreement was entered into on June 1, 2008.47
Ms. Hammer was subsequently paid all amounts of severance due to her under the contract. 48
In June 2008, when the Employment Agreement was entered into by Ms. Hammer and
Sun Valley, Mayor Willich was authorized, and had the supporting unanimous vote of the City
Council, to hire Ms. Hammer. 49 At the time the Employment Agreement was entered, there was
no intent by either party that Ms. Hammer was or would waive or release any statutory right or
protection under the IPPEA. 50 And, when Ms. Hammer signed the Supplemental Release, she
had absolutely no intent to release any statutory rights or waive any of the claims alleged in the
present case. 51

Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r 32.
Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts, 1131-37.
47
Pltfs MSJ Aff. of Hammer, Ex. 2.
48
Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r 34
49
Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r,r 35-37.
50
Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r 36.
51
Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r 37.
45

46
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Even if Sun Valley's extension of Section 3.A. of the Employment Agreement, to relieve
it of liability imposed by the IPPEA, did not violate public policy, it would still fail. "Clauses

which exclude liability must speak clearly and directly to the particular conduct of the
defendant which caused the harm at issue." Jesse, 146 Idaho at 75, 233 P.3d at 6 (citing
Anderson & Nafziger v. G. T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 178, 595 P.2d 709, 712 (1979))

(emphasis added).

The language absolving Sun Valley of liability in Section 3 of the

Employment Agreement "for any and all claims for damages of any kind arising from a
termination without cause" is ambiguous and simply too broad. 52 See Jesse, 146 Idaho at 76-77,
233 P.3d at 7-8 (finding exculpatory clause in lease too broad to enforce).

Neither the

Supplemental Release nor the Employment Agreement cites to, acknowledges, or even infers
waiver and release of her statutory rights under the IPPEA or Sun Valley's liability for violations
thereof. 53 No language within either document purported to waive or release the right to sue
conferred upon Ms. Hammer by the IPPEA. 54 LC.§ 6-2105. Even if she could, Ms. Hammer
did not waive or release any claims or relief under the IPPEA. 55
The Employment Agreement and Ms. Hammer's Supplemental Release cannot absolve
Sun Valley of a possible violation of the IPPEA. Lee, 107 Idaho 979-80, 695 P.2d 364-65. "It is
a well-settled general doctrine that the law will not sustain a covenant of immunity which
protects against fraud or relieves one of a duty imposed by law for the public benefit." Lee, 107
Idaho at 982, 695 P.2d at 367 (Bistline, J., dissenting) (quoting 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 188,
p. 557) (emphasis added in Lee)). The Court should find as a matter oflaw that Ms. Hammer did

52

Pltfs MSJ Aff. of Hammer, Ex. 1, § 3.A.
Pltfs MSJ Aff. of Hammer, Exs. 1 and 2.
54
Pltfs MSJ Aff. of Hammer, Exs. 1 and 2.
55
Pltf s MSJ Stmt of Facts,,, 32-37.
53
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not and could not waive or release any right or protection provided under the IPPEA, and dismiss
Sun Valley's Fifth and Sixth Affirmative Defenses.
2.

Inherent in Idaho law is a presumption against the waiver or release
of statutory rights.

Idaho law restricts the waiver or release of a known right. 56 "Waiver is a voluntary,

intentionai reiinquishment of a known right or advantage." Brand S. Corp. v. King, 102
Idaho 731, 724, 639 P.2d 429, 432 (1981) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Nothing in the
record before the Court establishes that Ms. Hammer voluntarily and intentionally relinquished
her rights under the IPPEA. To the contrary, the record is replete with evidence that such a
waiver and release were not contemplated or intended under either the Employment Agreement
or the Supplemental Release. 57
No terms of the Employment Agreement or the Supplemental Release "speak clearly and
directly" to exclude Sun Valley's liability under the IPPEA. Jesse, 146 Idaho at 75, 233 P.3d at
6. And, when the language of the Supplemental Release was being negotiated by Ms. Hammer
and Sun Valley, Sun Valley did not request or require the Supplemental Release include specific
language regarding Ms. Hammer's rights under the IP PEA. 58 "The primary aim in interpretation
of all contracts is to ascertain the mutual intent of the parties at the time the contract was made."
56

The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that constitutional rights may be waived, so
long as the prospective plaintiff (often times a criminal defendant) does so knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently. See, Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 834-35 n.11 (2012); Lubcke v.
Boise City/Ada County Hous. Auth., 124 Idaho 450, 460 (1993). "However, the waiver of any
fundamental constitutional right is never presumed." Glangary-Gamlin Protective Ass 'n v.
Bird, 106 Idaho 84, 90, 675 P.2d 344, 350 (Ct. App. 1983) (citation omitted). "[T]he waiver
must be affirmatively demonstrated." Bird, 106 Idaho at 90, 675 P.2d at 350. "As a corollary
to this definition of waiver, this Court has repeatedly stated that there is a presumption against
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights." Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Smith v.
State, 146 Idaho 822, 834-35 n.11 (2012) (citations omitted).
57
Pltf's Stmt of Disputed Facts, ff 3-5, 7, 16.
58
Pltf's Stmt of Disputed Facts, ff 3-5, 7, 16; Pltf's MSJ Aff. ofDonoval, Exs. 1-3.

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO SUN VALLEY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 15
1426

Opportunity, LLC v. Ossewarde, 1636 Idaho 602, 607, 38 P.3d 1258, 1263 (2002) (citation

omitted). "If possible, the intent of the parties should be ascertained from the language of the
agreement as the best indication of their intent." Opportunity, LLC, 1636 Idaho at 607, 38 P.3d at
1263 (citation omitted). And, "when a subsequently executed agreement specifically references
and relies on a former agreement, the two are to be interpreted together, if possible."
Opportunity, LLC, 1636 Idaho at 607, 38 P.3d at 1263 (citing Silver Syndicate, Inc. v. Sunshine
Mining Co., 101 Idaho 226,235,611 P.2d 1011, 1020 (1979)).

The Supplemental Release purposefully refers back to the intent of Ms. Hammer and
Mayor Willich when they signed the Employment Agreement in June 2008:
Upon payment of the severance payment required pursuant to
Section 3 .A. of the City Administrator Employment Agreement
dated June 1, 2008, I release the City Of Sun Valley for any claims
defined in Section 3.A. of the City Administrator Employment
Agreement as were intended when the City Administrator
Employment Agreement was entered into on June 1, 2008. 59
The evidence of record shows that Mayor Willich and Ms. Hammer did not intend the
Employment Agreement to "waive any statutory rights or future discrimination, harassment,
retaliation or other non-contract claims if the City of Sun Valley shoes to ever terminate the
Employment Agreement pursuant to the 'without cause' provisions of Section 3, Paragraph A." 60
The Supplemental Release expressly incorporates the Employment Agreement and expressly
incorporates the intent of Sun Valley and Ms. Hammer when the Employment Agreement was
executed. 61 To ascertain the intent of the parties in June 2008, the only admissible evidence
available to the Court is the testimony of Mayor Willich and Ms. Hammer, and the terms of the

59

60
61

Pltf's MSJ Aff. of Hammer, Ex. 2 (emphasis added).
Pltf's MSJ Aff. of Willich, ,r 7; Pltf's Stmt of Disputed Facts, fl 3-5, 7, 16.
Pltf's MSJ Aff. of Hammer, Ex. 2.
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Employment Agreement. 62 The Court should consider the Employment Agreement in light of
Ms. Hammer and Mayor Willich's testimony regarding their intent about the same.

63

In doing

so, the only outcome can be that no intent to waive or release Ms. Hammer's rights under the
IPPEA has ever existed.
Further, following Sun Valley's termination of Ms. Hammer it expressly recognized that
she may have claims and damages arising under the IPPEA. 64 Sun Valley mutually recited and
agreed that: "As a result of all incidents identified in [the 2011 IPPEA Case and her three
Notices of Tort Claim], and all subsequent and ongoing incidents regarding or relating to
Ms. Hammer's employment with the City of Sun Valley, she claims to have been injured by
the Prospective Defendants' alleged violations of her common law, state and federal
rights.',65 And, Sun Valley agreed to toll all applicable statutes of limitation in order for the
parties to explore both settlement and Ms. Hammer's actionable claims and damages. 66 In the
absence of settlement, this case ensued. 67 Now, over two years after Sun Valley acknowledged
Ms. Hammer's claims under the IPPEA, it asks the Court to deny her statutory rights and
protections promulgated by this State's legislature.
Sun Valley's Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied because Ms. Hammer never
voluntarily and knowingly waived or released her rights under the IPPEA.

62

Pltf's MSJ Aff. ofWillich, ,i,i 2-9; Pltf's MSJ Aff. of Hammer, ,i,i 3-4, 7-11, 15-22 and Ex. 1.
Pltf's MSJ Aff. of Willich, ,i,i 2-9; Pltf's MSJ Aff. of Hammer, ,i,i 3-4, 7-11, 15-22, Exs. 1 and
2; Pltf's MSJ Aff. ofDonoval, fl4-9.
64
Pltf's Resp. Aff. of Counsel, Ex. 3.
65
Pltf' s Resp. Aff. of Counsel, Ex. 3.
66
Pltf's Resu. Aff. of Counsel, Exs. 3-4.
67
Pltf' s Resp. Aff. of Counsel, Ex. 3.
63
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3.

No consideration was paid by Sun Valley for Ms. Hammer's alleged waiver or
release of her IP PEA claims.

The alleged release of non-contract claims was both unintended and lacked consideration,
and therefore the release could not have been formed. 68 In Idaho, "[eJvery contract must have
these four elements ... : I. Competent parties; 2. A lawful purpose; 3. Valid consideration; and
4. Mutuai agreement by all parties to all essential terms." IDJI 6.01.1. The severance payment
that Ms. Hammer received was not consideration for waiver or release of her IPPEA rights. The
severance payment was wages, and was treated as such by Sun Valley and Ms. Hammer. The
Employment Agreement makes clear that what Ms. Hammer was receiving as consideration
upon termination without cause was a severance benefit, not consideration for a release of
statutory protections:
Upon such termination, Employer shall pay Employee, as
severance pay, a lump sum cash payment equal to six (6) months,
base salary described in Section 5, Subsection A.
The severance payment herein is intended to be Employee's sole
exclusive remedy for any and all claims for damages of any kind
arising from a termination without cause and such severance
payment is hereby agreed to be reasonable, fair and equitable by
both parties to this Agreement.69
Under Idaho law, severance pay is wages; it is a component of compensation in an
employment agreement. Sarbacher v. AmeriCold Realty Trust, Case No. I: I O-cv-429-BL W,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131290, *20-24 (D. Idaho, Nov. 14, 2011). Similarly, the United States
Supreme Court recently explained:
[SJeverance payments made to terminated employees are
'remuneration for employment.' Severance payments are, of
course, 'remuneration,' and common sense dictates that employees
68
69

Pltfs Stmt of Disputed Facts, ,r,r 3-5, 7, 16.
Pltfs MSJ Aff. of Hammer, Ex. I (emphasis original).
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receive the payments 'for employment.' ... Severance payments
are made in consideration for employment - for a 'service ...
performed' by 'an employee for the person employing him ... .'

United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1395, 1399-1400 (2014) (quoting 26 U.S.C.
§ 3121 (b) ). If Sun Valley intended the termination without cause provision to also give rise to a

release of IPPEA rights and protections, it needed to pay consideration beyond the severance (i.e.
wages) for that additional release. Groves v. Firebird Raceway, Case No. 94-3554, 1995 U.S.
App. LEXIS 28191 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 1995) (citing Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. Tiger Enters., Inc.,
99 Idaho 539, 585 P.2d 949, 952 (1978) (a release is a type of contract)); Vance v. Connell, 96
Idaho 417, 529 P.2d 1289, 1291 (1974) (some consideration is a necessary element to all
contracts); Karnes v. Quality Pork Processors, 532 N.W.2d 560,562 (Minn. 1995) ("as with any
other contract, a release requires consideration ...."); Brown v. Kentucky Lottery Corp., 891
S.W.2d 90, 92 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995) ("it is well established that a release must be supported by
valuable consideration.").
Ms. Hammer's situation is analogous to the Sarbacher v. AmeriCold Realty Trust. In

Sarbacher, the employee and employer entered into an employment agreement providing for a
severance payment in the event the employee was terminated without cause. 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 131290, *5. After being terminated, the employee sued for his wages. The employer
disputed that severance pay was a wage and instead argued that the severance payment was
liquidated damages. Sarbacher, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131290, *17-24. Judge Winmill held
that "severance pay is an item of bargained-for compensation in exchange for services rendered"
and is thus "a wage under prevailing Idaho authority." Sarbacher, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
131290, *24. And, a "plaintiff is not required to return or offer to return consideration received
pursuant to a valid release agreement as a prerequisite to initiating a [] action premised on
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violations only purportedly released by the agreement." Botefur v. City of Eagle Point, 7 F.3d
152, 156(9thCir.1993).
In both Johnson v. Allied Stores Corp. and Sarbacher, the terminated employee was
supposed to receive (Johnson), or actually received (Sarbacher), a lump sum payment at the time
of termination. Johnson v. Allied Stores Corp., 106 Idaho 363,679 P.2d 640 (1984); Sarbacher,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131290.

In both cases the ruling court found that the lump sum

severance payments were considered wages for past performance.

Neither court held the

severance payments to be liquidated damages for other claims. Both courts held that "a claim for
severance pay is [] a component of the compensation in an employment agreement. Severance
pay is not a mere gratuity." Johnson, 106 Idaho at 367, 679 P.2d at 644; Sarbacher, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 131290, *19. Here, no consideration was paid for the alleged release of IPPEA
claims. 70 No consideration was paid for a release of claims beyond the non-contract claims
arising out of a termination without cause because such a release was never intended. 71
Judgment as a matter of law that Ms. Hammer voluntarily released her IPPEA claims
cannot be entered because no consideration was paid by Sun Valley for such a release. Sun
Valley's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied.
4.

The federal court's decision in Ms. Hammer's parallel civil rights case is not final
or binding on this Court.

An action arising from the same facts and circumstances as this case is currently pending
before the United States District Court for the District of Idaho. 72 However, the federal case
involves only federal causes of action arising from the federal defendants' violations of Ms.

70

Pltf' s MSJ Aff. of Hammer, Ex. 1.
Pltfs Stmt of Disputed Facts, 11 3-5, 7, 16.
72
Hammer, et al. v. Sun Valley, et al.

71
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Hammer's federally guaranteed civil rights and state common law claims. 73 The federal case is
not another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action. See I.R.C.P.
12(b)(8). The federal court has never had before it a claim of waiver of rights under the
IPPEA. 74 And, unlike this Court, the federal court was not bound by the Idaho Supreme Court's
decision in Lee v. Sun Valley Co., prohibiting contractual relief from liability that undermines the
declared intent ofan Idaho statute. 107 Idaho 976,695 P.2d 361 (1984).
The federal MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER relied on by Sun Valley to bolster this
Court's confidence in finding a waiver or release of Ms. Hammer's rights under the IPPEA is
neither final nor binding on this Court. 75 (Def's. Corrected MSJ Mem., § IV.A.3. p. 16.) The
federal court's Decision resulted from Sun Valley's motion for judgment on the pleadings
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(c). 76 It was not a motion for summary judgment that allowed
Ms. Hammer to submit evidence. 77 In response to the federal court's issuance of the referenced
Decision, Ms. Hammer timely filed PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE
COURT'S MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS that is still
pending. 78 Ms. Hammer also filed PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED MOTION TO AMEND THE SCHEDULING
ORDER AND MOTION FOR LEA VE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT, which is still pending in the federal
court. 79 And, Ms. Hammer filed PLAINTIFF SHARON HAMMER'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT regarding certain federal causes of action and state common law claims that the

73

Hammer, et al. v. Sun Valley, et al., DN I, Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial.
Hammer, et al. v. Sun Valley, et al., DN 1, Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial.
75
Hammer, et al. v. Sun Valley, et al., DNs 41, 44, 44-1, 45, 45-1.
76
Hammer, et al. v. Sun Valley, et al., DNs 18, 41.
77
Hammer, et al. v. Sun Valley, et al., DNs 41, 22 (Judge Lodge refused to convert the 12(c)
motion to a Rule 56 motion).
78
Hammer, et al. v. Sun Valley, et al., DNs 44, 44-1, 51, 57.
79
Hammer, et al. v. Sun Valley, et al., DNs 45, 45-1 -45-4, 52, 58.
74
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federal court erroneously dismissed and/or that are expected to be revived when the federal court
grants the pending Motion for Reconsideration. 80 The federal Decision has no bearing on this
Court's denial of Sun Valley's Motion for Summary Judgment.

B.

Ms. Hammer Has Presented a Prima Facie Case of Sun Valley's Violations
of the IPPEA
1.

Ms. Hammer repeatediy reported vioiations or suspected violations of official
Sun Valley rules and regulations.

Government employees in Idaho are provided with heightened protections against
termination or other adverse employment actions when the employee communicates "a violation
or suspected violation of a law, rule or regulation adopted under ... a political subdivision of this
state .... "

I.C. § 6-2104(1).

Sun Valley incorrectly asserts that its Personnel Policies &

Procedures Manual is not an official rule or regulation of the City of Sun Valley.

(Defs.

Corrected MSJ Mem., § IV.B.3.) Idaho Code § 50-902 codifies the process by which city
councils pass or adopt official ordinances and resolutions. Once an ordinance or resolution is
adopted by a city council it "shall be read and received in evidence in all courts and places
without further proof." I.C. § 50-902. Further, Idaho Code § 50-907(1) defines "permanent
records" of a municipal corporation as including "ordinances and resolutions."

I.C. § 50-

907(1)(b). The City of Sun Valley Personnel Policies & Procedures Manual expressly identifies
the numerous Resolution Numbers by which the Mayor and City Council have perpetually and
repeatedly adopted the Manual as a permanent record - a rule or regulation - of Sun Valley. 81
Sun Valley's reliance on Mallonee v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 139 Idaho 615, 84 P.3d
551 (2004), to support its argument that its Personnel Policies & Procedures Manual is not a rule

80
81

Hammer, et al. v. Sun Valley, et al., DNS 48 -48-44, 50, 53.
Pltfs MSJ Aff. of Counsel, Ex. 3, cover page.
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or regulation that can be violated under the IPPEA is misplaced. (Defs. Corrected MSJ Mem., §
IV.B.3.) The Defendant in Mallonee was the Idaho Department of Correction ("DOC"), a public
administrative body, not the state or a political subdivision of the state - like Sun Valley is.

82

Because the DOC was just an administrative body the extent of its authority to promulgate
interdepartmental policies and procedures that could equate to a law of the state, namely
pursuant to the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, was limited. Id., 139 Idaho at 620, 84 P.3d
at 556. The Mallonee Court found that because the DOC policies could not be promulgated as a
law, rule or regulation of the state, the plaintiffs complaints about violations of DOC policies
was not a protected act under the IPPEA.

139 Idaho at 620, 84 P.3d at 556. Mallonee is

inapplicable here because the City of Sun Valley is a political subdivision of the state of Idaho, 83
and reprisal against an employee for communicating violations of any of Sun Valley's rules or
regulations adopted by resolution is a protected activity under the IPPEA.

I.C. §§ 6-2101,

et seq., 50-902 and 50-907(a).
Here, the Policies & Procedures Manual had been repeatedly adopted by resolutions of
the Mayor and Sun Valley City Council. 84 I.C. § 50-907(1); see also I.C. § 50-902 (establishing
process for passage of resolutions).

Ms. Hammer's complaints about Councilman Ribi's

violations of the harassment policy contained within the Policies & Procedures Manual were
protected acts under the IPPEA. The Court should find as a matter of law that Ms. Hammer

82

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL ("Amended Complaint"),
12; DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL ("Answer"), ,r 3.
83
Amended Complaint, ,r 2; Answer 1 3.
84
Pltf s MSJ Aff. of Counsel, Ex. 3, cover page.
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engaged in protected activities when she lodged such complaints with Mayor Willich and City
Attorney Adam King. 85
2.

Sun Valley's termination of Ms. Hammer, purportedly "without cause," was
pretext for its retaliation in violation of the IPPEA.

Sun Valley's purported reasons for terminating Ms. Hammer cannot be taken as true on
summary judgment, nor is Ms. Hammer required to show anything more than a rational inference
of retaliatory discharge in violation under the IPPEA. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that
"the McDonnel Douglas analysis should be applied to actions arising under Idaho's
whistleblower act." Curlee v. Kootenai county Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 396, 224 P.3d
458, 463 (2008).
When the_McDonnell Douglas analysis is applied to cases involving
retaliatory discharge under a whistleblower statute, the test is as
follows: (1) the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of
retaliatory conduct for an action protected by the relevant
whistleblower statute; (2) once the plaintiff demonstrates a prima
facie case, the defendant is obligated to produce evidence which, if
taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nonretaliatory reason for the adverse action; and (3) if the defendant
articulates a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for discharge, then the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the reason the defendant offers is a pretext for
retaliatory conduct.

Curlee, 148 Idaho at 396, 224 P.3d at 463 (citation omitted). However, "the burden-shifting

rule of McDonnell Douglas ... has little or no application at the summary judgment stage.
The rule explicitly governs the burden of persuasion at trial." Id. (quotations omitted)
(emphasis added). It would be error for the district court to apply the burden-shifting proof
requirements at the summary judgment stage. Id. "[I]n order to survive summary judgment, [an
IPPEA plaintifl] only [has] the burden of presenting evidence from which a rational inference of

85

Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r 4.

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO SUN VALLEY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 24
1435

retaliatory discharge under the whistleblower act could be drawn." Id. "If [the IPPEA plaintiff]
present[s] a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, the district court [is] not free to accept as
true the employer's testimony that she was fired from some other legitimate reason." Id.
(emphasis added); see also Van v. Portneuf Medical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 559-60, 212 P.3d
982, 989-90 (2009) ("Van f') (holding district court erred by simply accepting employer's
proffered reasons for firing IPPEA plaintiff).
Regardless of the very limited application of McDonnel Douglas analysis to Sun Valley's
motion for summary judgment, ample evidence exists that Ms. Hammer's termination was not
"without cause" and that the stated reasons are mere pretext. "A plaintiff may establish pretext
'either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy or
credence."' Frogley v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 155 Idaho 558,564,314 P.3d 613,619
(2013) (quoting Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,256 (1981)).

"Direct

evidence of discriminatory animus has been recognized by several circuits as 'evidence which, if
believed, proves the fact without inference or presumption."' Frogley, 155 Idaho at 564, 314
P.3d at 619 (quoting Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1085 (5th Cir. 1994))
(additional citations omitted). "Recognizing that direct evidence is rare, the plaintiff 'may come
forward with circumstantial evidence that tends to show that the employer's proffered motives
were not their actual motives because they are inconsistent or otherwise not believable."'

Frogley, 155 Idaho at 622, 314 P.3d at 567 (quoting Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d
1217, 1222 (91h Cir. 1998)). "As a general rule, causation is an issue of fact for the jury and only
rarely can the issue be determined on a motion for summary judgment." Van I, 147 Idaho at 989,
212 P.3d at 559 (citation omitted).
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Over the course of two years Ms. Hammer lodged multiple complaints regarding Mr.
Ribi's violations of Sun Valley's anti-harassment policy; which Mr. Ribi had knowledge of.

86

Finally, on November 11, 2011, Mr. Ribi spearheaded a Special Meeting of the City Council
regarding allegations of misconduct by Ms. Hammer asserted by the Sun Valley Treasurer and
Sun Valley City Clerk. 87 Resulting from that meeting alone, Mr. Ribi, along with Councilmen
DeWayne Briscoe and Robert Youngman, demanded that Ms. Hammer resign, and Mr. Ribi
began asserting that criminal charges could be made against her.

88

By November 18, 2011, Ms. Hammer was placed on administrative leave by Mayor
Willich.89 Even though Mayor Willich told Ms. Hammer she was placed on leave to protect her
from Mr. Ribi, Sun Valley reported to the local newspaper that she was placed on administrative
leave pending investigation of her for improper use or misappropriation of City funds. 90
Beginning on November 21, 2011 through mid-January 2012, a series oflegal and administrative
proceedings ensued between Ms. Hammer, Sun Valley and various City officials arising from
Sun Valley twice placing her on administrative leave without any honest specificity of its cause
to do so, and from Mr. Ribi's continuing, now-public harassment of Ms. Hammer. 91

Sun Valley repeatedly publicized confidential personnel matters regarding Ms. Hammer's
employment with the City. 92

On January 19, 2012, Sun Valley publically terminated Ms.

Hammer's employment in a manner that violated the terms of her Employment Agreement, and
then pursued a public smear campaign to destroy Ms. Hammer's personal and professional
Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r 4.
Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r,r 5-7.
88
Pltf s MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r,r 8-9.
89
Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r 11.
90
Pltf s MSJ Aff. of Counsel, Exs. 9-11; Pltf s MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r,r 10-11.
91
Pltf s MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r,r 12-27.
92
Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r,r 13-14, 21-29.
86

87
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reputations. 93 Following her termination, the Idaho Mountain Express reported that: "When
asked whether Hammer's termination was with or without cause, Naylor said, 'There was no
stated cause."'94 Given the totality of the circumstances surrounding Ms. Hammer's termination,
Sun Valley's own attorney could not truthfully state she was fired "without cause." Even Mr.
Naylor's quote that, "[t]here was no stated cause," implies that some cause did exist, but Sun
Valley would not, or could not, be publically forthright about that cause.
The factual circumstances and growing animosity against Ms. Hammer leading up to her
involuntary leaves and termination evidence that Sun Valley's actual motives for such adverse
employment actions were retaliatory. Sun Valley's argument that Ms. Hammer has not stated a

prima facie case must be rejected.

Sun Valley's proffered reasons for her termination are

pretextual, and its Motion must be denied.

3.

Sun Valley took adverse actions against Ms. Hammer in violation of the IP PEA

Sun Valley admits that, at a minimum, it took an adverse action against Ms. Hammer
when it terminated her employment. (Def's. Corrected MSJ Mem., § IV.B.4.a.)

Sun Valley

undertook additional adverse actions against Ms. Hammer in violation of the IPPEA. 95 The
IPPEA defines an "adverse action" against an employee to mean: "to discharge, threaten or

otherwise discriminate against an employee in any manner that affects the employee's
employment, including compensation, terms, conditions, location, rights, immunities,

promotions or privileges." LC. § 6-2103(1) (emphasis added). An employer is prohibited from
engaging in actions that "could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a

Pltf's Resp. Aff. of Counsel, Ex. 1 ,r,r 12-17; Pltf's Stmt of Disputed Facts, ,r,r 2-3; Pltf's MSJ
Stmt of Facts, ,r,r 28-29.
94
Pltf's Stmt of Disputed Facts, ,r 3.
95
Pltf's MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,r,r 8-11, 13, 21-29; Pltf's Stmt of Disputed Facts, ,r,r 2, 6, 10-14.
93
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charge of [violation of law]." Burlington N & Santa Fe Ry. V. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006).
"[A] plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action
materially adverse, 'which in [the Title VII] context means it well might have dissuaded a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination."' White, 548 U.S. at
68 (quotations omitted). "To constitute an adverse employment action, 'a government act of
retaliation need not be severe and it need not be of a certain kind. Nor does it matter whether an
act of retaliation is in the form of the removal of a benefit or the imposition of a burden."'
Ledford v. Idaho Dep 't ofJuvenile Corr., Case No. 1:12-cv-00326-BLW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

29911, at ** 12, 21-23 (D. Idaho Mar. 6, 2014) (quoting Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d
968, 975 (9th Cir. 2003)). "Indeed, a 'campaign[) of harassment and humiliation' could be
deemed an adverse employment action even without the loss of any governmental benefit."'
Ledford, 2014 U.S. Dist LEXIS 29911, at** 13, 21-23 (quoting Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 975)).

Here, the adverse actions taken by Sun Valley against Ms. Hammer include threats of
termination if Ms. Hammer refused to resign; threats of criminal charges if Ms. Hammer refused
to resign; biased investigations; Sun Valley's publication of confidential personnel actions
against Ms. Hammer, including two administrative leaves; Sun Valley's publication of alleged
wrongdoings by Ms. Hammer; termination; and a post-termination smear campaign by Sun
Valley. 96 Each of these actions by Sun Valley were adverse to Ms. Hammer's employment.
Each of these actions were prohibited by the IPPEA. LC.§§ 6-2103(1), 6-2104.
Ms. Hammer has both alleged and shown that Sun Valley engaged in prohibited acts that
were adverse to her employment. Sun Valley admits that it engaged in adverse actions against

96

Pltfs MSJ Stmt of Facts, ,18-11, 13, 21-29; Pltfs Stmt of Disputed Facts, ,1 2, 3, 12, 13.
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Ms. Hammer.

(Defs. Corrected MSJ Mem., § IV.BA.a.) Sun Valley's argument that Ms.

Hammer has not stated a prima facie case must be rejected and its Motion denied.

C.

Ms. Hammer's Claims were Timely Filed because Each Was Expressly Protected by
Tolling Agreements with Sun Valley
No part of Ms. Hammer's IP PEA case is barred by expiration of any statutory limitation.

Idaho Code § 6-2105 requires that: "An employee who alleges a violation of this chapter may
bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or actual damages, or both, within one
hundred eighty (180) days after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this chapter." I.C.
§ 6-2105(2) (emphasis added). Sun Valley and Ms. Hammer entered into a Tolling Agreement

that expressly protected and extended her right to bring an action arising from wrongful,
retaliatory acts of Sun Valley that occurred in November and December 2011. 97

Ms. Hammer claims to have suffered injuries begim1ing on or about November 11, 201 l.
Ms. Hammer has previously identified certain claims and damages in her initial Idaho
Protection of Public Employees Act ('·IPPEA,") suit, filed November 21, 2011; and in her
three previous Notices of Tort Claim, dated December 14, 2011, December 26, 2011, and

December 30, 2011. :Ms. Hammer believes that new and additional claims are available
to her as a result of the Prospective Defendants' alleged additional and/or ongoing
conduct. As a result of all incidents identified in the above-referenced matters, and all
subsequent and ongoing incidents regarding or relating to Ms. Hammer's employment
-.vith 1he City of Sun Valley, she claims to have been injured by the Prospective

Defendants' alleged violations of he.r common law, state and federal rights.
The parties lo this Agreement aclr--now)edge that the applicable statutes of limitation
would require the Prospective Plaintiff to re-file and/or amend her IPPEA suit and/or
serve another notice of tort claim upon the City of Sun Valley, to include and/or identify
additional defendants, allegations md statements of injury, no later than May 9, 2012.
However, the parties to this Agreement desire an opportunity to further discuss settlement
of the matter prior to the IPPEA suit being re-filed and/or the additional notice of tort
claim being served.

97

Pltfs Resp. Aff. of Counsel, Ex. 3.
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The original tolling period was from May 8, 2012 through May 30, 2012. 98 Sun Valley and Ms.
Hammer later entered into the Extension of Tolling Agreement that incorporated by reference all
recitals, terms and conditions of the Tolling Agreement, and only extended the tolling period
through June 29, 2012.

99

Ms. Hammer's COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY

TRIAL was timely filed on June 29, 2012.
As recited in the Tolling Agreement, conservatively, the earliest that Ms. Hammer claims
to have suffered injuries prohibited by the IPPEA was on or about November 11, 2011, when
Sun Valley demanded her resignation without any explanation or evidence of wrongdoing. 100
Under the IPPEA, Ms. Hammer then had until May 9, 2012 to file a civil action. Alternatively,
the first time that Ms. Hammer was placed on administrative leave on November 18, 2011 is
more likely the first actionable occurrence under the IPPEA. One-hundred-eighty days from
November 18, 2011 is May 16, 2012. Pursuant to the terms of the Tolling Agreement and the
Extension of Tolling Agreement, Ms. Hammer's Complaint was timely filed.
Even under Sun Valley's argument, that its termination of Ms. Hammer on January 19,
2012 was its only retaliatory act prohibited by the IPPEA, the Complaint was timely filed.
(Defs. Corrected MSJ Mem., § IV.B.4.a.) One-hundred-eighty days from January 19, 2012 is
July 17, 2012. The Complaint was file before that possible deadline. Now, instead of complying
with its contractual obligations set forth in the Tolling Agreement and Extension of Tolling
Agreement, Sun Valley presents a nonsensical argument that the Court should count backwards
180 days from the date the Complaint was filed and find any wrongful acts prior to that
backwards analysis as being time-barred. This analysis is wrong. The IPPEA is forward-looking
Pltf s Resp. Aff. of Counsel, Ex. 3 1 1.
Pltfs Resp. Aff. of Counsel, Ex. 4.
100
Pltfs Resp. Aff. of Counsel, Ex. 3; see also Pltfs Stmt of Disputed Facts, 112.

98

99
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and provides an IPPEA plaintiff with "one hundred eighty (180) days after the occurrence of

the alleged violation of this chapter" to file an action. I.C. § 6-2105(2) (emphasis added). Sun
Valley's argument that the Court should count backwards is not based on the plain language of
the statute.
The Court should deny as a matter of law Sun Valley's claim that its acts of retaliation
against Ms. Hammer, committed in November and December 2011, are time-barred.

D.

Remedies Under the IPPEA Do Not Exclude Any Type of Lost Wages or
Pain and Suffering
To date, the Idaho Supreme Court has expressly refused to render a decision on whether

an IPPEA plaintiff may recover damages for pain and suffering and front pay. Van v. Portneuf

Med Ctr., 156 Idaho 696, 330 P.3d 1054, 1065 (2014) (Van II). The Court must therefore look
to the terms of the statute, which enumerates the following opportunities for relief to an IPPEA
plaintiff:
A court, in rendering a judgment brought under [the IPPEA], may
order any or all of the following:
(1) An injunction to restrain continued violation of the
provisions of this act;
(2) The reinstatement of the employee to the same position
held before the adverse action, or to an equivalent position;
(3) The reinstatement of full fringe benefits and seniority
rights;
(4) The compensation for lost wages, benefits and other
remuneration;
(5) The payment by the employer of reasonable costs and
attorneys' fees;
(6) An assessment of a civil fine of not more than five hundred
dollars ($500), which shall be submitted to the state treasurer for
deposit in the general fund.
I.C. § 6-2106 (emphasis added); see also LC. 6-2105 (defining damages for injury or loss caused
by violation of the IPPEA). Importantly, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that "front pay is a
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permissible element of damages" under statutes that list "lost wages and benefits" as a type of
damages that may be awarded to a plaintiff. O'Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796, 811, 810 P.2d
1082, 1097 (1991) (analyzing damages available under Idaho Code§ 67-5908(3), Idaho Human
Rights Act); see also Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 899-900, 104 P.3d 367, 373-74 (2004)
(upholding a jury instruction that enabled an award of future wages to an IPPEA plaintiff).

Both back pay and front pay are subsets of the global term, 'lost
wages.' This is illustrated by the fact that lost wages are to be
awarded as an element of 'actual damages,' which are commonly
understood as those actual losses caused by the conduct at issue.
In other words, the purpose of the lost wages element of damages
is to restore to the plaintiff all of the benefits lost as a result of the
violation of the [statute]. There is no distinction drawn in the
statute between actual damages suffered before the case reaches a
courtroom from those arising after trial. . . . Our conclusion on the
issue of front pay is bolstered by policy considerations. If damages
were measured by the interval between the wrongful conduct and
the date of trial, plaintiffs attorneys would have great incentive to
procure trial delays in order to increase the amount of compensable
damages. In addition, to cut off the measure of damages as of the
date of trial would preclude full compensation to people injured by
discriminatory practices. The alternative, to allow full
compensation to injured plaintiffs for actual losses, is consistent
with the terms of the statute and the policy 'to make persons whole
for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment
discrimination.' Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
418 (1975).

O'Dell, 119 Idaho at 811-12, 810 P.2d at 1097-98. "The amount of future lost wages or front
pay to be awarded is a matter to be determined by the trier of fact upon review of the evidence in
the record." O'Dell, 119 Idaho, 812, 810 P.2d at 1098.
Ms. Hammer's prayer for relief is not limited to damages, but also requests orders
reinstating her job, her benefits and her seniority rights. 101 Regardless of the scope of relief
sought by Ms. Hammer, neither the IPPEA nor Idaho case law support Sun Valley's position that
101

Amended Complaint, p. 33.
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she cannot be awarded special or general damages. Ms. Hammer should be permitted to prove
her damages in this matter. The Court should deny Sun Valley's request that Ms. Hammer's
damages be limited as a matter of law.

V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer respectfully requests that Sun
Valley's Motion for Summary Judgment be denied in its entirety. Ms. Hammer also requests
that her Motion for Summary Judgment be granted in its entirety.
DATED this 1st day of December, 2014.
JONES & SWARTZ PLLC

By~~~
~RTZ
JOYM.

GA
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District Judge
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Eric B. Swartz, ISB #6396
Joy M. Vega, ISB #7887
JONES & SWARTZ PLLC
1673 W. Shoreline Drive, Suite 200 [83702]
P.O. Box 7808
Boise, ID 83707-7808
Telephone: (208) 489-8989
Facsimile: (208) 489-8988
Email: eric@jonesandswartzlaw.com
joy@jonesandswartzlaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2012-479
Plaintiff,
VS.

CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI;
and De WAYNE BRISCOE,

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
RESPONSE TO SUN VALLEY'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss.
)
County of Ada

I, Joy M. VEGA, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as follows:
1.

I am an attorney with the law firm of Jones & Swartz PLLC, and am authorized to

practice law before this and all courts of the State ofldaho.
2.

I am counsel of record for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer in the above action.
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3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of the AFFIDAVIT OF

SHARON R. HAMMER IN SUPPORT OF RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT, filed on July 22, 2014, in Case No. 1:13-cv-211-EJL, In the United States District
Court for the District ofldaho.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of the Jai.'1.uarJ 25, 2012

newspaper article published by the Idaho Mountain Express.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of the Tolling Agreement

between Ms. Hammer and Sun Valley, dated May 8, 2012.
6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of the Extension of Tolling

Agreement between Ms. Hammer and Sun Valley, dated May 24, 2012.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 1st day of December, 2014.

Notary Public for Idaho
My Commission expires I)
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[ ] Overnight Delivery

[ ] Han.d Delivery
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and on the 2nd day of December, 2014, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
served on the following individual(s) by the method indicated:
Kirtlan G. Naylor
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950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83 702-6103

[ ]
[ ]
[X]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
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Hand Delivery
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Eric B. Swartz, ISB #6396
Joy M. Vega, ISB #7887
JONES & SWARTZ PLLC
1673 W. Shoreline Drive, Suite 200 [83702]
P.O. Box 7808
Boise, ID 83707-7808
Telephone: (208) 489-8989
Facsimile: (208) 489-8988
Emaii: eric@jonesandswartzlaw.com
joy@jonesandswartzlaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sharon R. Hammer and James R. Donoval

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

SHARON R. HAMMER and JAMES R. DONOVAL,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI, in his
individual and official capacity; and DEWAYNE
BRISCOE, in his individual and official capacity,

Case No. 2013-cv-00211-EJL
AFFIDAVIT OF
SHARON R. HAMMER IN
SUPPORT OF RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DN 47)

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss.
County of Ada
)
I, Sharon R. Hammer, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as follows:
1.

I am a named Plaintiff in the above-captioned matter.

2.

I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein and if called upon to

testify about the same, I could do so competently.
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3.

On September 15, 2011, I was employed by the City of Sun Valley ("City" or

"Sun Valley") as the Sun Valley City Administrator. On that day I personally attended and
participated in a scheduled meeting of the Sun Valley City Council ("Council") that was held in
the Council Chamber at Sun Valley City Hall.
4.

A topic of discussion during the meeting was certain pre-approved budgeted items

and whether an amendment to the City budget was required at that time. This topic included
discussion regarding generally acceptable accounting methods for modifying budgeted line
items.

5.

The Council took a break and I walked up to the front receptionist area of City

Hall to make copies of certain documents that were being discussed in the meeting.

On his own volition, Mr. Ribi followed me to the receptionist area He then

6.

began demanding that I make changes to the City budget and certain budget documents based on
his unilateral opinions of what the budget should contain. In response, I attempted to explain to

Mr. Ribi the generally accepted accounting practices and procedures for modifying municipal
budgets.

I attempted to explain this to him so that he would understand that his personal

demands of me were unacceptable and contrary to generally accepted accounting practices for
municipal government.

Mr. Ribi became increasingly and very agitated, and continuously

interrupted me, telling me how he wanted the particular procedure done.
7.

Every time that I tried to re-explain the correct budgeting procedures, Mr. Ribi

would cut me off, raise his arms in the air and waive his hands, saying angrily: "You don't
understand!" As the conversation continued, I perceived that Mr. Ribi was becoming more and
more enraged.

AFFIDAVIT OF SHARON R. HAMMER IN SUPPORT OF RESPONSE TO
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8.

Eventually, I told Mr. Ribi that I was just going to talk with Mayor Wayne

Willich. At that point. Mr. Ribi raised his anns up and at me and leaned towards me, in what I
perceived to be a very violent and physical threatening motion, puffed up his chest. and yelled at
me: "No! You will not talk to the Mayor!"
9.

in response to Mr. Ribi's physically and verbally violent outburst, my heart began

racing, and I was extremely fearful that Mr. Ribi was going to imminently physically strike me
with his hands or arms. I was fearful for my safety. Instinctively, I stepped back and away from

Mr. Ribi, and said: ..Whoa!" I believe that during this confrontation Mr. Ribi intended to either
cause me physical hann or make me fearful that he was going to strike me at that moment.
10.

I then turned away from Mr. Ribi and walked down the hallway back to the

Council Chamber where Mayor Willich and other Council Members and City staff were. I took
my seat at the City Administrator's table.

I engaged Councilman Robert Youngman in a

conversation about the proposed budget amendment. Mr. Ribi sat down at his seat on the
opposite end of the dais from me. He overheard my conversation with Councilman Youngman,
slammed the table in front of him with his hands, and yelled, "We are trying to make a point!"
Councilman Youngman responded by saying to Mr. Ribi, "Shut your mouth!"
11.

Prior to Mr. Ribi's assault on me, I had made numerous complaints to Mayor

Willich, Police Chief Cam Daggett, and the City's attorney, Adam King, regarding Mr. Ribi's
harassment and hostility directed towards me during numerous confrontations that he had
initiated. Included in some of those complaints, I told these City representatives that I was
becoming increasingly fearful of Mr. Ribi and concerned that he would someday become
physically violent towards me. After the September 15, 2011 Council meeting, I told each of
these City representatives about the assault by Mr. Ribi and asked each for advice on how I could
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protect myself from him. I believe that on September 15, 2011, Mr. Ribi harbored significant illwill and hatred for me because I had complained about him to Mayor Willich, Police Chief
Daggett and Mr. King.
12.

I was terminated from my employment with the City on January 19. 2012.

Foiiowing my termination I have been wiabie to secure new empioyment within my career fieid
of local government management.
13.

Within weeks of being fired, I began applying for positions of Town Manager,

Town Administrator. City Manager, County Manager, Assistant City Manager, Finance Director,
etc. with communities in Idaho, Colorado, Oregon, Washington, Oklahoma, Delaware, and
Arizona. Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of the Job Search Summary that
I have kept.
14.

In March 2012, I applied for jobs with two municipalities in Washington. Greg

Prothman, the executive recruiter who had recruited me to the Sun Valley City Administrator
position, was the recruiter for each of the Washington positions. Mr. Prothman and I set up a
Skype interview.

During the interview he told me that he did not need to discuss my

professional skills because he knew I could do the job. Instead, he only wanted to know about
what happened in Sun Valley. Mr. Prothman was very concerned with the fact that I had sued
the City and Councilmembers. And, regardless of my explanation of why I had filed a lawsuit, it
was clear to me that because I had sued Sun Valley and sitting Councilmembers, Mr. Prothman
was no longer interested in me as a candidate for any position that he was recruiting for.
15.

I interviewed with about a third of the prospective employers. With each of the

employers that I interviewed with I always received excellent and positive feedback after the
initial interview. Undoubtedly though, within each interview process one of the interviewers
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would have conducted independent online research about me and would see the press releases
paid for by Sun Valley, the near daily blog postings by Mr. Ribi, and the weekly articles in the
Idaho Mountain Express - all about my termination, the ongoing investigations against me, and
the statements by City representatives about my alleged misconduct and criminal conduct. After
the issue of Sun Vaiiey crune up, the whoie tenor of the interview process changed from positive
and energetic to awkward, tense and accusatory.

Several times in the course of each of

interview, I was asked about the situation with Sun Valley and why I was terminated. No matter
how hard I tried to redirect the interviewers to my professional abilities, they always crune back
to the allegations by Sun Valley. And, because the investigations initiated by Sun Valley were
ongoing, each interviewer would want to know when the investigations would be concluded.
16.

I was one of three finalists with the City of Bend, Oregon. I was also a finalist

with the City of McCall, Idaho. But I received no job offer. I have not received any job offers in
the field oflocal government management. I believe that I have not received a job offer because
of all of the negative online publicity paid for and promoted by the City of Sun Valley and its
representatives.
17.

Since January 2012, I have done everything that I can do to present myself as a

professional and viable candidate. I consulted with online reputation management companies. I
created and maintained online profiles to highlight my professional abilities. I sought out several
more-seasoned city managers who had also gone through difficult firings to get advice on how to
manage the situation created by Sun Valley. I conducted extensive researched about how to
overcome a negative employment experience. I always provided comprehensive application
materials for every position I applied for. I followed up with every prospective employer who
asked for more information or for an interview. I even researched the best way to conduct
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interviews by Skype. Regardless of the efforts that I have taken to present myself, Sun Valley
and its representatives have destroyed all prospects I have for working in my chosen career field
of local management administration.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

_/ \

~----\\ \ l\

c ~ - ,-~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 21st day of July, 2014.

~
5/Lt. /2-C'I
My Commission expires

'

b
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 22nd day of July, 2014, I filed the foregoing document
electronically through the CM/ECF system, which caused the following parties or counsel to be
served by electronic means, as more fully reflected on the Notice of Electronic Filing:
Kirtlan G. Naylor, kirt@naylorhales.com
Tyler D. Williams, tdw@naylorhales.com

Jacob H. Naylor, jake@naylorhales.com
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702-6103
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HAMMER 004084
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A

C

D

E

F

G

Interview Process

Salary Range

Date Applied

Hammer Job Search
1
2

IState

City/County

Position

Search Firm

2012

3

Dillion

CO

Town Manager

Fred Rainguet
KRW Associates, LLC

4

co

Estes Park

Town Administrator

Gary Suiter
The Mercer Group
Heather Gantz
Waldron Consulting Firm

5
Sherwood

OR

City Manager

6
CO

Garfield County

County Manager

Phil McKenny
Peckham & McKenny

7
North Bend

WA

City Administrator

Did not use an external search
firm.
Cheryl Proffitt-Schmidt,
Administrative Services Director
Did not use an external search
firm.

8
Bend

OR

g
10 Liberty
- La Plata County

11
-~--Issaquah
-

12

-

-

WA
CO

-

-

Assistant City Manager

_
City Administrator
County Manager

·-·

WA

-· · · -

---

Did not apply
Did not use an external search
firm.

--

--

-

--

Deputy City Administrator Greg Prothman
Prothman

-

---

Telephone interview with Fred Rainguet.
$100,000 - $110,000
He sounded very interested in my experience. He asked
me about what happened in Sun Valley and I did not
hear from him again.
Submitted resume. Did not move through the interview $114,000 - $135,000
process.
Telephone interview with Heather Gantz and Jeremy
$115,000 - $130,000
Parks. They asked me about working with the City
Council in Sun Valley and why I was terminated. Did not
get a second interview.
Telephone interview with Phil Mckenny.
$105,137 - $131,421
He sounded very interested in my experience. He asked
me about what happened in Sun Valley and I did not
hear from him again.
Submitted resume. Did not move through the interview $98,234 - $120,216
process.
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I traveled to Bend to introduce myself to the city
manager. He meet with me for a brief introduction. I
was subsequently interviewed by Skype and then
invited out for an in person interview as one of three
finalist for the position. What happened in Sun Valley
came up in every interview.

DOQ

2/22/2012

CD

....::i

en

(7)
I

rv

·n

DOQ
I traveled to Durango to introduce myself to the human $12S,OOO - $145,000
resources director, Kelly Ganevsky. She meet with me
and we discussed the county manager position. She
asked me extensive questions about what happened in
Sun Valley.
-·-··-··
-·Did not receive an interview
$124,584- $158,998
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HAMMER 004084

HAMMER 004085
A

-

2

City/County
lake Forest

8
State
WA

C

D

Position

Search Firm

City Administrator

Greg Prothman
Prothman

E
Interview Process
Interviewed with Greg Prothman via Skype. I had met
Greg when I was interviewing for positions when i left
Oak Park, IL. Sun Valley used Greg when Sun Valley

F
Salary Range
$115,000 - $135,000

G
Date Applied
3/20/2012

hired me in 2008. During this interview he said he did
not need to discuss my administration skills because he

(")
~I)

tn

knew I could do the job. He wanted to know what
happened in SV. We spoke for about 45 minutes and hie
only wanted to discuss what happened in SV. Followinu
the interview I wrote Greg a letter further explaining
13
Arvada

co

Deputy City Administrator

Bob Murphy & Associates

CD
~

(~
I

the situation. I did not move through the interview
process.
I spoke with Bob Murphy and told him I was going to
$122,442 - $152,050
submit my resume for the position. I told him that I was
going to be in town and asked if I could stop by and
introduce myself. He suggested that I contact Deputy
City Manager, Bill Ray. I met with Mr. Ray while in

n
<
I

0
3/19/2012

16 Greenwood
Twin Falls

Finance Director
Director of Finance

ID

Power Engineers - Business
Development Coordinator

co

Assistant TO City Manager Search conducted internally
Larry Shelton
City Manager
Chell Consulting, LLC

17
18 Greenwood
Choctaw

OK

19
Newark

DE

20
Damascus

OR

Ketchum

ID

21

22
Oak Ridge
23

OR

Search conducted internally
Search conducted internally

Did not receive an interview
No response
No response

~

I

::0

rn

CXJ
$89,359 - $116,167
$99,144 - $142,440
DOQ

4/7/2012
4/18/2012
4/27/2012

CJ
0

C")

c:

:3CD

:J

No response
I was notified via email that I made the first cut of
resumes. I was asked to complete a background check
and release form. I did not proceed through the
interview process.
City Manager
Robert Slavin
Submitted resume. Did not move through the interview
Slavin Management Consultants process.
Heather Gantz
Submitted resume. Did not move through the interview
City Manager
process.
Waldron Consulting Firm
I spoke with the previous executive director who had
Environmental Resources Search conducted internally
moved to the ED position with the Goldmine Thrift
Center - Executive Director
Store. I had not previously known him. He was excited
about my interest in the position. I attempted several
follow up conversations but could not reach him.
City Administrator

...

N

c....
rI

14

co
co

c::,
~

Denver. He asked me about what happened in SV. I did
not proceed through the interview process.
15 Loveland

...
...

~

Search conducted internally

r+
(J1

DOQ
DOQ

4/18/2012

en
I

N

:!:!
DOQ

4/30/2012

ro
Cl.
c::,

---i

$100,000- $120,000

4/30/2012

DOQ

5/12/2012

;:•...
~

~~

-o
~I)

tC
CD
~

Submitted resume. Did not move through the interview $6S,OOO - $75,000
process.

5/17/2012

...
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D

E

F

G

City/County

State

Position

Search Firm

Interview Process

Salary Range

Date Applied

New Castle

co

Town Administrator

Search conducted internally

24
Chandler

AZ

Assistant City Manager

CPS HR Consulting

25
Gilbert

AZ

Assistant TO the Town

Search conducted internally

Manager
26
Hailey

ID

Executive Director Blaine

Search conducted internally

27

ID

City Manager

$85,000 - $90,000

nSl>
(/)

<'D

council felt that my "interview was outstanding" but
they selected other candidates to proceed through th1i
interview process.
Submitted resume. Did not move through the interview $128,831 - $180,363
process.
Interviewed via telephone with the assistant city
manager and the human resource analyst. They asked
why I was terminated in SV. I did not hear back from
them after the interview.
I interviewed with the Board of Directors. I knew a

5/31/2012

I-'

....

(:.-)
I

(")

6/8/2012

Search conducted internally

$70,864 - $99,207

6/3/2012

Avon

~

.i,,.

Ol
0

29

co

Town Manager

The Morrison Group, LLC

....I\J
I

1.

J

c.....
r$60,000 - $82,000

6/28/2013

'
;o

rn

c:o
CJ
0

,:
(')

3

...

CD
::,

about SV. Later my hairdresser told me that Larry
Schoen had said that he felt that they could not hire me
because I was too controversial.
I initially interviewed via Skype with the Mayor and
DOQ
council members. The interview was going very well

(11

c,,
I
N

6/20/2012

I1

co
Cl.

given the similarities between the cities of Mccall and
SV. I knew the CM that was leaving the position fairly
well. I had worked with him on the Idaho City
Manager's Association. They asked about what
happened ln SV and the atmosphere changed
significantly and they seemed less interested. I was
asked to participate in a 2nd Skype interview. That
Interview was entirely about what happened in SV and
lasted for approximately 45 minutes. I did not proceed
28

<I

c:,
c:,

couple of the board members from my work In the
community. Larry Schoen was a Blaine Co
Commissioner and I knew him very well. Also, my
hairdresser was a new member of the Board but did nc>t
attend the interview. The interview went very well until
they asked about what happened in SV. I could feel th1i
energy drain from the room when we started talking

Co Drug Coalition

McCall

I interviewed via Skype with the city council. The
interview went very well and they specifically
mentioned being impressed with the emergency
management training that I have. They asked what
happened in SV and the issue was discussed
extensively. I received an email that said that the

c:,

::J
~

....

~i:,..

-o
~I.)

(!J

CD
~

through the interview process.
Submitted resume. Did not move through the interview $13S,OOO - $16S,OOO
process. Virginia Egger was hired as the Town Manager.
Virginia was the Sun Valley City Administrator prior to

....

~

6/8/2012

me. She was terminated by the City and then rehired
after I was terminated.
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B

C

City/County
Salem

State
Position
OR Deputy City Manager

Ketchum

ID

D
Search Firm
Search conducted internally

30
31

Community Library
Executive Director

E

F

Salary Range
Interview Process
Submitted resume. Did not move through the Interview $104,764 - $132,775
process.
Did not submit resume
DOQ

G
Date Applied
7/13/2012
7/18/2012

0

2013

32
Boise

ID

Boise

ID

33

Idaho Smart Growth Executive Director
Idaho Association of Soil

4/6/2013

Search conducted internally

i called the Board President Kit TIiiotson and spoke to
DOQ
him about the position. He sounded very interested in
my experience. He asked me why i was no longer
working in local government. i Submitted resume did
not move through the interview process.
Submitted resume did not move through the interview DOQ
process.

6/12/2013

Executive Director
34
ID

35
Meridian

ID

Idaho Housing and Finance Search conducted internally
Association - HOME
Construction Finance
Coordinator
City of Meridian ID Business Operations
Manager - Public Works
Dept

CJ)

Submitted resume did not move through the interview DOQ
process.

Conservation Districts -

Boise

P.>

Search conducted internally

Search conducted internally

I

n

I\J

7/10/2013

I.

r-,

SS2,344 -$65,424
I had several interviews for this position. Initially a
phone interview with the human resources director and
the deputy public works director. I had a subsequent
phone interview with the same two individuals. I was
invited for an in person interview with the same people!
who conducted the phone interview and the public
works director. The interview was extensive and I felt
was going very well. At the end of the hour the PW
Director said "Idaho Is a small town and we have read
about what happened on the internet. Would you like

7/17/2013

;:u
m
OJ

CJ
C>
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36
Boise

ID

Ketchum

ID

37

39

""~ . )'
(..,

message the following week that they "committee had
decided to continue their search."

-

"".
""CiJ.
<:I
C)
C)

to tell us your side of the story." We discussed the issUE!
for another half hour. I could feel their enthusiasm for
me decrease as we discussed sv. I received a phone

38

Cl)

----Ontario

OR

Advocates for the West Executive Director
City Administrator
City Administrator

Search conducted internally
Phil McKenny
Peckham & McKenny
CH2M Hill

Submitted resume did not move through the interview DOQ
process.
$129,898 - $166,534.
Submitted resume and cover letter via company's
website. Did not move through the interview proce_s~.
CH2M Hill is contracting with the City of Ontario, OR for DOQ
work and I spoke with City Engineer re: contract work
as City Administrator.

9/6/2013

"".
~

lJ
P,)

5/9/2014

(Cl

ct>

""l'\J.

5/7/2014
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0)
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Sun Valley terminates
administrator' 5 contract
By R£BECCA MEANY

Express Staff Writer
Following an executive
session Thursday, the Sun
Valley City Council
reconvened in public
session and voted to
approve the termination
of City Administrator
Sharon Hammer's
employment contract.

Mayor Dewayne Briscoe
announced that Hammer
would be offered a
lump-sum severance
payment of six months'
base salary.

- -----·---

When asked whether Hammer's termination was with or
without cause, Naylor said, "There was no stated cause."
Hammer had been placed on paid leave in November and
December by then·Mayor Wayne Wil\ich, who returned her to
active duty for a few days. Briscoe placed her on leave -again
Jan. 4 one day after he was sworn into office.
A conflict between Hammer and the city erupted publicly
last November, when she filed a lawsuit against the city,
Councilmen Nils Ribl and Bob Youngman, and City Attorney
Adam King. In the suit. she alleged that Ribi repeatedly
harassed her and. when she complained to Wt\lich, Rib!
sought to have her terminated from her position. She also
alleged that Youngman and King colluded in that effort, and
that the city should have done more to protect her from
Ribi.
She sued under the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act.
Hammer dropped her suit aga;nst the city and the other
defendants on Jan. 12, while retaining the right to refile.
Other, related lawsuits are still pending in 5th District Court.

Sharon Hammer

Briscoe declined to comment
th
termination which was effi t~n . e reason for the contract
ec 1Ve 1mmediately He d i
d
,
t he question to Kirtlan Naylor a Bol
.
e erre
the city's insurance carrier to ~epreS::thttorn~y afppointed by
~~~
e~nh
In an email to the Idaho Mountain Express, Naylor did not
comment on h reason for the termination, but said the

:,e;:;;l:::;~:~::;~:gent upon

As for Hammer and Oonoval's next move?
''We're going"toU.;ake a couple of days and figure out what
we're going to do," Oonoval said Tuesday.
Meanwhile, Brtscoe said he has been handling the duties of
the city administrator. The city has not made clear if or
when it will hire someone to replace Hammer.
Rebecca Meany: rmeany@mtexpress.com

her not suing the

"This would Include conduct by city elected off' 1 ls
employees ac rmg m
. t he1r. official capacities; he1c said.
a and
Wthheether she would be prohibited from filing a lawsuit on
o
r issues,
Mr [Jim]
D Naylor, said• "[r]o quote CH ammer•s attorney ]
•
onova1' Anyone can sue anyone ff th
•,
the court can stop someone from filing tr1·vo1ouseylawsuits
want. Only
•

___ _O.~ l- --·-·-..
said__after the meeting that Hammer.s contract •
allows for termination without ca
. .
.pays her six months' sala
use providing that the city
ry.
.
Donoval said that means the city d .
legal.complaint against Hammer ;a~~~~~~otehsn't have any
termmatfon.
e
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T01LING AGREEMENT
This tolling agreement ("the Agreement") is made as of May 8, 2012, by and between
SHARON R. HAMMER ("Ms. Hammer" or "Prospective Plaintiff"), by and through
her legal counsel, Jones & Swartz PLLC, and the CITY OF SUN VALLEY and its
current and former employees, elected officials, and other agents, counsel or

representatives in any capacity C'Prospective Defendants"), by a...-id through t1ieir legal
counsel, Naylor & Hales, P.C.
Ms. Hammer claims to have suffered injuries beginning on or about November 11, 201 l.
Ms. Hammer has previously identified certain claims and damages in her initial Idaho
Protection of Public Employees Act ("IPPEA") suit, filed November 21, 2011; and in her
three previous Notices of Tort Claim, dated December 14, 2011, December 26, 2011, and
December 30, 2011. Ms. Hammer believes that new and additional claims are available
to her as a result of the Prospective Defendants' alleged additional and/or ongoing
conduct. As a result of all incidents identified in the above-referenced matters, and all
subsequent and ongoing incidents regarding or relating to Ms. Hammer's employment
with the City of Sun Valley, she claims to have been injured by the Prospective
Defendants' alleged violations of her common law, state and federal rights.
The parties to this Agreement acknowledge thai the applicable statutes of limitation
would require the Prospective Plaintiff to re-file and/or amend her IPPEA suit and/or
serve another notice of tort claim upon the City of Stm Valky, to include and/or identify
additional defendants, allegations and statements of injury, no later than May 9, 2012.
However, the parties to this Agreement desire an opportunity to further discuss settlement
of the matter prior to the IPPEA suit being re-filed and/or the additional notice of tort
claim being served
For these reasons, the parties to this Agreement mutually agree that the applicable
statutes of limitation shall be tolled as described below and that, at the end of the tolling
period, if the matter has not been settled, the Prospective Plaintiff may file suit against
the Prospective Defendants as she deems necessary without any prejudice whatsoever.
The Prospective Plaintiff and the Prospective Defendants agree as follows:
1.
Term of Toiling Period - Unless extended in accordance with the provisions of
this Agreement, the "Tolling Period" for the Prospective Plaintiff shall run through and
include May 30, 2012. The Tolling Period shall begin to nm on the "Effective Date"
which shall be May 8, 2012.

2.

Termination of Tolling Period-The Tolling Period will expire by its own terms

at 11:59 p.m., on May 30, 2012.
3.
Extension of Tolling Period - The parties to this Agreement may choose to
extend the Tolling Period by execution of an appropriate written extension agreement.

TOLLING AGREEMEl:,J'T - 1
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4.
No Litigation During Tolling Period - During the Tolling Period the parties to
this Agreement shall not commence any litigation. arbitration or other proceeding against
each other on any claim or issue whatsoever arising from Ms. Hammer's employment
with the City of Sun Valley, her terntlnation from said employment, or any other related
incidents in which Ms. Hammer claims to have been injured.
'i.

Tolling of T.imitati.on PPrio,J - Any """ ,.11 applic,ihJ .. dat11tes nf limit .. tton

l"\T

repose, whether statutory, contractual or common law, shalt be tolled during the tenn of
the Tolling Period with respect to any claim or issue between the Prospective Plaintiff
and Prospective Defendants whatsoever. The parties to this Agreement may not assert in
reliance on the passage of time during the Tolling Period any claim or defense of waiver,
estoppel, laches or any similar claim or defense. However, nothing in this Agreement
shall preclude any party from relying on the passage of time either before the Tolling
Period has begun or after the Tolling Period has ended in support of any claim or defense.
6.
Written Notice - Where this Agreement requires or pennits written notice, the
party giving such written notice shall send it by facsimile or messenger delivery to legal
counsel for the non-noticing party.
7.
No Waiver of Claims - Nothing in this Agreement is intended as, shall constitute,
or shall be used as evidence of an admission of wrongdoing or liability, including
comparative liability or fault, a waiver of any right or defense in subsequent litigation, an
estoppel, or an admission as to any other matter of fact or law. The parties shall be
entitled to use this Agreement to enforce the terms of the Agreement.
Use of Discovery - The parties to this Agreement agree that the informal
8.
exchange of i11formation shall not preclude either party from initiating discovery in any
subsequent litigation between the parties to this Agreement provided the parties to this
Agreement agree to use best efforts to avoid duplicating discovery already taken.
9.
Binding on Assigns - This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the
benefit of the original parties who opted to be governed by its terms along with their
respective heirs, legal representatives, predecessors, successors and assigns.

Governing Law - This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of
10.
Idaho and construed in accordance therewith.

Counterparts - This Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts,
11.
each constituting a binding original. Any of the parties hereto, their authorized
representative or legal counsel may execute this Agreement by signing any such
counterpart.
Entil"e Agreement - This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement of the
12.
parties. No other terms are binding on the parties except those found within this
Agreement. Any changes to this Agreement must be made in a writing signed by the
parties, their authorized representative or legal counsel.

TOLLING AGREEMENT • 2

1466

••
5/9/2012 4:33 PM

:ROM: Fax

TO: 4898989

PAGE: 004 OF 004

13.
Waiver - A waiver by either party of any term or condition of this Agreement or
any breach of any tenn or condition, in any instance, shall not be construed as a waiver of
any other term or condition, shall not constitute a waiver of a similar breach in the future,
or of any other breach, and shall not nullify the effectiveness of such provision.
14.
Headings - The headings used in this Agreement are for convenience purposes
only and shall not be used to interpret or construe its provisions.
JONES & SWARTZ PILC

By~~~
•

ARTZ

·,

JOYM. VEGA

Attorneys for Sharon R. Hamml!.r

NAYLOR & HALES. P.C.

KIR

.NAYLOR

Attorneys for City of Sun Valley, its employees,
elected officials, and agents

TOILING AGREEMENT· 3
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EXTENSION OF TOLLING AGREEMENT
This extension to the May 8, 2012 Tolling Agreement ("Extension") is made as of May
24, 2012, by and between SHARON R. HAMMER ("Ms. Hammer" or "Prospective
Plaintiff'), by and through her legal counsel, Jones & Swartz PLLC, and the CITY OF
SUN VALLEY and its current and former employees, elected officials, and other agents,
counsel or representatives, in any capacity ("Prospective Defendants"), by and through
their legal counsel, Naylor & Hales, P.C.
This Extension incorporates by reference all recitals, tenns and conditions of the Tolling
Agreement as if restated in full herein. This Extension does not alter or amend any
aspect of the Tolling Agreement, except as stated herein.
As of the date of this Extension, the parties continue to require an oppo1iunity to further
discuss settlement of the matter prior to the pending IPPEA suit being re-filed and/or the
additional notice of tort claim being served, as described in the Tolling Agreement.
Pursuant to Paragraph 12 of the Tolling Agreement, any changes to that Tolling
Agreement must be made in a writing signed by the parties, their authorized
representative or legal counsel.
The Prospective Plaintiff and the Prospective Defendants further agree as follows:

l.
Term of Tolling Period - The extended "Tolling Period" for the Prospective
Plaintiff shall run through and include June 29, 2012. The Tolling Period shall begin to
run on the "Effective Date" which shall be May 24, 2012.

2.
Termination of Tolling Period -The Tolling Period will expire by its own terms
at 11:59 p.m., on June 29, 2012.
AH other terms of the May 8, 2012 Tolling Agreement remain in full force and effect as if
restated herein.

JONES & SWARTZ PLLC

NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.

B~~~',~
A~

ERICB.

JoyM;VEGA
Attorneys for Sharon R. Hammer

EXTENSION OF TOLLING AGREEMENT - l
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Fl LED ~:--___,__

Eric B. Swartz, ISB #6396
Joy M. Vega, ISB #7887
JONES & SWARTZ PLLC
1673 W. Shoreline Drive, Suite 200 [83702]
P.O. Box 7808
Boise, ID 83 707-7808
Telephone: (208) 489-8989
Facsimile: (208) 489-8988
Email: eric@jonesandswartzlaw.com
joy@jonesandswartzlaw.com

DEC -9 2014
Jolynn Drage,
istrict
Court B::1inu County, Idaho

Attorneys for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2012-479
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI;
and DeWAYNE BRISCOE,

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION
Sun Valley presents no evidence adverse to the Court finding that no voluntary and
knowledgeable intent to waive or release any statutory rights exists and that judgment as a matter
oflaw should be entered in favor of Ms. Hammer. Defendant City of Sun Valley has accepted as
true and undisputed all of Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer's stated material facts that support her

Motion for Summary Judgment.

Sun Valley does not dispute that it only purportedly

terminated her without cause, which means that she was actually terminated for cause and

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
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without due process.'

Sun Valley does not dispute that:

"In June 2008, when the [City

Administrator Employment Agreement ("Employment Agreement")] was entered into, there was
no intent by either party that Ms. Hammer was waiving or would waive any constitutional or
statutory rights, or claims of discrimination, harassment, retaliation, or tort."2 Sun Valley does
not dispute that, prior to Ms. Hammer signing the Supplemental Release Pursuant to City
Administrator Employment Agreement ("Supplemental Release"), Sun Valley was repeatedly
advised that she "would not waive or release any non-contract claim, or type of claim other than
those arising from the severance package."3 Sun Valley does not dispute that "[t]he intent of
Ms. Hammer's release extended only to claims arising out of any dispute related to the severance
package.',4 Nor does Sun Valley dispute that: "In January 2012, when Ms. Hammer signed the
Supplemental Release, she had no intent to relinquish any constitutional or statutory rights or [to]
waive any of the claims alleged in the present case."5
Idaho's law on waiver and release plainly requires that, where an exculpatory clause does
not violate public policy, any such relinquishment of rights or claims still requires the act to be
made voluntarily and with knowledge. The admitted material facts, and absence of adverse
evidence, show the Court that no legal, voluntary or knowledgeable waiver or release was signed
by Ms. Hammer in relation to her statutory rights and protections under the Idaho Protection of
Public Employees Act ("IPPEA"). Ms. Hammer's Motion for Summary Judgment should be
granted and Sun Valley's Fifth and Sixth Affirmative Defenses dismissed as a matter oflaw.

6

1

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pltfs MSJ Supp. Mem."), filed
November 18, 2014, § II, ,i 30.
2
Pltf s MSJ Supp. Mero., § II, ,i,i 35-36.
3
Pltfs MSJ Supp. Mero.,§ II, ,i 32.
4
Pltfs MSJ Supp. Mem., § II, ii 33.
5
Pltf's MSJ Supp. Mem., § II, ,i 37.
6
Ms. Hammer incorporates by reference the entirety of the legal arguments and evidence submitted in
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO SUN VALLEY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, filed December 2, 2014.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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II.ARGUMENT
A.

Sun Valley's 2008 Exculpatory Clause and Ms. Hammer's 2012 Release Do Not
Absolve Sun Valley of Liability For Its Illegal Actions

1. The exculpatory clause of the Employment Agreement violates the public policy
underlying the IPPEA.
Freedom to contract is not limitless. Idaho's rule has historically imposed the restriction
that express agreements exempting one party from liability are not enforceable where a public
duty is involved. Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496, 499-500, 465 P.2d 107,
110-111 (1970).

Sun Valley cannot contract-away its statutory obligations to not retaliate

against employees who engage in activities protected by the IPPEA.

See I.C. § 6-2104

(codifying protected employee acts). Nor can Sun Valley relieve itself of liability for violations
of the IPPEA at the commencement of a relationship with a new employee. See I.C. § 6-2104
(prohibiting employer from certain acts).

Sun Valley's attempt to relieve itself of the rule

established in Lee v. Sun Valley Co., which expanded invalid exclusions from permissible
exculpatory contracts, must also be rejected. 107 Idaho 976,979,695 P.2d 361,364 (1984).
Sun Valley is prohibited from contracting its way out of liability arising from violations
of the IPPEA because such liability has been prescribed to it by Idaho's legislature. "[W]e do

hold that where the legislature has addressed the rights and duties pertaining to personal
injuries arising out of the relationship between two groups, i.e., employers/employees,
outfitters and guides/participants, and has granted limited liability to one group in
exchange for adherence to specific duties, then such duties become a 'public duty' within
the exception to the general rule validating exculpatory contracts." Lee, 107 Idaho at 979,
695 P.2d at 364 (1984) (emphasis added).

The public policy exclusion from exculpatory

contracts is not limited to circumstances involving personal injury. It is also applicable to non-

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
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personal injury statutes, including: employer duties under Idaho's workmen's compensation
statutes (Id. (citing LC. § 72-318)); minimum wage statutes (Id. (citing Sherba Bros., Inc. v.
Campbell, 361 So.2d 814 (Fla. App. 1978)); property exemptions from attachment and execution
(Id. (citing Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. Parr, 370 P.2d 400 (Kan. 1962)); unemployment

compensation statutes (Id. (citing Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Employment Sec. Bd. of Review, 502 P.2d
645 (Kan. 1972)); statutory right of redemption (Id. (citing Elson Dev. Co. v. Ariz. Savings &
Loan Ass'n, 407 P.2d 930 (Ariz. 1965)); and landlord-tenant relationships arising from Idaho's

statutory implied warranty of habitability (Jesse v. Lindsley, 146 Idaho 70, 233 P.3d 1 (2008)).
The import of Lee's rule is that where the legislature has addressed the rights and duties arising
out of the relationship between two groups, such as employers and employees, then those
codified duties become a "public duty" within the exception to the general rule validating
exculpatory contracts. Lee, 107 Idaho at 979, 695 P.2d at 364 (1984). This public policy
exclusion from the general rules of contract is not new. Rawlings, 93 Idaho at 499-500, 465 P.2d
at 110-111 (striking exculpatory clause that relieved one party for acts of broad, undefined
negligence).
Sun Valley's violation of the IPPEA resulting, in part, from Ms. Hammer's termination in
retaliation for engaging in activities protected by the IPPEA implicates important public policy
codified by Idaho's legislature. Ms. Hammer's analogy to and reliance on the rule stated in Lee
is not inapposite or inapplicable.

Lee, its progeny, and its predecessors all support

Ms. Hammer's argument that Sun Valley's attempt to contract its way out of liability arising
from its statutory violations is impermissible. Through the IPPEA, Idaho's legislature expressly
intended to establish a standard of care dictating government employer response to employee
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"whistleblower" activities. J.C. § 6-2101. It would be improper for the Court to imply and
enforce a waiver that is an affront to the IPPEA and that the parties did not agree to.
Sun Valley's legal arguments fail as a matter of law.

The Court should grant

Ms. Hammer's Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety.

2. Inherent in Idaho law is a presumption ae:ainst the waiver or relea11e of
statutory rights.
Idaho law does restrict the waiver or release of a known right. 7 "Waiver is a voluntary,

intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage." Brand S. Corp. v. King, 102
Idaho 731,724,639 P.2d 429,432 (1981) (emphasis added) (citing Nelson v. Hopper, 86 Idaho
115,383 P.2d 588 (1963); Crouch v. Bischoff, 78 Idaho 364, 304 P.2d 646 (1956)). In order to
find an exculpatory clause enforceable, a court must find that the clause "speaks clearly and
directly" to the excused wrongdoing. "Clauses which exclude liability must speak clearly and

directly to the particular conduct of the defendant which caused the harm at issue."
Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 178, 595 P.2d 709, 712 (1979)
(citations omitted) (rejecting exculpatory language exempting seller from liability for crop loss).
Broad exculpatory language cannot be isolated from the context of the clause in which it appears.

Anderson & Nafziger, 100 Idaho at 178, 595 P.2d at 712.
Contrary to Sun Valley's blatant misrepresentations of the law and the facts to the Court,
Idaho does require waiver of protected rights to be done knowingly and voluntarily. (Defs.

7

The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that constitutional rights may be waived, so long as
the prospective plaintiff ( often times a criminal defendant) does so knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently. See, Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 834-35 n.11 (2012); Lubcke v. Boise City/Ada County
Hous. Auth., 124 Idaho 450, 460 (1993). "However, the waiver of any fundamental constitutional
right is never presumed." G/angary-Gamlin Protective Ass 'n v. Bird, 106 Idaho 84, 90, 675 P.2d 344,
350 (Ct. App. 1983) (citation omitted). "[T)he waiver must be affirmatively demonstrated." Bird,
106 Idaho at 90, 675 P.2d at 350. "As a corollary to this definition of waiver, this Court has repeatedly
stated that there is a presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights." Id. (emphasis
added) (citations omitted). Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 834-35 n.11 (2012) (citations omitted).
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Opp'n to Pl.'s MSJ, p. 7.) Nothing in the record before the Court establishes that Ms. Hammer
voluntarily or intentionally relinquished her rights under the IPPEA. To the contrary, the record
is replete with evidence that such a waiver and release were not contemplated or intended under
either the Employment Agreement or the Supplemental Release. 8 No terms of the Employment
Agreement or the Supplemental Release "speak clearly and directly" to exclude Sun Valley's
liability under the IPPEA. Anderson & Nafziger, 100 Idaho at 178, 595 P.2d at 712; Jesse, 146
Idaho at 75, 233 P.3d at 6.
When the language of the Supplemental Release was being negotiated by the parties,
Sun Valley did not request or require the Supplemental Release to include specific language
releasing Ms. Hammer's rights under the IPPEA. 9 In fact, Sun Valley drafted its own version of
the release that was rejected by Ms. Hammer. 10 After various correspondences with Sun Valley
regarding the language of the release, Sun Valley accepted the Supplemental Release from
Ms. Hammer. 11 And, during those contract negotiations, Sun Valley was put on notice that
Ms. Hammer was not releasing any right under the IPPEA. 12
Without evidence of Ms. Hammer's voluntary intent to waive or release her rights under
the IPPEA, no such waiver can legally exist. Ms. Hammer's Motion should be granted.

Pltfs MSJ Supp. Mem., § II, ,r,r 30-37.
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO SUN VALLEY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ("Pltf s Resp. to Defs.
MSJ"), filed December 2, 2014, § II, ,r,r 3-5, 7, 16; AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES R. DONOVAL IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ("Aff. of Donoval"), filed November 18, 2014, Exs. 1-3;
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES R. OONOVAL IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ("Supp. Aff. of Donoval"), filed contemporaneously herewith, Exs. 1-2. Mr. Donoval's
Supplemental Affidavit is filed in reply to, and for the purpose of contradicting, Sun Valley's claim that
Ms. Hammer waived all claims (of any kind) as asserted in its opposition to Ms. Hammer's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
10
Supp. Aff. of Donoval, Ex. 2.
11
See Supp. Aff. ofDonoval, Exs. 1-2; Aff. ofDonoval, Exs. 1-3; AFFIDAVIT OF SHARON R. HAMMER IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ("Aff. of Hammer"), filed November 18,
2014, Ex. 2.
12
Aff. of Donoval, Exs. 1-3.
8
9
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B.

Ms. Hammer and Mayor Willich's Intent is Expressly Referenced and Incorporated
Into the Supplemental Release and Can Properly Be Considered By the Court
Through Their Testimony

The intent of Ms. Hammer and Sun Valley, as of 2008, is not presented to the Court for
the purpose of contradicting, varying or altering the terms of the Employment Agreement. It is
presented for the purpose of providing information expressly incorporated by reference into the
Supplemental Release.

The Supplemental Release purposefully refers back to the intent of

Ms. Hammer and Mayor Willich when they signed the Employment Agreement in June 2008:
Upon payment of the severance payment required pursuant to
Section 3.A. of the City Administrator Employment Agreement
dated June 1, 2008, I release the City Of Sun Valley for any claims
defined in Section 3.A. of the City Administrator Employment
Agreement as were intended when the City Administrator
Employment Agreement was entered into on June 1, 2008. iJ
The evidence of record shows that Mayor Willich and Ms. Hammer did not intend the
Employment Agreement to "waive any statutory rights or future discrimination, harassment,
retaliation or other non-contract claims if the City of Sun Valley chose to ever terminate the
Employment Agreement pursuant to the 'without cause' provisions of Section 3, Paragraph A." 14
The Supplemental Release expressly incorporates the Employment Agreement and expressly
incorporates the intent of Sun Valley and Ms. Hammer when the Employment Agreement was
executed. 15
To ascertain the intent of the parties in June 2008, the admissible evidence available to
the Court includes the testimony of Mayor Willich and Ms. Hammer. 16 "The primary aim in
interpretation of all contracts is to ascertain the mutual intent of the parties at the time the contract
13

Aff. of Hammer, Ex. 2 ( emphasis added).

14

AFFIDAVIT OF WAYNE WILLICH IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

("Aff. ofWillich"), filed November 18, 2014, ,r 7; Pltl's MSJ Supp. Mem., § II, fl 30-37.
15
Aff. of Hammer, Ex. 2.
16
Aff. ofWillich, ,r,r 2-9; Aff. of Hammer, fl 3-4, 7-11, 15-22, and Ex. 1.
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was made." Opportunity, LLC v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 607, 38 P.3d 1258, 1263 (2002)

(citation omitted). "If possible, the intent of the parties should be ascertained from the language of
the agreement as the best indication of their intent." Opportunity, LLC, 136 Idaho at 607, 38 P.3d
at 1263 (citation omitted).

And, "when a subsequently executed agreement specifically

references and relies on a former agreement, the two are to be interpreted together, if possible."
Opportunity, LLC, 136 Idaho at 607, 38 P.3d at 1263 (citing Silver Syndicate, Inc. v. Sunshine
Mining Co., 101 Idaho 226, 235, 611 P.2d 1011, 1020 (1979)).

"Although parol evidence

generally cannot be submitted to contradict, vary, add or subtract from the terms of a written
agreement that is deemed unambiguous on its face, there is an exception to this general rule
where a latent ambiguity appears." Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 455, 259

P.3d 595, 601 (2011) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). "A latent ambiguity exists where an
instrument is clear on its face, but loses that clarity when applied to the facts as they exist."
Knipe Land Co., 151 Idaho at 455,259 P.3d at 601 (citation omitted).

Latent ambiguities have appeared regarding which of the claims Ms. Hammer intended to
release and which she intended to keep through the language, "any claim." Latent ambiguities
have also appeared regarding what Ms. Hammer and Mayor Willich intended when entering into
the Employment Agreement in 2008. These latent ambiguities have appeared as a result of
varying arguments being presented by the parties in their attempts to apply the Supplemental
Release to the facts of the case. Ms. Hammer and Mr. Donoval's testimony regarding their
drafting of the Supplemental Release, and Ms. Hammer and Mayor Willich's testimony about
what they intended when entering into the Employment Agreement in 2008, are appropriate for
review in light of such latent ambiguities. Knipe Land Co., supra.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 8

1477

Neither Ms. Hammer nor Mayor Willich's testimony defining what the phrase "claims"
included varies or contradicts the terms of the Employment Agreement, but instead provides
what they defined the word "claims" to mean at the time the Employment Agreement was
entered into. The same can be said for Mr. Donoval and Ms. Hammer's testimony about their
reference to Ms. Hammer and Mayor Willich's 2008 intent and the "any claim" phrase contained
in the Supplemental Release. 17
Latent ambiguities can arise even with the most seemingly understandable term when
trying to apply actual facts to the term. For example, in Mountainview Landowners Coop. Ass 'n,

Inc. v. Cool, the Idaho Supreme Court had to look to extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of
the parties' use of the term "swimming" in an easement agreement. 139 Idaho 770, 86 P.3d 484
(2004). And, in United States v. Park, the Ninth Circuit looked to extrinsic evidence as to what
the term "livestock" meant in an easement agreement. 536 F .3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008). In both

Mountainview and Park, the presumption would be that the definition of the words "swimming"
and "livestock" would be readily determinable. But, in both cases, when the facts related to the
matter were analyzed against the terms, both courts turned to extrinsic evidence to address the
latent ambiguity. The same should be done in this case regarding the term "any claim." 18
The Court must consider the Employment Agreement in light the Supplemental Release's
express incorporation of Ms. Hammer and Mayor Willich' s intent about the same. 19 In doing so,
the only outcome can be that no intent to waive or release Ms. Hammer's rights under the IPPEA
has ever existed.20

Aff. ofWillich, ,r,r 2-9; Aff. of Hammer, ,r,r 3-4, 7-11, 15-22, Ex. 2; Aff. ofDonoval, 1Mj 4-9; Supp. Aff.
ofDonoval, Exs. 1-2.
18
Aff. of Hammer, Ex. 2.
19
Aff. ofWillich, 1Mj 2-9; Aff. of Hammer, ,r,r 3-4, 7-11, 15-22, Exs. 1 and 2; Aff. ofDonoval, ,r,r 4-9.
20
Pltf's MSJ Supp. Mem., § II, ,r,r 30-37.
17
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C.

Judge Lodge's Federal Interim Order Is Not Final Or Binding On This Court
Sun Valley has no reputable legal basis to argue that Judge Lodge's interim Order is

applicable in any way to Ms. Hammer's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Defs. Opp'n to Pl.'s
MSJ, pp. 2, 6, 7.) The federal MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER relied on by Sun Valley is
neither a final judgment nor binding on this Court. 21 The federal court's Order resulted from
Sun Valley's motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(c).22 It was
not a motion for summary judgment that allowed Ms. Hammer to submit evidence. 23 In response
to the federal court's issuance of the referenced Order, Ms. Hammer timely filed PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT'S MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, which is still pending. 24 Ms. Hammer also filed PLAINTIFFS'
RENEWED MOTION TO AMEND THE SCHEDULING ORDER AND MOTION FOR LEA VE TO AMEND THE
COMPLAINT, which is still pending in the federal court. 25 And, Ms. Hammer filed PLAINTIFF
SHARON HAMMER'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT regarding certain federal causes
of action and state common law claims that the federal court erroneously dismissed and/or that
are expected to be revived when the federal court grants the pending Motion for
Reconsideration. 26

The interim federal Order has no bearing on this Court's grant of

Ms. Hammer's Motion for Summary Judgment.

21

Sharon R Hammer and James R Donoval v. City ofSun Valley, Nils Ribi, and De Wayne Briscoe, Case
No. I: l 3-cv-211-EJL, In the United States District Court for the District of [daho ("Hammer, et al. v. Sun
Valley, et al."), DNs 41, 44, 44-1, 45, 45-1.
22
Hammer, et al. v. Sun Valley, et al., DNs 18, 41.
23
Hammer, et al. v. Sun Valley, et al., DNs 41, 22 (Judge Lodge refused to convert the l2(c) motion to a
Rule 56 motion).
24
Hammer, et al. v. Sun Valley, et al., DNs 44, 44-1, 51, 57.
25
Hammer, et al. v. Sun Valley, et al., DNs 45, 45-1 - 45-4, 52, 58.
26
Hammer, et al. v. Sun Valley, et al., DNs 48 - 48-44, 50, 53.
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Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8) is not applicable to this matter.

That Rule

provides a defense arising from "another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause of action." I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8). "The first test is whether the other pending case has gone to
judgment." Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 106 Idaho 905, 908, 684 P.2d 307, 310 (Ct. App.
1984), overruled on other grounds by NBC Leasing Co. v. R&T Farms, 112 Idaho 500, 733 P.2d
721 (1987). "The second test is whether the court, although not barred from deciding the case,
should nevertheless refrain from deciding it." Klaue v. Hern, 133 Idaho 437, 440, 988 P.2d 211,
214 (1999) (citing Wing, 106 Idaho at 908,684 P.2d at 310).
In exercising such discretion, a trial court should evaluate the
identity of the real parties in interest and the degree to which the
claims or issues are similar. The court also may consider the
occasionally competing objectives of judicial economy,
minimizing costs and delay to the litigants, obtaining prompt and
orderly disposition of each claim or issue, and avoiding potentially
inconsistent judgments.
Wing, 106 Idaho at 908, 684 P.2d at 310. "The trial court is to consider whether the court in

which the matter already is pending is in a position to determine the whole controversy and to
settle all the rights of the parties." Diet Ctr., Inc. v. Basford, 124 Idaho 20, 22, 855 P.2d 481,
483 (Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted).

"[W]hether the other court has already exercised

jurisdiction is [another] important factor in determining whether to dismiss a parallel Idaho
action under Rule 12(b)(8)." Zaleha v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, 129 Idaho 532, 534,
927 P.2d 925, 928 (Ct. App. 1996). Sun Valley has not and cannot present argument for this
Court's adoption of any part of the federal Order under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8).
Nor may issue preclusion be used to bar this Court from dismissing Sun Valley's
challenged affirmative defenses. "Issue preclusion protects litigants from litigating an identical
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issue with the same party or its privity." Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d
613,617 (2007) (citation omitted).
Five factors are required in order for issue preclusion to bar the
relitigation of an issue determined in a prior proceeding: (1) the
party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case;
(2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the
issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be
precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was
a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the
party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity
with a party to the litigation.
Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618 (citation omitted). Of the five requisite
factors, only the fifth is satisfied when comparing this IPPEA case to the federal Order and
pending federal motions. Issue preclusion is not applicable to this case.
No reason exists for this Court to show deference to the federal court under theories of
comity. If this Honorable Court has an inclination to rely on the federal Order for any part of its
analysis of the competing Motions for Summary Judgment before it, that inclination should be
dismissed. The federal court has not issued any judgment in Mr. Hammer's civil rights violation
case. Judge Lodge's analysis and determinations stated in the Order are far from final. There
are at least three motions challenging the erroneous Order currently pending. And, Ms. Hammer
has not had an opportunity to appeal any final judgment to the Ninth Circuit. This Court must
conduct independent analysis regarding the exculpatory clause in the Employment Agreement
and the intent of the Supplemental Release at issue in this case.
This Court has exclusive jurisdiction over Ms. Hammer's IPPEA claim. No part of the
interim federal Order is binding on this Court, and it should be disregarded in its entirety.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer respectfully requests that the
Court grant her Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety.
DATED this 8th day of December, 2014.
JONES & SWARTZ PLLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 8th day of December, 2014, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document was served on the following individual(s) by the method indicated:
The Honorable Jonathan P. Brody
District Judge
Minidoka County Courthouse
8th & G Streets
P.O. Box368
Rupert, ID 83350

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Fax: (208) 436-5272
Overnight Delivery
Hand Delivery
Email:

and on the 9th day of December, 2014, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
served on the following individual(s) by the method indicated:
Kirtlan G. Naylor
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83 702-6103

[ ]
[ ]
[X]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Fax: 383-9516
Hand Delivery
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com

JovM.VEGA

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 14
1483

IJ. IU,&fo~

\.UI

1L-vo-,v14+

I IJ

FILED ;.-:.-~
Eric B. Swartz, ISB #6396
M_J

·~:::C
·~
,-:--.-

·.,_,,,
,.~.~

·'C
--...
"""'

.

DEC - 9 2014

Joy M. Vega, ISB #7887
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1673 W. Shoreline Drive, Suite 200 [83702]
P.O. Box 7808
Boise, ID 83707-7808
Telephone·: (208) 489-8989
Facsimile: (208) 489-8988
Email: eric@jonesandswartzlaw.com
joy@jonesandswartzlaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2012-479
Plaintiff,

vs.
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI;
and DeWAYNE BRISCOE,

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF
JAMES R. DONOVAL IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Ada

: ss.
)

I, James R. Donoval, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as follows:

1.

I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein and if called upon to

testify about the same, I could do so competently.
2.

I am married to Sharon R. Hammer, who from. June 2008 to January 19, 2012,

was the City Administrator of the City of Sun Valley, Idaho ("Sun Valley").

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES R. DONOVAL IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-!
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e.vo-... ..,J-o rv:,

......

3.

1J.,, .v 1

1,-vo-,v ,.,.

LI.J

I am a licensed attorney in Idaho, having been sworn-in to the Idaho State Bar in

October 2009, after having practiced law in Illinois since 1988.
4.

Beginning in November 2011, I have represented Ms. Hammer in various matters

associated with legal disputes between her, Sun Valley, and various Sun Valley officials and
employees.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of a portion of an email

chain between me and Mr. Naylor on January 20, 2012.
6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a 1rue and correct copy of a portion of an email

chain between me and Mr. Naylor, on January 21, 2012, with e attachment.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this~ day of December, 2014.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 8th day of December, 2014, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document was served on the following individual(s) by the method indicated:
The Honorable Jonathan P. Brody
District Judge
Minidoka County Courthouse
8th & G Streets
P.O. Box368
Rupert, ID 83350

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
f 1
[ ]
L

_,

U.S. Mail
Fax: (208) 436-5272
Overnight Delivery
Hand Deliverv
Email:
~
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and on the 9th day of December, 2014, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
served on the following individual(s) by the method indicated:
Kirtlan G. Naylor
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.

950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702-6103

[ ]
[ ]
[X]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Fax: 383-9516
Hand Delivery
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com
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HAMMER 000288

From; Kirtfan Naylor <kirt@naylorhales.com>
To: jdonoval <jdonoval@aol.com>

Subject: RE: Lump Sum payment
Date: Fri, Jan 20, 2012 11:34 am

That won't do. If our accountants tell us this should be considered salary, the only way we will 1099 is if
there is an indemnification by your client of all taxes and penalties (including the to the City), if the IRS
deems it to be salary.
1

Also, l just received the signed "release ' and demand.
The release language you propose is not adequate. It needs to be identical to the Agreement, which
states: "Consequently, receipt of the severance payment is subject to execution of a release of all claims
against the City of Sun Valley."
Please revise your release agreement to replace the last paragraph with this language, in order for
payment to be made:

"I release all claims against the City of Sun Valley."

. L.,,.,,

,. <v'·

{, \.

·· .... )
Kirt Naylor
208.947.2070

From: 11~9_119y.1i~>,11Jl.q>_m [m;u/tO:JtlQn9val(~),1ql.comJ
Sent: Friday, January 20, 2012 10:37 AM
To: Kirtlan Naylor
Subject: Re: Lump Sum payment

As to her portion • yes.
Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBerry

From: Kirtlan Naylor <kir t@n_.:1y!o(h;1l,~'i.rnrn>
Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2012 10:03:32 -0700
To: idor1oval1~wl .co111<jdonovgl@.il.ol .corn>

Subject: RE: Lump Sum payment
Will she sign an indemnification if there is deemed to be any tax liability for the City if this is deemed
salary, requiring withholdings?

Kirt/an G. Naylor
Naylor & Hales, P.C.

950 w. Bannock, Suite 610
Boise, Idaho 83702
Direct 208 947-2070
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RE: Lump SlU11 payment

http:i/maii.aoi.comi .,.:>478-2 i ifaoi-6/en-us/mail/PrintMessage.aspx

HAMMER 000297
/~

From; Kirtlan Naylor <kirt@naylorhales.com>
To: Kirtlan Naylor <kirt@naylorhales.com>; jdonoval <jdonoval@aol.com>

Subject: RE: Lump Sum payment

Date: Sat, Jan 21, 2012 4:03 pm
Attachments: Release.pdf (42K)

Jim,
Also, the limiting language is part of the agreement she signed. So, when it says, "receipt of the
severance payment is subject to execution of a reiease of aii ciaims against the City of Sun Valley," in
essence, the lump sum isn't due until that condition has been met.
You quoted the rest of the paragraph, it seems that to quote the rest is exactly what should be done.
I have attached the acceptable release. If it is not received by 1:00pm Monday, payment will not be
able to be made by direct deposit.
(also, your release references January 2011)

if!:;
Kirt Naylor

208.947.2070

From: Kirtlan Naylor
Sent: Saturday, January 21, 2012 3:36 PM

To: 'idonov.1l@a.ol.com'
Subject: RE: Lump Sum payment

Why is she not signing it before Wednesday?

ifs'
Kirt Naylor

208. 947.2070

From: id pp qv,1 l(.f!)J) o[.JQ!.11 (1_i1,1j I tq :jil. 011 o•, ill@,w.1. c<>.11)}
Sent: Saturday, January 21, 2012 3:34 PM
To: Kirtlan Naylor
Subject: Re: Lump Sum payment

I'm thinking treble damages and attorney fees. Read the statutes. You can't put limiting language on
payments. She will sign your release on wednesday specifically under duress. Talk to you on wednesday.
Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBerry
From: Kirtlan Naylor <ki, tri>1uyi•>111_;1!<!'i:i.. f)m>

I of4

2/10/2012 7:19 AM

HAMMER 000297
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HAMMER 000298

RELEASE PURSUANT TO CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
The City Administrator Employment Agreement dated June 1, 2008 between the City of Sun
Valley and Sharon R. Hammer, and as extended by the Extension dated September 17, 2009,
states as follows:
The severance payment herein is intended to be the Employee's sole exclusive
remedy for any and all claims for damages of any kind arising from a tennination
without cause and such severance payment is hereby agreed to be reasonable, fair
and equitable by both parties tot his Agreement. Accordingly, Employee waives
her right to bring a claim of any kind for damages against Employer arising from a
termination without cause. Consequently, receipt of the severance payment is
subject to execution of a release of all claims against the City of Sun Valley.
Therefore, pursuant to the language of the City Administrator Employment Agreement, I state as
follows:

"J release all claims for damages of any kind arising from a tennination without cause on January
19, 2012, and all claims against the City of Sun Valley."
Dated this _ _ of January, 2012.

Sharon R. Hammer

James Donoval, Witness
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Kirtlan G. Naylor
[ISB No. 3569)
Jacob H. Naylor
[ISB No. 8474)
Tyler D. Williams
[ISB No. 8512]
DEC D9 2014
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
='::'~D::J:
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone No. (208) 3 83-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; jake@naylorhales.com; tdw@naylorhales.com
Attorneys for Defendants City of Sun Valley,
Ribi, and Briscoe.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2012-479
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; and
DeWayne BRISCOE,

SUN VALLEY'S REPLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

I.
INTRODUCTION
Sun Valley moved for summary judgment on the primary basis that Hammer waived and later
released her whistleblower claim under the plain and unambiguous tenns of her 2008 Employment
Agreement and 2012 Release. Judge Lodge has already ruled in this respect in a related federal case
and his decision there is correct and his reasoning persuasive. This Court should do the same.
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Additionally, even considering the merits of her allegations, Hammer cannot proceed to trial
on the basis that Ribi merely allegedly violated the Employee Manual, as it does not constitute a law,
rule or regulation under the Whistleblower Act and thus any such alleged violation is not a predicate
act implicating the statute. Further, Hammer cannot demonstrate a prima facie whistleblower claim
because placing an employee on paid administrative leave pending an investigation is not an adverse
action and she cannot demonstrate that her termination was causally connected to complaining about
Ribi's alleged misconduct. In fact, Sun Valley had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to
discharge Hammer (the new mayor determined he would rather vet and hire his own City
Administrator because he could not work with Hammer), and it did so under the "without cause"
provision of Hammer's Employment Agreement, for which she received a severance payment.
Hammer simply cannot show that this was pretext where she expressly acknowledged otherwise
when she accepted that money.
Last, in the event any portion of this case were to proceed to trial, the scope of Hammer's
damages are limited by the Whistleblower Act. In the unlikely event she prevailed, she cannot
recover general damages, including her alleged pain and suffering. Thus, partial summary judgment
is appropriate on this issue.
For all these reasons, Sun Valley has shown that summary judgment is appropriate in this
case. The burden thus shifted to Hammer to cite to materials in the record or put forth material
evidence to overcome summary judgment. As set forth below, however, Hammer has failed to do
so. Accordingly, summary judgment should be granted and final judgment entered for Sun Valley.
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II.
ARGUMENT
A.

The Waiver and Release Are Valid And Enforceable

Sun Valley has already responded to Hammer's flawed argument that the waiver and release
are invalid because they violate public policy, and need not be further belabored here, (See Def's
Opposition Memo) There are, however, three issues raised in Hammer's response that were not
directly raised in support of her own motion for summary judgment and must be addressed.
First, Hammer contends that there is a presumption in Idaho law against the waiver or release
of statutory rights. (Plfs Resp. at 15-16.) This is incorrect. Each of the cases cited by Hammer in
support merely stand for the unremarkable proposition that the waiver of fundamental constitutional
rights is not presumed. (See id at 15, n. 56). The Whistleblower Act plainly does not involve
fundamental constitutional rights and Hammer has not identified any authority that there is a
presumption against waiver or release of a whistleblower claim. (See id.) In fact, the case law cited
by Hammer in support of her motion for summary judgment states just the opposite: in a
recreational-use statute claim, a waiver/release is generally valid under basic contract principles
unless an exception applies. Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976 (1984). Hammer's contention that
there is a presumption against the waiver of a statutory claim is simply incorrect.
Second, Hammer contends that Sun Valley is precluded from raising its waiver/release
defenses because over two years ago it signed a tolling agreement with Hammer that acknowledged
she had alleged various violations of the Whistleblower Act, and Sun Valley attempted to resolve
those claims. (Plfs Resp. at 17.) This argument is meritless and has no basis in the Tolling
Agreement itself, law, or common sense. In fact, Section 7 of the Tolling Agreement (which
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Hammer) specifically precludes the use of the agreement as "a waiver of any right or defense in
subsequent litigation, or estoppel, or an admission as to any other matter of fact or law." (Vega Aff.,
Ex. 3.) Further, the agreement makes clear that Sun Valley merely acknowledged the existence of
Hammer's claimed allegations. It states plainly that "Ms. Hammer claims to have suffered injuries"
and that she "claims to have been injured by the Prospective Defendants' alleged violations of her
common law, state and federal rights." (Id at 1.) Sun Valley certainly did not admit to Hammer's
claims nor did it agree to foreclose itself from raising all available defenses in the event settlement
negotiations failed.
Third, Hammer argues that the release was not supported by consideration. (Plfs Resp. at
18-20.) This is an argument that Judge Lodge correctly rejected because "consideration for the
release of'any and all claims' was given in the form of the six-months severancy pay which Plaintiffs
do not dispute having received." (Judge Lodge's Decision at 16.) It is well settled that contracts must
be supported by valid consideration. Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass'n. Inc, 152 Idaho 519,526
(2012). Consideration exists when there is something given in exchange for a promise. While
consideration is invalid ifit is something to which the other party has an absolute right, "forbearance
to prosecute a disputed claim is good consideration." Id As Judge Lodge pointed out, the release
was in exchange for the severance, which is valid consideration. It is clear under the tenns of the
Employment Agreement that the severance payment was not an automatic payment to be made upon
a termination without cause, but rather was contingent upon Hammer's release of her claims against
Sun Valley. She could not receive the severance without her release of all claims.
Hammer tries to negate this fact through her incorrect reliance on Sarbacher v. AmericCold

Realty Trust, Case No. 1:10-CV-429-BLW, 2011 WL 5520442 (D. Idaho 2011), but this case is
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distinguishable. In Sarbacher, there was no election from the employee to accept or reject the
severance payment as a contractual condition, rather the employer had a pre-existing duty to pay the
severance payment upon a termination without cause. While that case does make the general
proposition that severance payments can be considered wages, the court applied an analysis of the
context and contractual language regarding the severance payment at issue to determine its
application as wages. Id at 9. A similar comparative analysis to the "severance payment" provision
of Hammer's Employment Agreement leads to the conclusion that her payment was not considered
"wages," and therefore it is valid as consideration for the contractually required release.
More specifically, in Sarbacher, the court first noted that simply referring to a payment as
"severance" alone is not sufficient to automatically consider a severance payment as "wages."

Sarbacher at 9. A more thorough analysis of the context and language surrounding the payment is
required before immediately disregarding anything given the name "severance." Therefore, although
Hammer's payment is referenced as a "severance payment," this does not equate to "wages.". The
severance payment in Sarbacher was specifically classified and negotiated in the employment
agreement as wages and an element of compensation, and there was no contractually required
additional action (such as a release) from the employee in order to receive it upon a termination
without cause. Id at 2. That is not the case here. Hammer's severance payment was not classified
as wages and she was only entitled to her severance payment in exchange for a release of all claims.
Sun Valley did not owe her the payment unless that condition was satisfied. This constitutes valid
consideration.
Further, an analysis of Hammer's severance payment leads to the conclusion that it is more
akin to a liquidated damages payment as the Idaho Supreme Court held in Moore v. Omnicare, Inc.,
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118 P.3d 141 (2005). In that case, the severance payment was not "compensation for labor or
services rendered by an employee," I.C. § 45-601 (7), but rather were considered "future wages." The
plain language ofHammer's Employment Agreement indicates that the severance payment at issue
here, like in Moore, "constituted part of a liquidated damages provision due and owing in the event
Omnicare terminated Moore 'without cause,"' and therefore is not wages.

Id In fact, the

Employment Agreement expressly states that the severance pay would be "equal to six (6) months,
base salary"; it does not state that it is salary. (Employment Agreement§ 3.A) (emphasis added).
For these reasons, there was consideration for Hammer's release of her claims against the City of
Sun Valley.

B.

Hammer Fails to Overcome Summary Judgment on Her Whistleblower
Claim
1.

The Violation of City Policy Does Not Constitute a Predicate Act
Implicating the Idaho Whistleblower Act

Hammer argues that the Employee Manual is a "rule or regulation" for purposes of the
Whistleblower Act because it was adopted pursuant to city council resolutions. (Pit's Resp. at22-24.)
In support she relies upon Idaho Code §§ 50-902 and 907(1). However, Section 50-902, by its
express terms, does not apply. The statute governs "[t]he passage or adoption of every ordinance, and
every resolution or order to enter a contract. ... " I.C. § 50-902 (emphasis added). An ordinance is
a formal legislative act of a city council and the procedures for adopting are prescribed by Idaho
Code, Sections 50-901, 901A, and 902. A resolution is different from an ordinance, as it is not
enacted in the same manner and does not have the same binding effect. A resolution does not have
the force and effect of law, like an ordinance does. State v. Idaho State Bd of Land Com'rs, 150
Idaho 547,557 (2010) (citing Balderston v. Brady, 17Idaho 567,577 (1910) (noting that a resolution
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"is not enacted in the manner provided for the enactment of law ... and it is not contended that it
is a law. 11 ) 20 C.J.S. Counties§ 145 (2014).
The Employee Manual is plainly not an ordinance and, though adopted by resolution as an
internal administrative policy of the City, is not itself a resolution of any kind, let alone a resolution
to enter a contract. 1
Additionally, Hammer's reliance on Idaho Code § 50-907(1), which defines "permanent
record" to include ordinances and resolutions, is also misplaced as that provision has no bearing on
whether a permanent record is a rule or regulation. While ordinances and resolutions are obviously
permanent records, all permanent records are not ordinances or resolutions, or laws, rules or
regulations. Indeed, the phrase "permanent record" also includes budget records, cash books and
other types of records that in no way could be deemed rules or regulations. See id.
Hammer also argues that Mallonee v. Idaho Department ofCorrection (relied upon by Sun
Valley for the proposition that employee manuals are not rules or regulations for purposes of the
Whistleblower Act) does not apply because the defendant there was !DOC, a public administrative
body, not a municipality like Sun Valley. (Plfs Resp. at 22-23.) The distinction is meaningless. At
the core of Mallonee is that the IDOC policies there did not have the force or effect oflaw because
they were not promulgated under the APA. 139 Idaho at 620. At the state administrative level, the
prescribed procedures in the APA ( e.g., publishing with comment period, due process) and

1

Hammer also incorrectly states that 11 [ o]nee an ordinance or resolution is adopted by a
city council it 'shall be read and received in evidence in all courts and places without further
proof."' (Plfs Resp. at 22) (quoting in part LC. § 50-902. This provision actually only applies to
ordinances, not resolutions. I.C. § 50-902 (last paragraph of statute).
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underlying legislative authority is what makes a rule or regulation equivalent to a law for purposes
of a Whistleblower claim. Id.
Likewise, at the municipal level here, the Employee Manual was not promulgated under the
ordinance-making process ofldaho Code §§ 50-902, 901 A and 902 and therefore does not have the
force and effect oflaw, like promulgated rules or regulations do per Mallonee. Hammer incorrectly
states that the Mallonee court found that IDOC "policies could not be promulgated as a law, rule or
regulation of the state.... " (Plf's Resp. at 23.) The issue in Mallonee was not, however, about
whether IDOC had authority to promulgate policies as rules or regulations. IDOC could have
promulgated what was set forth in its policies as rules or regulations, via the APA, but it did not so.
Consequently, IDOC's policies were not deemed rules or regulations under the Whistleblower Act.
The same is true here: the Employee Manual was not promulgated as an ordinance, and thus is not
a law, rule or regulation.
Hammer's argument that violation ofEmployee Manual can constitute a predicate act because
it was adopted by resolution is also unavailing. Unlike an ordinance, a resolution does not have the
force and effect of law. With the exception of a resolution to enter into a contract, there is no
statutory process for the passage of a resolution, like there is with an ordinance or a state rule or
regulation. See Idaho Code § 50-902. Rather, a resolution is simply a device to accomplish any
number of city administrative matters, such as adopting an internal personnel policy. Hammer's
suggestion that a resolution is equal to an ordinance is based on a flawed reading ofidaho Code §
50-902 and is simply incorrect.
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In short, to the extent Hammer supports her Whistleblower claim based on her allegations
that one or more city official violated the Employee Manual, she cannot proceed because such is not
a predicate act implicating the statute.

2.

Hammer Fails to Demonstrate that Her Termination Was a
Pretext

Hammer contends that Sun Valley's reasoning for her termination was a pretext because she
was not actually fired "without cause" .2 (Plfs Resp. at 24-27.) This assertion is belied by the fact that
she indisputably signed the Release (drafted by her own husband and attorney) which plainly and
unambiguously states that Hammer was terminated pursuant to Section 3.A of her Employment
Agreement, the "without cause" provision, and for which she accepted the severance payment.
Hammer's mere recital ofthe fact that she had made allegations ofharassment by Ribi, and that there
had been allegations of wrongdoing against her and others, while relevant to why she was placed on
paid administrative leave and investigations began, does not show that her termination under the new
mayor was a pretext.
As Judge Lodge clearly explained:

Plaintiffs contend that Ms. Hammer's termination was not "without cause" and,
therefore, not subject to the waiver provision of Section 3.A of the Employment
Agreement. This argument is contrary to the plain and unambiguous language of the
Employment Agreement and the undisputed fact that she accepted the severance
payment as provided for in Section 3.A. ofthe Employment Agreement. Notably, the
release Ms. Hammer signed specifically references Section 3.A. of the Employment
Agreement which applies to terminations "without cause." To now argue her

2

Hammer asserts that Curlee stated that the McDonnel-Douglass burden shifting analysis
does not apply at summary judgment. However, she does not address Sun Valley's position that
Curlee has been implicitly overruled on that issue. (See Defs Corrected Memo at 18.)
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termination was for cause is contrary to the plain and unambiguous language of the
documents she affixed her signature to. 3
(Lodge Decision at 13-14) (footnote and internal citations omitted).
Hammer's conclusory assertion that she was discharged for some improper reason, even
though she acknowledged already in writing that she was discharged "without cause" and received
her severance payment, is unsupported by the record and is insufficient to show pretext. Summary
judgment is therefore appropriate.

3.

Being Placed on Paid Administrative
Investigation Is Not an Adverse Action

Leave

Pending

Hammer lists several alleged actions she contends were adverse employment actions, relying
on non-controlling Ninth Circuit and district court case law, arguing that these show a "campaign
of harassment and humiliation" sufficient to demonstrate an adverse action for purposes of the
Whistleblower Act. (Plf's Resp. at 27-29.) While the Ninth Circuit has taken an expansive view of
what may constitute an adverse employment action for purposes of federal retaliatory claims (e.g.,
Title VII, ADEA), other jurisdictions have not (at least one of which involved a whistleblower claim
similar to Idaho's) and Idaho is consistent with those other jurisdictions, as detailed in Sun Valley's
opening brief. (See Corrected Memo at 21-22.)
To reiterate, to be actionable, an adverse action must include significant changes in
employment. E.g., Hathewayv. Bd ofRegents ofUniv. ofIdaho, 155 Idaho 255,265 (2013). Several
jurisdictions have found that this does not include being placed on paid administrative leave pending
an investigation. (See cases cited in Corrected Memo at 21-22.) This makes sense given the need to

3

While Judge Lodge stated this while discussing Hammer's waiver/release, the same logic
bears significantly on the issue of pretext.
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use paid administrative leave to provide "a reasonable means to immediately neutraliz[e] a
potentially contentious situation while minimally affecting the [employee]." Russo, 87 A.3d at 407.
The record shows that Michelle Frostenson made allegations of potential misconduct by
Hammer, and Hammer was placed on paid administrative leave pending investigation. Hammer's
conclusory statements that there were "threats" to terminate her and that the investigation was
"biased" are unfounded. And, in any event, she has not shown how even if true such would constitute
an adverse employment action. More so, she has not provided any authority showing how Sun Valley
informing the public about issues of alleged wrongdoing is actionable under these circumstances and
has made no effort to explain why she believes a government should not inform its citizens about
matters of such significant public concern. Further, Hammer's belief that there was a "posttermination smear campaign" against her is also not actionable, as by her own concession Sun Valley
was no longer her employer during this period and since she was not an employee the Whistleblower
Act would not apply to any of her post-termination allegations. See LC. § 6-2104 (prohibiting an
employer from retaliating against an employee)

In all, the only plausible adverse action at issue here is her termination, but her claim on that
basis fails for other reasons as set forth above in Section B.2 and in Sun Valley's opening brief.

C.

Statute of Limitations

Hammer correctly points out the May 2012 Tolling Agreement, which counsel for Sun Valley
inadvertently overlooked. While this agreement does not act as a bar to Sun Valley's waiver and
release defenses, as Hammer contends, Sun Valley withdraws its argument that the statute of
limitations precludes part of Hammer's claim.
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D.

The Whistleblower Act Limits the Scope of Recoverable Damages

Hammer seeks all available remedies under the Whistleblower Act, including getting her job
back with full benefits and seniority rights,4 as well as "compensation for lost wages, benefits and
other remuneration." She takes this last phrase to mean that she is entitled to prove general damages
for pain and suffering. In support, however, she only cites to authority supporting her position that
front pay is part of the phrase "lost wages". (See Plfs Resp. at 32.) That authority does not speak to
general damages and, as Sun Valley previously argued, is not provided for under the Whistleblower
Act. (See Defs Corrected Memo,§ C.)
To the extent Hammer suggests the term "other remuneration" is a broad enough catchall that
would include pain and suffering, this is not the case. While not defined in the Whistleblower Act,
the term "remuneration" refers to a for quid pro quo: the consideration an employee received in
exchange for her services to the employer. See Black's Law Dictionary at 1409 (9th ed. 2009)
(defining it as "[p]ayment; compensation" or "[t]he act of paying or compensation."); Blacks's Law
Dictionary at 1460 (4th ed. 1951) (defining it as "reward; recompense; salary" and a "quid pro quo").

These definitions are consistent with the context ofldaho Code § 6-2106(4), which refers to the
types of consideration for an employee's services (i.e., "the compensation for lost wages, benefits
and other remuneration."). A plain reading of the statute is that "other remuneration" is simply a
catchall for the other types of unspecified forms of consideration an employee may receive in the
employer-employee quid pro quo relationship that is not totally captured in the phrase "compensation

4

Sun Valley indicated in its opening brief that Hammer was only seeking special and
general damages, but as she points out she is also seeking injunctive relief. Sun Valley disputes
that, even if she were to prevail, such injunctive relief would be appropriate in this case, but that
is not at issue in this motion for summary judgment.
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or benefits". Emotional pain and suffering and other types of general, non-economic damages are
simply not part of such consideration in the employment relationship, and are thus not included in
the phrase "other remuneration."
Not only is this understanding consistent with the Whistleblower statute, it is consistent with
how the term "remuneration" is used elsewhere in Idaho statutes. Because the Whistleblower Act
relates to public employment, other Idaho statutes related to employment are instructive. For
example, under Idaho's Employment Security Law, Idaho Code § 72-1301 et seq., "wages" include
"[a] 11 remuneration for personal services from whatever source, including commissions and bonuses
and the cash value of all remuneration in any medium other than cash." Idaho Code § 72-1328.
Likewise, under Idaho's Workers' Compensation Law, Idaho Code§ 72-101 et seq., "wages" means
"money payments for services" as well as other forms of remuneration, such as "the reasonable
market value of board, rent housing, lodging, fuel and other advantages ... [and] gratuities received
in the course of employment from others than the employer [e.g., tips]." Idaho Code§ 72-102(33).
Thus, it is apparent that "remuneration" refers to and is limited to the various types of consideration
in the employment relationship, and not a broad catch all that includes all imaginable damages.

If the Idaho legislature wanted the phrase "other remuneration" in Idaho Code§ 6-2106(4)
to include more than types of consideration related to employment, it could have done so. For
example, Idaho has created a civil cause of action for the crime of malicious harassment. See Idaho
Code § 18-7903 (b). The legislature took care to spell out the measure of damages more broadly such
that "[a] person may be liable to the victim of malicious harassment for both special and general
damages, including but not limited to damages for emotional distress, reasonable attorney fees and
costs, and punitive damages." Id. Further, the statute provides "[t]he penalties provided in this
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section for malicious harassment do not preclude victims from seeking any other remedies, criminal
or civil, otherwise available under law." Idaho Code § 18-7903(c).
Similarly, Idaho has created a civil cause of action against any person who violates Idaho
Code § 27-502 (related to disturbance of cairns and graves) and a prevailing plaintiff may be
awarded, in addition to injunctive relief and attorney fees, actual damages. Idaho Code § 27-504(1 ),
(2). The legislature specifically provided that actual damages under that statute "include special and
general damages, which include damages for emotional distress." Idaho Code§ 27-504(2).
In addition to damages for lost wages, benefits and other remuneration, the "Whistleblower"
Act similarly provides for attorney fees and injunctive relief, Idaho Code § 6-2106(5), but does not
go on to specify that a plaintiff may recover for general damages or other special damages unrelated
to employment, like the malicious prosecution and protection of grave statutes do.
Lastly, under the federal Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq., pertaining
to federal employees, damages include "back pay and related benefits, medical costs incurred, travel
expenses, and any other reasonable and foreseeable consequential changes." 5 U.S.C. §
1221(g)(l)(A)(ii). This language therefore provides for broader relief going beyond the what is
contemplated in the employer-employee relationship.
Thus, under each of the above examples where general damages such as pain and suffering
are supported, the respective legislatures specifically drafted language providing for comparatively
broad relief. Idaho, however, did not do so for its Whistleblower Act. The remedial provision of
the statute is worded in such a way that it limits recovery to economic damages related to an
employee's services. General damages are therefore not allowed.
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III.
CONCLUSION
As shown in Sun Valley's moving papers and as further set forth above, summary judgment
is appropriate. Hammer's Whistleblower Act claim should be dismissed and final judgment entered.
DATED this 9th day of December, 2014.
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 9th day of December, 2014, I caused to be served,
by the method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
Eric B. Swartz
JoyM. Vega
Jones & Swartz, PLLC
PO Box 7808
Boise, ID 83 707-7808

_

,,)1.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax Transmission: 489-8988
Email: eric@jonesandswartzlaw.com
joy@jonesandswartzlaw.com

.Jr:

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFI'H JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Plaintiff,

v.
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI;
and DeWAYNE BRISCO,
Defendant
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Case No. CV-2012-479

MEMORANDUM DECISION
ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BACKGROUND

On December 16, 2014, the Court heard the parties' arguments on cross motions for
summary judgment with respect to the defendant's fifth and sixth affirmative defenses.
Defendant's motion also included a request for summary judgment, asserting that plaintiff's
allegations do not fall tmder Idaho's Protection of Public Employees Act (IPPEA), and in the
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event they did, possible remedies would be limited beyond what plaintiff requests. The Court
ultimately took the motions under advisement.
Th.is case began when plaintiff, Sharon Hammer, filed suit against defendant, City of Sun
Valley, for damages under Idaho's Protection of Public Employees Act (IPPEA). The plaintiff
contends that she was terminated from her employment \vi.th the City of Sun Valley on January
19, 2012 based on the fact that she had reported a city council member's conduct of harassing
her. During the same time period, allegations were also made that plaintiff had engaged in
inappropriate conduct with respect to the citf s management. Plaintiff was placed on
administrative leave while an investigation was conducted. Upon conclusion of the investigation
no charges were brought, and plaintiff resumed her duties. However, shortly after a new mayor
came into office early January 2012, the mayor and city council unanimously decided to
terminate plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff was terminated under the "without cause" provision
of her employment contract. Pursuant to the ''without cause" provision, plaintiff, with her
attorney's assistance, drafted and signed a supplemental release of claims in order to secure a
severance package. The signed supplemental release reads:
Upon payment of the severance payment required pursuant to Section 3.A. of the
City Administrator Employment Agreement dated June 1, 2008, I release the
City of Sun Valley for any claims defined in Section 3.A. of the City
Administrator Employment Agreement as were intended when the City
Administrator Employment Agreement was entered into on June 1, 2008.
Section 3.A of plaintiff's employment contract, which was referenced in plaintiff's release of
claims states:

Employer, acting through the Mayor, may terminate Employee's employment,
without case, for any reason or no reason. Any such decision to terminate shall
occur only after the Mayor consults with each member of the City Council. Upon
such termination, Employer shall pay Employee, as severance pay, a lump sum
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cash payment equal to six (6) months, base salary described in Section 5.
Subsection A.
The severance payment herein is intended to be Employee's sole exclusive
remedy for any and all claims for damages of any kind arising from a termination
without cause and such severance payment is hereby agreed to be reasonable, fair
and equitable by both parties to this Agreement. Consequently, receipt of the
severance payment is subject to execution of a release of all claims against the
City of Sun Valley. A tennination without cause shall not entitle Employee to an
informal review under any section of the City of Sun Valley Personnel manual
("Personnel Manual").
Plaintiff received a severance package and subsequently filed suit against the City of Stm
Valley for violation of the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act (IPPEA). Both parties filed
motions for summary judgment in this case regarding defendant Sun Valley's affirmative
defenses of waiver and release. Specifically, in its response to plaintiff Sharon Hammer's
complaint under the IPPEA, defendant asserts that plaintiff cannot bring suit against Sun Valley
because plaintiff had released the city from liability for any and all claims she might have had at
the time she was terminated from city employment Defendant's fifth and sixth affirmative
defenses state that "some or all of the Plaintiff's claims are barred by release ... [or] waiver."
Conversely, plaintiff argues that Section 3.A. of her employment contract is unenforceable
because it constitutes a prospective waiver and that the supplemental release pertains only to

contract and wage claims surrounding severance payment itself and that there was no
consideration for the signed release.
Lastly, plaintiff disputes defendant's assertion that. upon plaintiff's termination, the

parties simply went their separate ways. It is alleged that the City of Sun Valley or employees
thereof conducted a "smear campaign" against plaintiff that has caused her dam.age. Due to
defendant's conduct after plaintifrs termination, plaintiff asserts that even if there were

consideration for the supplemental release, it would be insufficient consideration.
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings,

depositions, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R. C.P. 56(c); Scona, Inc. v.

Green Willow Trust, 133 Idaho 283,286, 985 P.2d 1145, 1148 (1999). The court must liberally
construe all disputed facts in favor of the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences
and conclusions supported by the record in favor of the party opposing the motion. Wiemer v.

Rankin, 117 Idaho 566,570, 790 P.2d 347,351 (1990). If conflicting inferences are possible,
summary judgment should be denied. Only if there is no genuine issue of material fact after the
affidavits, pleadings, and depositions have been construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party should summary judgment be awarded. Loomis v. City ofHailey, 119 Idaho 434,
437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991).
This Court finds that no genuine issue of material fact exists in this case because

plaintiff's signed supplemental release of claims together with Section 3.A. of her employment
agreement present a clear and unambiguous contract. When a contract is clear on its face, there is
no need to go outside the four comers of the document State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253,257,281
P.3d 90, 94 (2012) ("If the language of the document is unambiguous, given its ordinary and

well-understood meaning, we will not look beyond the four comers of the agreement to
determine the intent of the parties."). When dealing with extrinsic evidence such as intent, the
parol evidence rule pronounces, "[i]fthe written agreement is complete upon its face and
unambiguous, no fraud or mistake being alleged, extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous
negotiations or conversations is not admissible to contradict, vary, alter, add to or detract from
the terms of the contract." Belk v. }Jartin, 136 Idaho 652,657, 39 P.3d 592,597 (200i) (quoting
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Chambers v. Thomas, 123 Idaho 69, 72, 844 P.2d 698, 701 (1992)). In this case, plaintiff's
supplemental release clearly absolves defendant of any liability for claims plaintiff had at the
time of her termination. The release operates to ''release the City of Sun Valley for any claims
defined in Section 3A. of the City Administrator Employment Agreement." When looking to
Section 3.A. of plaintiff's employment agreement, it unambiguously provides that "severance
payment herein is intended to be Employee's sole exclusive remedy for any and all claims for
dam.ages of any kind arising from a termination without cause." It also goes on to say that
"[c]onsequently, receipt of the severance payment is subject to a release of all claims against the
City of Sun Valley." (emphasis added). Plaintiff argues that Section 3.A. is void as against public
policy because it creates a prospective waiver. Although prospective waivers are generally
unenforceable, see E.EO.C. v. Townley Eng'g & lv(fg. Co., 859 F.2d 610,616 (9th Cir. 1988), in
this case, plaintiff signed a supplemental release after the time she knew of her potential claims
against defendant. As defendant correctly points out, there is "nothing to indicate how such a
release would violate public policy and, indeed, ... it makes no sense to forbid the resolution of
existing claims." Sun Valley's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment-4.
While plaintiff asserts that she never intended to release any non-contract claims, the
Court declines to consider the parties' subjective intent, where the contract is clear. Even if the
Court were to look to the parties' subjective intent outside the four comers of the documents-the supplemental release and Section 3.A. of the employment agreement-the release would be
interpreted in favor of defendant. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201 (2) states:
(2) Where the parties have attached different meanings to a promise or agreement
or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with the meaning attached by one
of them if at the time the agreement was made
(a) that party did not know of any different meaning attached by the other,
and the other knew the meaning attached by the first party; or
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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(b) that party had no reason to know of any different meaning attached by
the other, and the other had reason to know the meaning attached by the
first party.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201 (1981 ); see also Johnston v. C.LR., 461 F.3d 1162,
1165 (9th Cir. 2006) (The Court relied on§ 201 in determining that ''where one party has no
reason to know of any ot.li.er meaning than that apparent from the other pai."'ty's ovrn words, and
the other party did have reason to know the meaning the first party would attach to his words, the
first party's understanding prevails.").

In this case, plaintiff knew defendant's interpretation of the signed release's language.

Plaintiff asserts in her sworn affidavit that:
18. . .. In order to secure my immediate financial security, I was forced to
sign a release of claims that was acceptable to the City.
19. The language of the Supplemental Release purposely and intentionally
does not include any mention that I was releasing any non-contract severance
benefits.
20. The Supplemental Release purposely does not include any waiver or
release of any federal statutory claim, any constitutional claim, or any other
common law or tort claims that I may have against Sun Valley, its officials or
employees.
21. By signing the Supplemental Re)ease I did not intend to, nor did I
knowingly or voluntarily waive or release any non-contract claims, such as any
claims arising from the IPPEA.

Affidavit of Sharon R Hammer in Support of Plaintifrs Motion for Summary Judgment
(emphasis added). Through correspondence with the plaintiff, defendant made clear what kind of
release was acceptable. Based on plaintiff's affidavit, the Court finds that she knew or had reason
to know that defendant believed the supplemental release pertained to any and all claims, not

wage and contract claims only. The contract indicates the supplemental release wou1d apply to
all claims. At the hearing, plaintiff distinguished between "any" and "all," but Section 3.A. uses
both "any and all" and "all claims" in its language. The language in Section 3.A. is not
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

6ofll
1512

ambiguous. But if it is, defendant clearly wanted a release of all claims, and plaintiff knew that.
Paragraph 18 of her affidavit indicates she knew what was acceptable to defendant. Defendant
also submitted an affidavit from Mayor Willich to support the proposition that a release of noncontract claims was not contemplated. However, the affidavit indicates that he did not discuss the

types of cl,tjm~ contemplated in Section. 3.A. It is clear that what was intended in 2008 was a
release of all claims, based on the plain language of Section 3.A.
Additionally, plaintiff argues that the signed supplemental release in exchange for a
severance package lacks consideration because severance payments are in reality wages that
have already been earned. Plaintiff relies heavily on Sarbacher v. AmeriCold Realty Trust, No.
1:10-CV-429-BLW, 2011 WL 5520442 (D. Idaho Nov. 14, 2011) for the proposition that
severance payments constitute wages. However, although that case is unreported and thus nonauthoritative, it is distinguishable anyway in that it dealt with an employment contract that
provided for a severance package with no strings attached. See id at *6-*7. Here, on the other
hand, plaintifi's employment agreement provides for a severance package only conditionally.

Plaintiff was not entitled to severance payment upon termination alone. This case is more
comparable to Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 118 P.3d 141 (2005), where the Court
determined that liquidated damages for an employee's termination "without cause" were not
considered "wages" already earned. Therefore, plaintiff's severance package was not equivalent
to wages but instead served as consideration for her signed supplemental release. This case also
does not involve a situation to recover unpaid wages. Here, the severance package was paid; Sun
Valley was, by paying the claim, giving up any chance it had to say the firing was for cause to
avoid payment of the severance package.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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Lastly, plaintiff argues that although she was terminated under the "without cause"
provision of her employment agreement, she was in reality terminated "for cause" due to
criminal allegations against her. While there might have been genuine issues of fact concerning

whether plaintiff was terminated "for cause," she accepted, and impliedly asserted, that she was

terminated "with01..tt c.ause" when she elected to receive a severance package. Under her
employment contract, plaintiff~ to receive a severance package only if terminated "without
cause," and even then, only if she signed a supplemental release. Because plaintiff made the
choice to accept the severance package, acknowledging that she was terminated "without cause,"
she is now judicially estopped from making the argument that she was actually terminated "for
cause."
Judicial estoppel is appropriate to prevent "a party from gaining an advantage by taking
one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position." A & J
Const. Co. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682,684, 116 P.3d 12, 14 (200S)(citingSwordv. Sweet, 140

Idaho 242,252, 92 P.3d 492,502 (2004)). "Judicial estoppel is intended to prevent a litigant
from playing fast and loose with the courts." Id (citing McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 152,
937 P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997)). Indeed, "'[t]he circumstances under which judicial estoppel may

appropriately be invoked are probably not reducible to any general formulation of principle."'

Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 178 P.3d 597 (2008) (quoting Hamilton v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 2001)). Judicial estoppel assists courts in maintaining "the

dignity of the judicial process, it is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion."

Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Russell
v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1260, 111 S.Ct. 2915, 115
LEd.2d 1078 (1991 )). Therefore, in the exercise of discretion, this Court applies the equitabfo
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doctrine ofjudicial estoppel and refuses to consider whether plaintiff was actually terminated
"for cause." Plaintiff accepted a substantial benefit based on the fact that she was supposedly
terminated "without cause," and this Court declines to allow her to now assume an inconsistent
position. Judicial estoppel does not operate in situations where there is coercion or duress.
Plaintiff was in a difficult and stressfal situation, but she did not suffer duress or coercion; her
affidavit indicates she was clearly thinking strategically.
Because defendant's affirmative defense of release clearly and unambiguously applies to
any and all claims, plaintiff is barred from bringing her IPPEA suit against defendant Thus, no
genuine issues of material fact need be litigated, and the case must thereby be dismissed. Had
there not been a release and the payment of a severance package, there are factual disputes that
probably would prevent summary judgment. However, the supplemental release makes the
merits of the case moot. Defendant's other reasons for requesting summary judgment need not be
addressed, as the signed supplemental release is dispositive in this case. Any claims plaintiff may
have that arose after her termination present separate issues and are pending in federal court now
or subject to future suits as the case may be.

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby orders that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is
DENIED and defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Plaintiff,
V.

CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI;
and DeWAYNE BRISCO,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2012-479

MEMORANDUM DECISION
ON MOTION TO STAY
PROCEEDINGS ON PETITION
FOR STAY AND MOTION TO
EXPEDITE

ANALYSIS
Plaintiff has filed a motion to stay proceedings on the petition for fees filed by
Defendants. The deadline for response is quickly approaching. There has also been a motion to
reconsider filed, and to complicate matters, a motion to withdraw filed by counsel. This Court
believes all of the pending issues should be heard on the merits and not have a procedural
deadline prevent a substantive response. However. it is unclear why a stay is necessary.
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS ON PETIDON FOR STAY AND
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This Court considered denying the motion to stay on the basis that granting it could
actually prejudice the Plaintiff. If the deadline to file a response cannot be extended, to stay the
proceedings would prevent a response which the Plaintiff clearly wants to raise. However, after
consideration, this Court believes it has the discretion to extend the deadline to file a response to
the petition for fees.
It is the Court's understanding that the time for filing a response pursuant to I.R.C.P.
54(d)(6) may be enlarged in the Court's discretion. Wheeler v. McIntyre, 100 Idaho 286 (1979).
The Plaintiff has set forth reasons why an enlargement is appropriate. However, it is not clear
that a stay is necessary or that the issue of fees and costs cannot be decided at a hearing on the
motion to reconsider. The motion to withdraw could also affect the status of the case.
Thus, in the exercise of discretion, the time to file a response to the petition for fees is
extended until March 2, 2015, by the close of business. This will prevent the Plaintiff from
losing the ability to challenge costs while issues of representation are sorted out. A status
hearing may be helpful as well.

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby orders that the deadline to respond to the petition for
fees is extended until March 2, 2015, by the close of business. The motion to stay is thus denied
and the motion to expedite moot.

Dated:

J/to/tL
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Attorney for Appellant Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2012-479
Plaintiff-Appellant,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NU.S RIBI;
and DeWAYNE BRISCOE,

Defendants- R

TO:

ndents.

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, THE CITY OF SUN VALLEY, IDAHO,
NILS RIBI and DeWAYNE BRISCOE; NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

NOTICE TO THE DISTRICT COURT AND RESPONDENTS: On January 30, 2015,
Appellant filed her Motion For Reconsideration Of Entry Of Summary Judgment, a
Memorandum In Support and Affidavits In Support, within fourteen (14) days of the entry
of final judgment, as is allowed pursuant to I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B). Pursuant to I.A.R 14 (a),
as the Motion For Reconsideration Of Entry Of Summary Judgment, if granted, could
affect findings of fact, conclusions of law or the judgment entered herein, the forty two (42)
day period for filing a Notice Of Appeal is terminated, pending resolution of the Motion
For Reconsideration Of Entry Of Summary Judgment. However, to ensure that the
Appellant has timely filed her Notice Of Appeal herein, the Appellant is filing the Notice Of
Appeal herein, subject to possible amendment or revenal of the findings of the District
Court related its Memorandum Decision On Motions For Summary Judgment.
1.

The above-named Appellant, SHARON R. HAMME~ appeals against the above-

named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from a) the Memorandum Decision On Motion For
Summary Judgment

entered on January 9, 2015 and filed on January 12, 2015 (Exhibit A); b) the
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..
Memorandum Decision Granting Defendants Motion To Dismiss entered on November 22, 2013 and
filed on November 26, 2013 (Exhibit B); and, c) the Memorandum Decision Denying Plaintiff's
Motion To Enforce Subpoena And Compel entered on January 17, 2014 and filed on January 17,
2014 (Exhibit C); in the above-entitled action, the Honorable Judge Jonathan Brody, presiding.
2.

Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Orders described

in paragraph 1 above are appealable Orders under and pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (a)(l ).

3.

Appellant requests a review o{ the following issues:
(a) Did the District Court err as a matter of law by entering summary judgment

against the Appellant, and in particular in finding that the Appellant had waived any rights to proceed
against the Respondents pursuant to the provisions ofthe Idaho Protection OfPublic Employees Act
(Idaho Statute 6-2010 et seq.) (the "IPPEA") by the submission to Sun Valley of a Supplemental

Release on January 23, 2012 in order to receive contractual "severance" benefits as were described in
the City Administrator Employment Agreement the Appellant entered into with the Defendant City
Of Sun Valley on or about June 1, 2008?
(b) Did the District Court err as a matter of law in entering summary judgment

against the Appellant by finding that judicial estoppel barred the Appellant from raising any claims
against the Respondents under the provisions of the IPPEA?
(c) Did the District Court err as a matter oflaw that personal liability does not attach
to Defendants Ribi or Briscoe pursuant to the provisions of the IPPEA?
(d) Did the District Court err as a matter of law that Defendant Sun Valley and
subpoena respondent Patricia Latham-Ball possessed attomey-client or work product privilege
protections related to a disciplinary investigation performed by Patricia Latham-Ball in November
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and December of2011, and various reports issued by Patricia Latham-Ball which were subsequently
released to the public.
4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. However, the

Respondents filed documents ofan unknown quantity with the Court under seal, which are subject to

the appeal request herein
5.

The Appellant will not be requesting any transcripts in the matter, as there were no

evidential hearings held in the matter.
6.

Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record:
The standard record as is required by I.A.R. 28. The Appellant shall file an Amended

Notice OfAppeal detailing any additional documents to be included in the clerk's record upon final
findings of the District Court related to the pending Motion For Reconsideration Of Entry Of
Summary Judgment

7.

I certify:
(a)

That no request for any transcripts has been, or will be, made as there was no

testimonial evidence in the matter as all matters were ruled upon based on briefs, affidavits and oral
argument
(b)

That no fee was required in regards to the preparation of any reporter's

(c)

That the estimated fee for preparation ofthe clerk's record is unnecessacy until

transcript.

the Motion For Reconsideration Of Entry Of Smnmary Judgment has been ruled upon and a final
request for the clerk's record is made. However, should the clerk require an estimated payment at the
time of filing, such payment has been made.
(d)

NOTICE OF APPEAL- 3

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
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(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to

Idaho Appellate Rule 20.
DATED this

-z41H

day ofFebroary, 2015.

By

(~R~

JAMpS R. DONOVAL
i

Attof-ney For Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day ofFebruary, 2015, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document was served on the following individual(s) by the method indicated:
Kirtlan Naylor
Naylor & Hales
950 W. Bannock St, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83 702
Counsel for Respondent
Eric Swartz
Jones & Swartz
PO Box 7808
Boise, ID 83 707
Counsel for Appellant

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Fax:

[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Messenger Delivery
[ ] Email:
[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Fax:

[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Messenger Delivery
[ ] Email:

JAMES R DONOVAL

I
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FD"IH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Plaintiff.

v.
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NlLS RIBI;
andDeWAYNE BRISCO,
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2012-479

MEMORANDUM DECISION
ON MOTIONS POR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BACKGROUND
On December 16, 2014, the Court heard the parties' arguments on cross motions for

snmma:ry judgment with respect to the defendant's fifth and sixth affinnative defenses.
Defendant's motion also included a request for summary judgment, asserting that plaintiff's
allegmions do not fall under Idaho's Protection of Public Employees Act (IPPEA). and in the
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event they did, possible remmties would be limited beyond what plaintiff'requests. The Court

ultimately took the motions under amsement.

This case began when plaintiff, Sharon Hammer. filed suit against defendant, City of Sun
Valley. for damages under Idaho's Protection of Public Employees Act (IPPBA). The plaintiff
contends that she was terminated from her employment with the City of Sun Valley OD January

19, 2012 based on the tact that she bad ieported a city council member's conduct of harassing
her. During the same time period, allegations were also made that plaintiff bad engaged in

inappropriate conduct with respect to the city's management. Plaintitf was placed on
administrative leave while an investigation was conducted. Upon conclusion of the investigation
no charges were brought, and plaintiff' resumed her duties. However, shortly after a new mayor

came into office early January 2012, the mayor and city council ,manbnously decided to
terminate plaintiff's employment. PlaiDtiifwas ~ under the "without cause" provision
of her employment contract. Pursuant to the "without cause" provision., plaintiff; with her
attorney's~ drafted and siped a supplemental release of claims in order to secure a

severance package. The signed supplemental release reads:
Upon payment of the severance paym.entrequued pursuant to Section 3.A. of the
City Administrator Employment Agreement dated June 1, 2008, I release the
City of Sun Valley fo.r any claims defined in Section 3.A. ofthe City
Administrator EmplO)'Dlent Agreement as were intended when the City
Administrator Employment Agreement was entered into on June 1, 2008.

Section 3.A. of plaintiff's employment contract, which was referenced in plaintlirs release of
claims states:

Employer9 acting through the Mayor, may terminate Employee's emplo~
without case, for any reason or no reason. Any such decision to terminate shall
occur only after the Mayor consults with each member of the City Council Upon

such termination, Employer shall pay Employee, as severance pay, a lump sum
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cash payment equal to six (6) months, base salaty described in Section S,
Subsection A.
The severance pa:yment herein is intended to be Employee's sole exclusive
remedy for any and all claims for damages of any kind arising from a ter.minatlon
without cause and such severance payment is hereby agreed to be reasonable, fair

and equitable by both parties to this Agreement. Consequently, receipt of the
severance payment is subject to execution of a release of all claims against the
Cit.y of SlDl Valley. A ternrinanon without cause sball not entitle Employee to an
informal review under any section of the City of Sun Valley Personnel manual
("Personnel Mmmalj.
Plaintiff received a severance package and subsequently tiled suit against the City of Sun

Valley for violation of the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act (JPPBA). Both parties filed
motions for snmrnmy judgment in. this case regarding defendant Sun Valley's affimlative
defenses of waiver and release. Specifically, in its response to plaintiff Sharon Hammer's

complaint under the IPPEA. defendant asserts that plaintiff' cannot bring suit against Sun Valley
because plaintiff'had released the city from liability for any and all claims she might have had at

the time she was terminated ftom city employment. Defendant's fifth and sixth affin:native
defenses state that "some or all ofthe Plaintiff's c1aims are barred by release ... [or] waiver."
Conversely, plaintiff argues that Section 3.A. ofher employment contract is unenfmceable
because it constitutes a prospective waiver and that the supplemental release pertains only to
contract and wage claims smrounding severance payment itself and that there was no

consideration for the signed release.
Lastly~ plaintiff disputes defendant's assertion that, upon plaintiff's teminari®9 the

parties simply went their separate ways. It is alleged that the City of Sllll Valley or employees
thereof conducted a "smear campaign" against plaintiffthat bas caused her damage. Due to

defendant's conduct after plaintifrs termination, plaintiffasserts that even if there were
consideration for the supplemental release, it would be insufficient consideration.
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTIONS FOil SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositi~ aud adnns,ions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. S6(c); Scana, Inc. v.

Green Willow Trust, 133 Idaho 283,286, 985 P.2d 1145, 1148 (1999). The court must liberally
construe all disputed facts in favor of the non-moving party, and chaw all reasonable inferences
and conclusions supported by the record in favor of the party opposing the mo1ion. Wiemer v.
~ 117 Idaho 566. S10, 790 P.2d 347,351

(1990). lfconflicting inferences are possible,

summary judgment should be denied. Only if there is no gemune issue of material fact after the
affidavits, pleadings, and depositions have been construed in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party should summary judgment be awarded. Loomis v. City ofHailey, l l 9 Idaho 434,
437,807 P.2d 1272, 127S (1991).
This Court finds 1hat no genuine issue of material fact exists in this case because

plaintiff's signed supplemental release of claims together with Section 3.A. ofher employment
agreement present a clear and unambiguous contract. When a contract is clear on its face, there is

no need to go outside the four comers ofthe document. State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 257, 281
P.3d 90, 94 (2012) ("If the language ofthe document is unambiguous, given its onliDary and

well-understood meaning, we will not look beyond the fout comers of the agreement to
determine the intent ofthe parties."). When dealing with extrinsic evidence such as intent. the
parol evidence rule pronounces, "[i]fthe written agreement is complete upon its face and
unambiguous, no ftaud or rnisf.ake being alleged, ext.tiusic evidence ofprior or contemporaneous
negotiations or conversations is not admimble to contradict, vary, alter., add to or detmct from

the terms of the contract." Belk v. Martin, 136 Idaho 652, 657, 39 P.3d S92, 597 (2001} (quoting
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Chambers v. Thomas, 123 Idaho 69, 72, 844 P.2d 698, 701 (1992)). In this case, plaintiff's

supplememal release clearly absolves defendant of any liability for claims plaintiff had at the
time of her termination. The release operates to "release the City of Sun Valley for any claims
defined in Section 3.A. of the City Administrator Employment Agreement.,. When looking to

Section 3.A. of plaintiff's employment agn:ement. it unambiguously provides that "severance
payment herein is intended to be Employee's sole exclusive remedy for any and all claims for
damages of any kind arising ii'om a termination without cause." It also goes on to say that

"[c)onsequently, receipt of the severance payment is subject to a release of all claims against the

City of Sun Valley." (emphasis added). Plaintiff argues that Section 3.A. is void as against public
policy because it creates a prospective waiver. Although prospective waivers are generally
unenforceabl~ see E.E. O.C v. Townley Eng'g & A(fg. Co., 859 F.2d 610,. 616 (9th Cir. 1988), in
this case, pJaintiff signed a suppiemen.t.al release after the time she knew of her potential claims
against defendant As defendant correctly points out, there is "nothing to indicate how such a

release would violate public policy and, indeed, .•• it makes no sense to forbid the resolution of
existing claims." Sun Valley's Opposition to Plamtift"s Motion for Summary Judgment - 4.

While plamtiff asserts that she never intended to release any non-contmct claims, the
Court declines to consider the parties' subjective intent, where the contract is clear. Even if the
Court were to look to the parties' subjective intent outside the four comem of the documentsthe supplemental release and Section 3.A. of the employment agreement-the release would be

interpreted. in favor of defendant. Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 201(2) states:

(2) Where the parties have attached different meanings to a promise or agreement
or a tmn thereof'; it is interpreted in accordance with the meaning attached by one
of them if at the time the agreement was made
(a) that party did not know of any difi'&ent meaning attached by the other,
and the other knew the meaning attached by the first party; or
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(b) that party bad no reason to know of any different meaning attached by
the other, and 1he other had reason to know the meaning attached by the

mstparty.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201 (1981); see also Johnston v. C.LR., 461 F.3d 1162,
1165 (9th Cir. 2006) (The Comt relied on § 201 in determining that "where one party has no
reason to know of any other meaning than that apparent from the other party's own words, and
the other party did have reason to know the meaning the first party would attach to his words, the
first party's undelStandmg prevails. j.

In this case, plaintiff knew defendant's interpretation of the signed release's language.

Plaintiff asserts in her swom affidavit that:
18. . .• In order to secure my immediate financial security, I was forced to
sign a release of claims that was acceptable to the City.
19. The language of the Supplemental Release ]1Ul'J10Sely and intentionally
does. not include any mention that I was releasing any non-contract severance
benefits.
20. The Supplemental Release purposely does not include any waiver or
release of any federal statutory c ~ any constitutional claim, or any other
common law or tort claims that I may have against Sun Valley, its officials or
employees.
21. By signing the Supplemental Release I did not intend to, nor did I
knowingly or voluntan1y waive or release any non-commct claims, such as any
clmms arising ftom. the IPPEA.

Affidavit of Sharon R.. Hammer in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
(emphasis added). Through correspondence with the plaumfl: defendant made clear what kind of
release was accep1able. Based on plaintiff's affidavit. the Comt finds that she knew or had reason

to know that defendant believed the supplemental release pertained to any and all claims, not
wage and contract claims only. The contract meat.es the supplemental release would apply to
all claims. At the hearing, plaintiff distinguished between "any" and "all." but Section 3.A. uses

both "any and an-- and "all claims" in its language. The 1auguage in Section 3.A. is not
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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ambiguous. But if it is, defendant clearly wanted a release of all c ~ and plaintiff knew that.
Pamgraph 18 of her affidavit indicates she knew what was acceptable to defendant. Defendant

also submitted an affidavit from Mayor Villich to support the proposition that a release of non·
contract claims was not contemplated. However, the affidavit indicates that he did not discuss the
types of claims contemplated in Section 3.A. It is cleat that what was intended in 2008 was a

release of all claims, based on the plain language of Section 3.A.
Additionally, p1aintiff argues that the signed suppJementaJ release in exchange for a

severance package lacks consideration because severance payments are in reality wages that
have already been earned. PJaimuf relies heavily on Sarbacher v. AmeriCold Realty Trust, No.
l:IO-CV-429-BLW,2011 WL SS20442 (D. Idaho Nov. 14,20ll)fortheproposition that
severance payments constitute wages. However, although that case is unreported and thus nonautboritative, it is distinguishable anyway in that it dealt with an employment contract that
provided for a sevemnce package with no strings attached. See id at •6-•7. Here, on the other
band, plaintiff»s employment agreement provides for a severance package only conditionally.

Plaintiff was not entitled to severance payment upon termination alone. This case is more
compamble to Moore 11. Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 118 P.3d 141 (2005), where the Court
determined that liquidated damages for an employee•s termination "without eause" were not
considered "wages" akeady earned. Therefore, plaintilrs severance package was not equivalent
to wages but instead served as consideration for her signed supplemental release. This case also

does not involve a situation to n:cover unpaid wages. Here,, the severam:e package was paid; Suu

Valley was, by paying the claim, giving up any chance it had to say the tiring was for cause to

avoid payment of the severance package.
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Lastly,. plaintiff argues that although she was tennirnrted under the "without cause"

provision of her employment agreement, she was in reality tcmrinated "for cause" due to
criminal allegations against her. While there might have been genuine issues of :fact conceming

whether plaintiff was terminated "for cause,"' she accepted, and impliedly asserted, that she was
terminated "without cause" when she elected to receive a severance package. Under her
employment contraet, plain1iff'~ to receive a severance paclcage only ifterminated "without
~ " and even then, only if she signed a supplemental release. Because plaintiff made the

choice to accept the severance package, acknowledging that she was termiomed "without cause,"'
she is now judicially estopped from rnalring the argument that she was actually temdnated "for

cause."
Judicial estoppel is appropriate to prevent "a party from gaining an advantage by taking

one position, and then seeking a second advaut.age by taking an incompatible position." A & J

Const. Co.

11.

Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 684, 116 P3d 12, 14 (2005) (citing Sword v. Sweet, 140

Idaho 242, 252, 92 P.3d 492, S02 (2004)). "1udieial estoppel is intended to prevent a litigant
fiomplayingfastandloosewiththeeourts." Id (citingMcKayv. Owens, 130Idaho 148, 15~

937 P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997)). Indeed, '"[t]he circumatances uuderwhichjudicial estoppel may
appropriately be invoked are probably not ieduciole to any general formulation of principle.'"

Heinze v. BalJll1', 145 Idaho 232, 178 P.3d 597 (2008) (quo1ing Hamilton v. State Farm Fire &
Caa. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 2001)). Judicial estoppel assists courts in maintaining "the
dignity of the judicial process, it is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion."

Rissetto v. Plumben & Steamjltter& Local 343, 94 F.3d 597,600 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Russell
v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033t 1037 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1260, 111 S.Ct. 2915. 115
L.Ed.2d 1078 (1991)). Therefore. in the exercise of discretion, this Court applies the equitable
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doctrine ofjudicial estoppel and refuses to consider whether plaintiff was actually ternJinated

"for cause." Plaintiff accepted a substantial benefit based on the fact that she was supposedly
teJ'Drinated "without cause," and this Court declines to allow her to now assume an inconsistent
position. Judicial estoppel does not opemte .in situations where there is coercion or duress.
Plaintiff was in a difficult and stressful situation, but she did not suffer duress or coercion; her

affidavit indicates she was clearly thjnking strategically.
Because defendant's affirmative defense of release clearly and unambiguously applies to
any and all claims. plaintiff is barred from bringing her IPPEA suit against defendant. Thus, no
genuine issues of material fact need be litigated, and the case must thereby be dismissed. Had

there not been a release and the payment of a severance package, there are factual disputes that

probably would prevent summary judgment. However. the supplemental. release makes the
merits of the case moot. Defendant's other reasons for requesting summary judgment need not be
addressed, as the signed supplemental release is dispositive in this case. Any claims plaintiff may

have that mose after her temdnation present separate issues and are pending in federal court now

or subject to f.utme suits as the case may be.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby orders that plaintifrs motion for summary judgment is
DENIED and defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
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BACKGROUND
The dispute at issue involves the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer, and the
Defendants, the City of Sun Valley, Nils Ribi, and DeWayne Briscoe. The dispute is
centered on the Plaintiff's treatment while an employee for the City of Sun Valley. The
Plaintiff brought suit against the Defendants for retaliatory discharge in violation of the
Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act ("IPPEA'j. The Plaintiff has claims against
the City of Sun Valley, as well as Mr. Briscoe, and Mr. Ribi, in their individual
capacities.
The Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 19th, 2013, seeking to
dismiss the claims against Mr. Briscoe and Mr. Ribi. The Defendants argue that both Mr.

Briscoe and Mr. Ribi are elected officials, or agents, of the City of Sun Valley, and
therefore are not individually liable for a cause of action brought under I.C. § 6-210 I, the

IPPEA. Pursuant to that argument, the Defendants seek to dismiss the claim against Mr.
Briscoe and Mr. Ribi for failure to state a legal claim. The Plaintiff col.Dlters, stating that
both Mr. Briscoe and Mr. Ribi can be individually sued though the IPPEA, and that the
statutory intent of the IPPEA does not comport with limiting an injured plaintiff's ability
to bring a cause of action against such individuals.
The Motion to Dismiss was argued before this Courton October 1, 2013, with this
Court taking the matter under advisement.

MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
The standard for reviewing a 12(bX6) Motion for Dismjsi;aJ of a complaint is "A
l 2(b)(6) motion looks only at the pleadings to detennine whether a claim for relief has
been stated." Youngv. City ofKetchum, 137Idaho 102, I04,44P3d 1157, 1159(2002).
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When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), the non-moving party
is entitled to have all inferences viewed in his favor. Id at I 04 citing Orthman v. Idaho

Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 961, 895 P.2d 561,562 (1995). After drawing all inferences
in the non-moving party's favor, this Court must find whether a claim for relief has been
stated. Id "The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the
party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Id This Court must "examine

whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the requisite elements of standing in their
complaint to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss." Id. "Where a claim for relief is stated,
the complaint survives the motion to dismiss and the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence
in support ofits claim." lndep. Sek Dist. ofBoise City v. Harris Family Ltd P'ship, ISO

Idaho 583,587,249 P.3d 382,386 (2011) citing Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho
960, 962, 895 P.2d 561, 563 (1995).

DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS

"A I2(b)(6) motion looks only at the pleadings to detemrlne whether a claim for
reliefhasbeenstated." Youngv. Cityo/Ketchum, I37Idaho 102, 104,44P.3d ll57,
1159 (2002). The issue presented before this Court is whether the Plaintiff stated a claim
for relief.
To resolve the issue presented to this Court, it must be determined whether Mr.
Ribi and Mr. Briscoe are considered employers as defined by I.C. §6-2103(4)(b). The
IPPEA provides a cause of action "for public employees who experience adverse action
from their employer as a result of reporting waste and violations of a law, rule or
regulation." I.C. §6-2101. "Employer means the state ofldaho. or any political
subdivision or governmental entity eligible to participate in the public employees
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retirement system•••" I.C. §6-2I03(4)(a). Furthermore. an "'(e]mployer' includes an
agent of an employer,'' I.C. §6-2I03(4)(b), with no provision of the statute specifically
exposing an agent of an employer to any individual liability. Statutory interpretation is
necessary to detennine whether Mr. Ribi and Mr. Briscoe fall into the definition of
employer, as defined by the IPPEA.
When determining the meaning of words in a statute this Court is instructed to
consider "(l) [t]he language of a statute should be given its plain, usual and ordinary
meaning. Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the expressed intent of the
legislature shall be given effect without engaging in statutory construction. The literal
words of a statute are the best guide to determining legislative intent." J.C. § 73-113.
Where the meaning of a statute and the words within it are clear, this Court is confined to
follow that meaning and may neither add to nor take away by judicial construction.
Credit Bureau ofLewiston-Clarkston, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, 117 Idaho 29, 784
P 2d 885 (1989). The plain meaning of a statute will prevail unless following such a

meaning would lead to an absurd result Gibson v. Bennett, 108 P.3d 417, 141 Idaho 270
{2005). Furthermore, unambiguous language in a statute must fully interpreted by its
plain meaning by courts applying the statute unless clearly expressed legislative intent is
contrary. Kenneth F. White. Chtd v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 31 P.3d
926, 136 Idaho 238 (2001) review denied. Where words are used in a statute that have a
well-known meaning at common law, they are presumed to have been used in that sense.
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863,867 (2011), See State v. Oar, 129 Idaho 337,340,924

P.2d 599,602 (1996) (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583, 98 S.Ct 866, 871,
55 L.Ed.2d 40. 47 (1978).
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Here, this Court must determine whether an IPPEA action can be filed against
individuals who are elected officials and make decisions for a government employer. An
IPPEA claim is purely statutory. Van v. PortneufMed Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 558, 212 P.3d
982, 988 (2009). It is purely a statutory claim against government employers. Id
Although, this holding in Portneufis clear, that case did not directly address the question
presented here. Nevertheless, looking at the structure and context of the IPPEA, a claim
may be brought against a political subdivision or governmental entity, but not against an

individual agent or member of that entity.
The question is whether I.e.§ 6-2103(4)(b) creates individual liability.
Defendants essentially concede that Mr. Ribi and Mr. Briscoe are agents and thus fall
under the agency analysis (and therefore subject the City of Sun Valley to potential
liability), but argue that they are not subject to individual liability as they are not
employers themselves. The IPPEA specifically includes the agents of employers into the
definition of"employer'', when it stated ""(e]mployer' includes an agent of an employer."
I.C. §6-2103(4)(b). "Include," from the Latin Inclaudere, meaning "to shut in, keep
within," means "to confme within, hold as in an inclosure, take in, attain, shut up,

contain, inclose, comprise, comprehend, embrace, involve. Tenn may, according to
context, express an enlargement and have the meaning of and or in addition to, or merely
specify a particular thing already included within general words theretofore used.
'Including' within statute is interpreted as a word of enlargement or of illustrative
application as well as a word of limitation." Black's Law Dictionary 763 (6th ed. 2009)
citing Premier Products Co. v. Cameron, 240 Or. 123,400 P.2d 227,228 (1965). The
primary definition of"include" is of limitation; it is not primarily a conjunctive word,
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although it can be. The word can mean two different things, which highlights the problem
here.

While no Idaho case law is directly on point, numerous courts around the country,
when analyzing similar statutes, have come to the conclusion that the "agent" language is
only intended to hold employers liable and not supervisory employees, most citing
respondeat superior liability as the reason for the inclusion of the word "agent." see
Wathen v. General Electric Co., 115 F.3d 400, 406 (6th Cir. 1997); Obst v. Microtron.

Inc., 588 N.W.2d 550, 5S3-554 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); Reno v. Baird, 951
P.2dl333,1337 (Cal. 1998) citing Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313-1314, (2d
Cir.1995), Lenhardt v. Basic Institute of Technology, Inc., 55 F.3d 3n (8th Cir.1995),
U.S. E.E.O.C. v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir.1995). These

cases suggest a hypertechnical reading of the statute does imply personal liability. That is
the situation here, in that a technical reading or expansive definition of "includes"
suggests individual liability. However, a traditional meaning of"include" and the context
of the statute means that the above cases are correct.
The statutory remedies do not support individual liability. IPPEA, I.C. § 6-2106,
provides "any or all" of the following relief for employees: "(I) An injunction to restrain
continued violation of the provisions of this act; (2) The reinstatement of the employee
to the same position held before the adverse action, or to an equivalent position; (3) The
reinstatement of full fringe benefits and seniority rights; (4) The compensation for lost
wages~ benefits and other remuneration; (5) The payment by the employer of reasonable
costs and attorneys' fees; (6) An assessment of a civil fine of not more than five hundred
dollars ($500), which shall be submitted to the state treasurer for deposit in the general
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fund." Only the State ofldaho, or another governmental entity, not an individual, could

provide much of the relief prescribed by the statute, further illustrating that the Idaho
legislature did not intend to have supervisory employees be part of the definition of
"employer." An individual council member or commissioner could not individually take
action to reinstate an employee or provide benefits.
There is a provision in the statute which has created additional ambiguity. J.C. §
6-2105(3) is the venue provision of the statute. It states, "[a]naction begun under this

section may be brought in the district court for the county where the alleged violation
occurred, the county where the complainant resides, or the county where the person

against whom the civil complaint is filed resides or has his principal place of business."
I.C. § 6-2105(3). This suggests that an action could be filed against an individual. There
are several problems with this, however. The first and second are the stated legislative

intent codified in 6-2101, and the holding in Van v. Portneuf.
The third problem is that the remedies in the statute do not suggest individual
liability. I.C. § 6-2104 sets forth the ways the chapter may be violated. It can only be
violated by employers, not individuals engaging in particular conduct, unless a strained
interpretation is used.
This is not to say there are no other possible causes of action for alleged conduct

of individuals, but there is not an IPPEA claim. It can be dangerous for courts to overlook
or ignore parts of a statute, but here the codified legislative intent, case law, and other
parts of the statute lead to the conclusion that an individual cannot be sued

notwithstanding 6-2105(3).
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Taking all inferences in the non-moving party's favor. and looking only to the
pleadings, a claim for relief has not been stated as to the claims brought against Mr. Ribi
and Mr. Briscoe. Mr. Ribi and Mr. Briscoe in their individual capacities are not
employers under the definition of the IPPEA. Therefore, the Plaintiff cannot bring a
cause of action against them using the IPPEA.
The Defendants seek sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P 11. The issue presented is
fairly arguable and not so clear under Idaho law that sanctions are warranted. Rule 11 is a

court management tool to be applied narrowly. This Court finds that sanctions are not
warranted.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants Motion to Dismiss is hereby
GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED

Dated:

11 /22(21;,
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,

}

Plaintiff,

CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI;
and DeWAYNE BRISCOE,

-----------------Defendants..

)
)
)
)
)
)
}
)

CASE NO. CV2012-479

)

MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ENFORCE
SUBPOENA AND COMPEL

Sharon Hammer ("Plaintiff") brought a Motion to Enforce Subpoena against non-party
Patricia Ball and to compel production of documents withheld :from production in discovery and
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in response to subpoena. Ms. Ball and the Defendants, City of Stm Valley ("Sun Valley") ate
opposing the Motion claiming that attorney-client privilege and attorney work product
protections apply. Oral argument was heard on this matter on December 17, 2013. Because this
Court finds that'"ihe materials sought in the subpoena are protected by the work product doctrine,
the PlaintifPs Motion is denied.

FACTS AND BACKGROUND
The dispute at issue involves the Plaintiff: Sharon R. Hammer, and the Defendant, the
City of Sun Valley. The dispute is centered on the Plaintiff's treatment while an employee for the
City of Sun Valley. The Plaintiff brought suit against the Defendant for retaliatory discharge in
violation of the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act ("IPPEA'').
This Motion raises similar issues to this Court's decision in the Non-party City of Sun

Valley>s Motion to Quash Subpoena in the Ribi v. Donoval, in Blaine County Case No. CV2011-1040. There, this Court quashed a subpoena seeking Ms. Ball's investigation material and
the communications that coincided with the investigation into the Plaintiff's activities as an
employee for the City of Sun Valley, finding that the requested information was work product
Here, the Plaintiff has presented additional affidavits that contradict some of the fmdings in this
Court's Memorandum Decision Granting Non-Party City ofSun Valley's Motion to Quash

Subpoena.
Facts similar to the above mentioned subpoena are presented here. On November 10,
2011, following allegations of improper misuse of public funds and equipment by the Plaintiff,
Sun Valley conducted a special executive City Council session on November 11, 2011, to
evaluate the allegations. On or about November 12, 2011, the Plaintiff's then-attomey, James R.
Donoval, sent Mr. Wayne Willich, then ~un Valiey mayor, aietter with intention to pursue
MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING MOTION TO ENFORCE SUBPOENA AND
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litigation against Sun Valley and other officials in connection with Plaintiff's allegations of
harassment and the City's potential disciplinary action against her. Similar letters were also sent
by Mr. Donoval on November 15 and 16, 2011, following another special executive session on

November 14, 2011. There were three letters sent by Mr. Donoval to the mayor and members of
the Sun Valley City Council between November 12, 2011 and November 17, 2011. All three of
these letters either explicitly or implicitly threatened litigation against Sun Valley or members of
its government. On November 21, 2011, Mr. Donoval, on behalf of Sharon Hammer, filed a

lawsuit against Swi Valley and inembers ofits government in Idaho's Fifth District Court, Blaine
County.
On November 17, 2011, Adam King, the Sun Valley City Attorney, contacted Ms. Ball

about the possibility of retaining her services for a fact-finding investigation regarding various
allegations that could be the subject oflitigation. On November 21, 2011, Sun Valley retained
Ms. Ball for the purpose of conducting an investigation into alleged violations of City policy. On
November 22, 2011, Kirtlan Naylor was assigned by Sun Valley's insurance carrier to provide
legal defense to Sun Valley, and Mr. Naylor was to appointed as Ms. BalPs primary legal contact
on November 28, 2011. The scope of Ms. Ball's investigation included allegations concerning
violations of city policy made against Ms. Hammer, as well as allegations made by Ms. Hammer
against Nils Ribi in her November 21, 2011 lawsuit. On November 30, 2011, Ms. Ball was
informed that the scope of the investigation was to be expanded into additional allegations. In
conducting this investigation, Ms. Ball interviewed witnesses, reviewed information, and drafted
a report. Ms. Ball completed the factual basis of her report on December 9, 2011, and presented a
draft of the report to Mr. Willich, Mr. Briscoe, the City Council, Mr. King and Mr. Naylor on

December 12, 2011. Following corrections, the report was concluded on December 20, 2011 by
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Sun Valley; however the Plaintiff asserts that the investigation was completed on December 12,
20 l l. Portions of this report were later provided to the Blaine County Prosecutor for review as to
any criminal conduct.
On May 6, 2013, the Plaintiff issued a subpoena to Ms. Ball seeking to produce all audio

tapes of interviews, documents, communications, agreements, and reports obtained or produced
in connection with Ms. Ball's investigation for Sun Valley, also referred to as the Hammer
Disciplinary Investigation. Ms. Ball informed Sun Valley of the subpoena, and Sun Valley
responded to the subpoena on June 24, 2013 and provided what they considered non-privileged
documents and lodged objections as to privileged information. Plaintiff then began attempts to
meet and confer to seek production of those privileged documents. On November 1st, 2013,
Plaintiff filed the Motion to Enforce Subpoena.

LEGALSTANDARD
I.R. C.P. 26{b)(1) pennits broad discovery of any matter that is not privileged, even if it is
inadmissible, so long as it is "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence." I.R.C.P. 26(b)(l). The burden of showing information is privileged, and therefore
exempt from discovery, is on the party asserting the privilege. Kirkv. Ford Motor Co., 141 Idaho
697, 703-04, 116 P.3d 27, 33-34 (2005) citing Ex parte Niday, 15 Idaho 559, 98 P. 845 (1908).
I.R.E. 502(b) states: "A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other
person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the
rendition of professional legal services to the client which were made (1) between the client or
the client's representative and the client's lawyer or the lawyer's representative, (2) between the
client's lawyer and the lawyer's representative, (3) among clients, their representatives. their
iawyers, or their iawyer's representatives, in any combination, concerning a matter of common
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interest, but not including communications solely among clients or their representatives when no

lawyer is a party to the communication, (4) between representatives of the client or between the
client and a representative of the client, or (5) among lawyers and their representatives
representing the same client". I.RE. 502(b). A communication is confidential where it is not
intended to be disclosed to third parties, other than those third parties who are furthering the
rendition of professional legal services to the client or who are necessary to transmit the
confidential communication. I.RE. 502(a)(5).
Furthermore, work product is generally immune from discovery. See I.RC.P. 26(b)(3).
Work product is considered "documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable ... prepared
in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's
representative (including the party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or
agent) •.. " Id. Work product can only become discoverable "upon a showing that the party
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and
that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials by other means." Id. Additionally, "[i]n ordering discovery of such materials when
the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a
party concerning the litigation, including communications between the attorney and client,
whether written or oral." Id.

DISCUSSION
Sun Valley argues that the Motion to enforce the Plaintiff's subpoena should be denied
because the subpoena seeks protected work product and material protected by the attorney-client
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privilege. The Plaintiff argues that the material sought is not protected by the attorney-client
privilege and should not be considered work product.
A party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things prepared in anticipation
of litigation ''by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative ... only upon a

showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials ... and that the
party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by

other means." I.R.C.P. 26(bX3). If discovery of such material is ordered, "the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental. impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an

attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation." Id
There is ample support in the record that Ms. Ball was retained by Swi Valley in
anticipation of litigation, and that her investigation was substantially focused on issues that
appeared ripe for impending litigation. Aff. Ball, 1 5; A.ff. King, , 14. Ms. Ball was consulted
after Mr. Donoval had threatened litigation, was retained on the same day Mr. Donoval initiated
litigation, and conducted an investigation squarely related to that and other potential litigation.
Aff. King, Ex. A, p. 5, Aff. King, ,r 15, A:ff. Ball, ,r 5,7. Therefore, Ms.Ball's report was
prepared in large part for Sun Valley in anticipation ot: or in conjunction with pending and
anticipated litigation. There have been new affidavits produced. that create inconsistencies as to
when the investigation was completed. This Court's previous fmding is that the investigation was
completed on December 20th, 2011. Plaintiff now argues, and relies on Mr. Willich's new
affidavits, that by December 12, 2011, Ms. Ball's investigation and work was complete, and that
anything beyond this point was no longer authorized work product. However, there is not en~ugh
evidence th.at shows that this Court's previous finding that the investigation was completed on
December 20th, 2011, was incorrect In fact, e-mail communications provided in camera
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contradict Mr. Willich,s assertion that he gave Ms. Ball no authority or direction to modify the
"Final Ball Report'' in any manner after December 12, 2011. K. Naylor Aff., Ex. B, SV IN
CAMERA 57; Ex. L, 1 14. Furthermore, Plaintiff's affidavit states that Mr. Willich stated, to her
on December 16, 201 l, "~ the report of S~al In.vestigator Ball was close to-being completed
and~tbat discipfuiary charges against. :merif any, would be determined in afew-days."_Aff. K.

Naylor, Ex. 0, 1 5.. This further shows that Mr. Willich did not see the investig~tion as complete
on December 12, 2011. This Court continues to find that for the purposes of this motio~ Ms.
Ball's investigation was complete on December 20, 2011.

Moreover, if Sun Valley retained Ms. Ball in substantial part to conduct her investigation
in anticipation of litigation, as this Court finds it did, the materials produced as part of that
investigation are protected under I.R.C.P. 26(b)(3). It is irrelevant whether Mr. Naylor was her
primary contact, or whether Ms. Ball was retained as an attorney or merely an investigator.
I.R.C.P. 26(b)(3) protects material produced in anticipation of litigation either for a party or for
that party's representative.

The work product doctrine protects disclosure of communications. Upjohn Co. v. U.S.,
449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). "Communications" are precisely what the Plaintiff seeks in the
subpoena, essentially all documents generated in connection with Ms. Ball's disciplinary
investigation. The Plaintiff is free to depose any of the individuals interviewed by Ms. Ball in the
course of her investigation in order to discover underlying facts which may be related to this
case. However, the Plaintiff is not entitled to copies, however recorded, of Ms. Ball's interviews
with witnesses or communications with Swi Valley representatives engaged in pursuant to Ms.
Ball's duty as an investigator. Furthermore, the Plaintiff is not entitled to the e-mails produced in
accordance with the investigation. The Plaintiff can obtain the underiying facts obtained by Ms.
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Ball in these interviews through other discovery methods. Notably, the report itself became
publically available and Plaintiff has it.
It is possible under certain circumstances to waive the work product doctrine. If work
product is disclosed, and that disclosure is to an adversary, the protection is lost. Trustees of

Elec. Workers No. 26 Pension Trust Fundv. Trust Fund Advisors, Inc., 266 F.RD. l, 14-15
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). In this case, part of Ms. Ball's report was disclosed to the
Blaine Cmmty Prosecutor. Blaine County and Sun Valley are not adversaries; rather they share a
common interest. Disclosure to the Blaine County Prosecutor·is consistent with maintaining
secrecy from Sun Valley's adversaries. See U.S. v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(MCI's disclosure of work product to the government, for the purpose of aiding in the
investigation of MCI's opponent did not waive work product immunity). "While the mere
showing of a voluntary disclosure to a third person will generally suffice to show waiver of the
attorney-client privilege, it should not suffice in itself [to waive protection of work product].,, Id.
at 1299. Since there has been no showing that Sun Valley disclosed its work product to an
adversary, it has not waived protection of its work product.
Moreover, the Plaintiff has not shown that Sun Valley has waived work product
protection. The Plaintiff argues that Sun Valley has waived its attorney-client and work product
privilege. While there is no direct Idaho case law on the issue, the Plaintiff cites to federal case
law which analyzes a similar work product role. U~der the federal rule, work product protection
is only waived when fairness requires, and is limited to the subject matter of the related
disclosure, and does not create a blank.et waiver of the work product privilege in the entire case.

Hernandez v. Tanninen, 604 F.3d 1095, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2010). "[V]oluntary disclosure of the
content of a privileged attorney commwiication constitutes waiver of the privilege as to all other
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such communications on the same subject.'' Weil v. lnvestmenJ.lndicators, Research & Mgmt.,

Inc., 647 F. 2d 12, 23 (9th Cir. 1981). The Plaintiff attempts to argue that the voluntary waiver of
a single document waives all communications presented in a case. However, this is not the case.

Even a case cited by the Plaintiff states "[w]e conclude, then, that while the mere showing of a
voluntary disclosure to a third person will generally suffice to show waiver of the attorney-client
privilege, it should not suffice in itself for waiver of the work product privilege." Permian Corp.
v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1981) citing United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d

1285, 1299 (D.C.Cir.1980). Because Ms. Ball's findings were disclosed to the Blaine Cotmty

Prosecutor does not mean that waiver should be applied to all of Ms. Ball's other
communications. Furthermore, th.ere has been no evidence produced by the Plaintiff that the
Defendant has voluntarily disclosed any attorney-client communications between Mr. King and

Mr. Naylor nor any of the work product currently not being disclosed. Therefore, the privileges
remain. Lastly, Plaintiff's argument that Mr. Naylor and Mr. King we unauthorized to participate

in Ms. Ball's investigation is not supported by the evidence in the record.
The Plaintiff has not shown that she cannot obtain the underlying facts through

depositions, interrogatories, requests for production, or other discovery methods, nor has the
Plaintiff shown either a substantial need for Ms. Ball's materials, nor an undue hardship in
attaining the substantial equivalent of these materials by other means, and again, the Plaintiff has
the report itself. Because the Plaintiff has not met the burden under I.R.C.P. 26(b){3), and this
Court finds that Ms. Ball was retained in anticipation of litigation, and the materials she prepared
were prepared in anticipation of litigation, those materials are protected. Because of this, there is
no need to analyze whether those materials are protected from disclosure under the attorneyclient privilege.
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Subpoena and Compel is
hereby DENIED. As to fees and expenses. I.RC.P. 37(a)(4) may require :further argument Fees
and costs are denied without prejudice at this time and the issue will be discussed at the next

hearing.

IT IS SO ORDERED
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Cleric for the County of Minidoka, do hereby certify that on the
'l,'2- day of January, 2014, I filed the original and caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing document: MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ENFORCE SUBPOENA AND COMPEL to each ofthe persons
as listed below:
K.irt1an Naylor
Naylor & Hales, P.C.
950 W. Bannock St.~ Suite 610

/U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_ _ Hand Delivery

-

Overnight Mail
Via Facsimile

Boise, ID 83702

-

Eric B. Swartz
1673 W. Shoreline Drive, Suite 200
P.0. Box 7808
Boise, ID 83707

/ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_,_.Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Via Facsimile

CLERK.OF'THE DISTRICT COURT

· · ~ ~

BY:

.. . CrystaiRigb;

w~

Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
The Plaintiff,
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; and
DeWAYNE BRISCOE,
The Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2012-479
ORDER MODIFYING
AUTOMATIC STAY

On March 3, 2015, the Court heard the motion to withdraw as Plaintiff's counsel in the
case. At the hearing, the parties discussed the effect Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal, filed February
25, 2015, would have on this Court's ability to grant the motion to withdraw as counsel. Pursuant
to Idaho Appellate Rule 13(a), and upon stipulation of the parties, this Court orders that the
fourteen-day automatic stay be modified to allow for a ruling on the motion to withdraw that was
pending before the notice of appeal.
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\'i'S'\
Deputy Clerk for the County ofBlaine, do
I,
hereby certify that on the
day of 7<1J::{ ~
, 2015, I filed the original and
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document: ORDER
MODIFYING AUTOMATIC STAY, to each of the persons as listed below:
James Donoval
4110 Eaton Avenue
Suite D
Caldwell, ID 83607

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_ _ Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
.,.
X v·
F
·
·1
an,,a1
/
rltt
Af

Kirtlan G. Naylor
Naylor & Hales, P .C.
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702-6103

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_ _ Hand Delivery
_ _ Overnight Mail
,,.
_K._ Via :FassimiJe £./nCU I

Eric B. Swartz
Jones & Swartz, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 7808
Boise, ID 83 707-7808

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_ _ Hand Delivery
~ /
_
Overnight Mail

_L Yia Fsn. ·10

>

.e,rn. "''

3/~/
----~------

DATED
2-CJl<E:;
CLERK. OF THE DISTRICT COURT

Deputy Clerk
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FILED P.M

A.M~

Kirtlan G. Naylor
[!SB No. 3569]
Jacob H. Naylor
[ISB No. 8474]
MAR 11 2015
/
Tyler D. Williams
[!SB No. 8512)
Jplynn Drage, .
Dlsbict
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
Court Bf8!rlo County, Idaho
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610
Boise, fdaho 83 702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: kirt(@.naylorhales.com; jake@naylorhales.com; tdw@naylorhales.com
Attorneys for Defendants City of Sun Valley,
Ribi, and Briscoe.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2012-479

Plaintiff,
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENTS'
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
TRANSCRIPTS AND RECORD

VS.

CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; and
DeWayne BRISCOE,
Defendants.

TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED APPELLANT AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, AND
THE COURT REPORTER AND CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Defendant-Respondents, in the above-entitled

proceeding hereby request pursuant to T.A.R. 19, the inclusion of the following material in the
reporter's transcript or the clerk's record in addition to the standard record required to be included

by I.AR. 28 and the notice of appeal. Any additional transcript is to be provided in electronic
format.
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FROM: Fa>:
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F·A•oE:

OF 009

A copy of the transcript of the following hearings pursuant to I.A.R. 19(b):
A.

Hearing date: October l, 2013
Name of hearing: Hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Has a transcript been made? No
Name of reporter: Maureen Newton (208) 679-2534
Estimated number of pages: 1-100 pages

B.

Hearing date: December 17, 2013
Name of hearing: Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce Subpoena
Against Non-Party Patricia Ball and To Compel the Production of
Documents Withheld From Production in Discovery and in Response
to Subpoena
Has a transcript been made? Yes
Name ofreporter: Maureen Ne,:vton (208) 679-2534
Actual number of pages: 27 pages

C.

Hearing date: January 21, 2014
Name of hearing: Heming on Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of
Defendants Ribi and Briscoe's Motion to Dismiss
Has a transcript been made? Yes
Name of reporter: Maureen Nev.'ton (208) 679-2534
Actual number of pages: 40 pages

D.

Hearing date: April 14, 2014
Name of hearing: Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of
Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce Subpoena Against Non-Party Patricia
Ball and To Compel the Production of Documents Withheld From
Production in Discovery and in Response to Subpoena
Has a transcript been made? Yes
Name of reporter: Maureen Newton (208) 679-2534
Actual number of pages: 39 pages

E.

Hearing date: December 16, 2014
Name of hearing: Hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
and Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
Has a transcript been made? Yes
Name ofreporter: Maureen Ne,:vton (208) 679-2534
Actual number of pages: 58 pages
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A copy of the following documents filed with the Clerk of the District Court in

this matter pursuant to I.A.R. 19(b):
A.

9/17/2013 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

B.

9/17/2013 Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

C.

9/17/2013 Affidavit ofKirtlan G. Naylor in Support of Motion to
Dismiss

D.

9/24/2013 Errata to Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss

E.

9/24/2013 Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss

F.

9/27/2013 Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss

G.

11/4/2013 Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce Subpoena Against Non-Party
Patricia Ball and to Compel the Production of Documents
Withheld from Production in Discovery and in Response to
Subpoena

H.

11/4/2013 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce
Subpoena Against Non-Party Patricia Ball and to Compel
the Production of Documents Withheld from Production in
Discovery and in Repsonse to Subpoena

I.

11/4/2013 Affidavit of Wayne Willich Former Mayor of the City of
Sun Valley in Support of Motion to Compel

J.

11/4/2013 Affidavit of Attorney James R. Donoval Related to Motion
to Compel

K.

11/4/2013 Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to
Enforce Subpoena Against Non-Party Patricia Ball and to
Compel the Production of Documents Withheld from
Production in Discovery and in Response to Subpoena

L.

12/10/2013 Defendant's Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce
Subpoena

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENTS' REQUEST FOR
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M.

12/10/2013 Affidavit of Kirtlan G. Naylor in Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion to Compel. NOTE TO CLERK: EXHIBITS "A"
AND "B" TO THIS AFFIDAVIT 'WERE FILED IN
CAMERA, FOR THE JUDGE'S EYES ONLY. THESE
EXHIBITS MUST RETAIN THAT IN CAMERA
STATUS WHEN PRODUCED ON APPEAL, AND
MUST NOT BE PROVIDED TO PLAINTIFF'S
COUNSEL. EXHIBITS "A;; AND "B" SHOULD BE
PROVIDED TO THE SUPREME COURT IN
SEPARATE ENVELOPES AS PROVIDED TO THE
DISTRICT JUDGE. Sec, attached correspondence to
the clerk dated December 10, 2013.

N.

12/10/2013 Memorandum in Support of Plaintifrs Motion for
Reconsideration of Defendants Ribi and Briscoe's Motion to
Dismiss

0.

12/10/2013 Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of Defendants Ribi
and Briscoe's Motion to Dismiss

P.

12/13/2013 Reply in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce Subpoena
Against Non-Party Patricia Ball and To Compel the
Production of Documents Withheld From Production in
Discovery and in Response to Subpoena

Q.

12/13/2013 Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion to Enforce Subpoena Against Non-Party Patricia
Ball and To Compel the Production of Docwnents Withheld
From Production in Discovery and in Response to Subpoena

R.

12/13/2013 Supplemental Affidavit of James R. Donoval in Support of
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel

S.

1/6/2014

T.

I/14/2014 Defendants' Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration

U.

1/31/2014 Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Plaintiffs Motion
to Enforce Subpoena Against Non-Party Patricia Ball and to
Compel the Production of Documents Withheld from
Production in Discovery and in Rcpsonse to Subpoena, Oral
Argument Requested

Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration of Defendants Ribi and Briscoe's Motion to
Dismiss
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V.

1/31/2014 Supplemental Affidavit of Wayne Willich Former Mayor of
the City of Sun Valley in Support of Motion to Reconsider
Denial of Motion to Compel

W.

2/14/2014 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration of Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Subpoena
Against Non-Party Patricia Ball and to Compel the
Production of Documents Withheld from Production in
Discovery and in Response to Subpoena

X.

4/7/2014

Y.

11/18/2014 Declaration of Susan Robertson

z.

11/18/2014 Memorandum in Support of Sun Valley's Motion for
Summary Judgment

Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration

AA. 11/18/2014 Sun Valley's Motion for Summary Judgment

BB. 11/18/2014 Declaration of Kirtlan G. Naylor
CC. 11/18/2014 Declaration of Kirtlan G. Naylor- Exhibit F of Exhibit J is
Filed under Seal
DD. 11/18/2014 Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
EE.

11/18/2014 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment

FF.

11/18/2014 Affidavit of Sharon R. Hammer in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment

GG. 11/18/2014 Affidavit of James R. Donoval in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment
HH. l 1/18/2014 Affidavit of Wayne Willich in Support of Plaintiffs Motion
for Summary Judgment
II.

11/18/2014 Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff,s Motion for
Summary Judgment

11/21/2014 Corrected Memorandum in support of Sun Valley's motion
for summary judgment
KK. 12/2/2014 Sun Valley's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment
LL. 12/2/2014 Plaintiffs Response to Sun Valley's Motion for Summary
Judgment
JJ.

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENTS' REQUEST FOR
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MM. 12/2/2014 Affidavit of Counsel in Suppo11 of Plaintiffs Response to
Sun Valley's Motion for Summary Judgment
NN. 12/9/2014 Reply in Supp011 of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment
00. 12/9/2014 Supplemental Affidavit of James R. Donoval in Support of
Plaintif11s Motion for Summary Judgment
PP. 12/9/2014 Sun Valley's Reply Memorandum in Support for Summary
Judgment

3.

Exhibits (civil cases only):

Not applicable.
4.

I certify that a copy of this request was served upon the Reporter and Clerk

of the District Court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20.

DATED this 11 'h day of March. 2015.

NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11th day of March, 2015, I caused to be served, by the
method(s) indicated, a true and c01Tect copy of the foregoing upon:
James R. Donoval
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste. D
Caldwell, ID 83607

Plaintifj's Attorney
Court Clerk
c/o Judge Brody's Chambers

~ U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax Transmission: 649-1603
Email: jdonoval(alaol.com
~LS.Mail

Minidoka County Court
PO Box 368
Rupert, ID 83350
Maureen Newton, Court Reporter

___le' U.S. Mail

c/o Judge Brody's Chambers

Minidoka County Court
PO Box 368
Rupert, ID 833 50

8406_44 JAR 19 Request for Transcript and Documents. wpd
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NAYLOR&.. HALES, P.C.
ATTORNEYS

AT

LAW

Kirtlan G. Naylor
Roger J. Hales
Bruce J. Castleton
James R. Stoll
Eric F. Ne!son
David Sasser
Jacob H. Naylor
Tyler D. Willlams
Joan E. Callahan

KIRTLAN G. NAYLOR
Direct Line: 947-2070
E-mafl: kirt@naylorhales.com

Of Counsel

Robert G. Hamlin
James D. Carlson

December 10, 2013

Via U.S. Mail and Email: isutherland@co.minidoka.id.us

Janet Sunderland
715 G Street
PO Box 368
Rupert, ID 83350
Re:

Hammer v. City of Sun Vallev, et al.
Blaine County Case No: CV-2012-479

Dear Janet:
As a follow up to my email to you on December 10, 2013, enclosed are courtesy
copies of the following documents:

1.
2.

3.

Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Subpoena;
Affidavit ofKirtlan G. Naylor in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel;
and
Exhibits A-0 as referenced in the Affidavit.

Exhibits A and B are being provided to Judge Brody only as they contain attorneyclient communications. Thank you.
Sincprely,
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Tricia J. Wassmuth
Legal Assistant to Kirtlan G. Naylor
tjw

Enclosures
cc: Clients, w/Enclosures
M:\[CRMP\Hammcr v. Sun Valley\Leuers\8406 Lir Clerk 07_Sunderland.wpd
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

)
)
)

SHARON R. HAMMER,
Plaintiff/ Appellant,

Supreme Court No. 43079

)

)
)
)

vs.
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RISI; and
DeWAYNE BRISCOE,

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

)

Defendants/ Respondents,

_________________

)
)
)
)
)

I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that the following documents will
be submitted as exhibits to the Record:
Confidential Exhibits
1-

EXHIBIT F of EXHIBIT J to the Declaration of Kirtlan G. Naylor filed on November 18,
2014

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court
this
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EXHIBIT LIST-1
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2015.

Jolynn Drage, Clerk of the Court
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By
Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,

)
)

Plaintiff /Appellant,

Supreme Court No. 43079

)
)
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

)

vs.

)
CiTi OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBi; and
DeWAYNE BRISCOE,

)
)

Defendants/Respondents.

)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Blaine

)
) ss.
)

I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
Clerk's Record on Appeal was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, full and
correct Record of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of
the Idaho Appellate Rules as well as those requested by the Appellant.
I do further certify that all, if any, exhibits offered or admitted in the above-entitled
cause and exhibits requested by the Appellant will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme
Court along with the Clerk's Record on Appeal and the Court Reporter's Transcript on Appeal.
IN WITNESS.WHEREOF, ~ehereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said
Court at Hailey, Idaho, this 2- day of
~ , 2015.
Jolynn Drage, Clerk of the Court

By

~\o:v:=--

Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
)

SHARON R. HAMMER,

)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff /Appellant,
vs.

Supreme Court No. 43079

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

\

CiTY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBi; and
DeWAYNE BRISCOE,

)

)

)
)
)

Defendants/Respondents.

I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record to each
of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
Kl RTLAN NAYLOR
950 W. Bannock St., Ste 610
Boise, ID 83702

JAMES R. DONOVAL
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste D
Caldwell, ID 83607

Attorney for Defendants/Respondents

Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appellant

'

IN WITNESS WHEREO~hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal

of the said Court this

, 2-

-.o _

day of

, 2015.

JOLYNN DRAGE, Clerk of the Court

By

~'o-----\ .,.--

Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk~

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - 1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Plaintiff /Appellant,
vs.

)
)

Supreme Court No. 43079

)
)
)

AMENDED
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

)
)

CiTY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; and
DeWAYNE BRISCOE,

)
)

Defendants/Respondents.

)
)

I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that I have emailed,
one copy of the Reporter's Transcript to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as
follows:

KIRTLAN NAYLOR
950 W. Bannock St., Ste 610
Boise, ID 83702
kirt@naylorhales.com

JAMES R. DONOVAL
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste D
Caldwell, ID 83607
jdonoval@aol.com
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appellant

Attorney for Defendants/Respondents

IN WITNESS WHEREOF~ t o set my hand and affixed the seal
of the said Court this

/()

day of

, 2015.
JOLYNN DRAGE, Clerk of the Court

By

~~.--=-

Crystal Rigby, eputyC1ek

AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - 1

